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Introduction
“Latin America is at a crossroads”. Scholars have used this trite 
catchphrase several times in the past. And after all, with the 
epidemic of the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) morphing 
into a pandemic and going global, which countries and regions 
of the world cannot be said to be at a crossroads?
Yet, this is all the more true for today’s Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC) region. The region is experiencing new 
transformations in political, economic, and societal terms. In 
turn, all these rapid changes are having an impact on how LAC 
countries shape their own foreign policies, and on how they 
adapt to the challenges of an increasingly multipolar world.
First, Latin America is at a crossroads both politically and 
strategically. During the Cold War and beyond, LAC countries 
had two choices: either be loyal followers of the United States, 
or side with the socialist bloc headed by the Soviet Union. Of 
course, this was not always a clear choice. However, it could 
often determine the fate of governments, through coups, 
guerrillas, foreign interference, or mass protests. Today, the old 
world is gone and a new one has risen from its ashes. After 
the short hiatus of the 1990s and early 2000s, when Latin 
American countries were left with the US as their main partner 
(or opponent), and the EU was much further away, LAC 
countries today face a renewed “bipolar” competition between 
the US and China, with the EU at the margins. Beijing’s rising 
heft has been the subject of hundreds of articles. Most agree 
that China’s influence has shifted over time from pre-eminently 
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economic to more political, on par with Beijing’s newfound 
assertiveness on the world stage. At the same time, China’s tools 
for political influence have remained in large part economic 
and financial (such as debt financing), and this allows for sharp 
comparisons with another pre-eminently economic actor in 
terms of influence: the EU and its member states. As this Report 
will show, Brussels has not managed to properly leverage its 
economic heft in the region.
Second, Latin American countries are (or, better, continue 
to be) at a crossroads in terms of political institutions, as they 
grapple with the benefits and costs of democracy, and are 
constantly tempted by autocratic setbacks or, to the very least, 
democratic retrenchment. The past few years have shown how 
hard it can be to preserve democracy in one of the regions 
that has been most prone to regime change since the Second 
World War, apart from Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2019, as unrest 
in Venezuela continued, protests against austerity and political 
corruption swept through South America, involving Argentina, 
Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and Colombia. The violent 
ousting of Bolivia’s then-President Evo Morales in November, 
following elections that according to the Organization of 
American States were “clearly manipulated”, shows how hard 
it can be to preserve and bolster democratic institutions in the 
region.
Third, Latin America is at a crossroads economically. Much 
has changed since the end of the Cold War, but some things have 
remained the same. The LAC region today counts a number 
of countries whose rising economic status has been formally 
acknowledged. Three of them, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 
are members of the G20, with Chile also a permanent guest of 
the summit. Brazil itself is the world’s ninth biggest economy, 
vying with Italy for eighth place. Moreover, despite persistent 
inequalities in income and wealth, many citizens are now much 
richer than they were in the recent past. Three decades after the 
end of the Cold War, Mexicans are now on average 34% richer 
in real terms, Brazilians 38%, and Argentines 61%. Such rapid 
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improvements have taken place despite recurrent economic 
crises. After its 2001 default, Argentina remains constantly on 
the brink. Brazil experienced a prolonged recession between 
2014 and 2016, followed by stagnation. Finally, Mexico’s 
growth is pretty steady, but Trump’s blunt tactics in trade 
renegotiations and the current oil price crash pose a challenge 
to a country marred by violence and disappointing structural 
reforms.
In the face of all these changes,  this Report asks two related 
questions. First, how are the United States, the EU, and China 
adapting their foreign policies to the old and new realities of the 
LAC region? Second, how are some of the main countries in the 
region (namely Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela) responding, or 
contributing to determine such a constantly shifting scenario?
There is no doubt that Trump’s election came with the 
expectation of a different US approach to the Latin American 
region. This is why in the first chapter Loris Zanatta asks: what 
has really changed over the past four years? How did Trump’s 
arrival affect the US stance towards Latin America? Or, to 
put it more bluntly: does the Trump administration actually 
have a specific foreign policy towards Latin America? During 
the election campaign, Trump railed against Latino migrants, 
pledged to build a wall along the border, and envisaged trade 
renegotiations with many countries. Four years on, it seems 
that the impression that the US President only has a short-
term strategy vis-à-vis Latin America is well founded. This 
short-termism has had a profound impact on how each Latin 
American country has tried to cope with a neighbouring 
superpower that has become less and less predictable.
While the US appear to have decided to devoid only a limited 
amount of time towards the region, Europe appears to be 
playing the long game. As Gian Luca Gardini argues, at the start 
of 2019 EU-Latin America relations appeared to have reached a 
stalemate. But, by the end of the year, prospects for a re-launch 
were surprisingly – and paradoxically – more promising. Brexit, 
the large influx of Venezuelan asylum seekers reaching Europe, 
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the wave of protests that shook the entire region, and the need 
to counterbalance Trump’s rhetoric have spurred a number of 
new initiatives. The new European Commission has signalled 
a renewed willingness to engage with LAC countries, especially 
on trade and public diplomacy, while Germany has even 
announced a new policy towards the region as a whole. Barring 
the unexpected (and still uncertain, but surely profound) impact 
of the ongoing global pandemic, EU-Latin America relations 
appear set for a further deepening – albeit always in the shadow 
of the two “giants”, the US and China.
Turning to Beijing, Mario Esteban and Ugo Armanini 
show how China-Latin America trade and investment ties 
have skyrocketed since the early 2000s. China-LAC relations 
have been mainly economic, as the 2015-2019 China-LAC 
Cooperation Plan has targeted US$500 billion in bilateral 
trade and US$250 billion in bilateral foreign direct investment 
by 2025. But the cooperation has grown more political over 
time, as evidenced by the 10 strategic partnerships that China 
has signed with LAC countries (including Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina and Chile), and more recently by the enlargement 
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Ultimately, China’s 
relations with several Latin American countries appear to 
have entered a new stage, as Beijing’s engagement has become 
multidimensional (economic, political, institutional, and even 
military), with global and regional implications, opportunities 
and risks. It remains to be seen whether long-terms concerns 
about increasing dependence on China’s credit lines, as well as 
Beijing’s reassessment of the sustainability of its own outreach, 
will lead to a strengthening or loosening of China-LAC ties in 
the near future.
Turning to regional players, Brazil is certainly going through 
a period of political and economic transformation. The election 
of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 is still having ripple effects on the 
country, Guilherme Casarões argues, as the former army 
captain and lawmaker never hid a nostalgic admiration for the 
region’s past military dictatorships, summarised in the slogan: 
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“Brazil above everything, God above everyone”. However, time 
has shown that Bolsonaro’s image is not quite that of the leader 
of a junta: according to Casarões, he is more of a traditional 
conservative, engaged in a crusade to bring God, the nation, 
and the (traditional) family back into the political mainstream. 
Bolsonaro’s foreign policy envisions a world of strong and 
sovereign nations as opposed to one marked by multiculturalism 
and open borders. This puts Brazil starkly apart from many 
other Latin American countries and should make it a natural 
ally of the United States under Trump. Moreover, Bolsonaro’s 
election has put Brazil’s stance towards China on more 
unbalanced terms, as many of the president’s advisers warned of 
China’s threat to “buy Brazil”, even as the country has benefited 
from billions of dollars in trade and investment beforehand. 
However, Bolsonaro has been forced to revise his foreign policy 
stance due to Trump’s trade war, which threatened competitors 
and allies alike, and pushed the Brazilian president to rapidly 
rebuild ties with Beijing.
In the next chapter, Antonella Mori explains that Venezuela 
is going through a deep economic, political, and humanitarian 
crisis. At the domestic level, the political-institutional clash has 
intensified, and so has the confrontation between supporters and 
opponents of Nicolás Maduro and his rival Juan Guaidó, which 
have pushed millions of Venezuelans to leave their country. The 
internal political clash between supporters of Mr. Maduro and 
Mr. Guaidó is mirrored at the international level by two opposing 
sides: the United States, Canada, and the EU are backing Mr. 
Guaidó and calling for new elections, while Russia, China, and 
Cuba stand behind Mr. Maduro, criticising external interference 
in Venezuela’s affairs. This ideological and geopolitical opposition 
stands as a stark example of what could happen in the future, 
should Latin America become one of the major playgrounds in 
the US-China (and US-Russia) confrontation.
Finally, Rafael Velázquez Flores argues that Mexico’s 
foreign policy has often been neglected by scholars, due to its 
continuity under the dominant party system that characterised 
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the country between 1930 and 2000. However, in 2018, the 
election of president Obrador put Mexico under the spotlight. 
The president’s foreign policy has been marked by a mixture 
of continuity and change, adopting a pragmatic and prudent 
approach. In spite of this, the country’s foreign policy stance 
has been thrown into disarray by the unpredictable pattern of 
conflict and cooperation with Trump’s United States. President 
Trump has forced Mexico into revising its attitude towards the 
neighbouring superpower, and to negotiate both on trade and 
on migration from a weaker position. In the end, Obrador was 
successful in avoiding a breakdown in trade talks, and did not 
bow to Trump’s pressure to pay for part of the wall that is being 
built at the US-Mexico border. Cooperation prevailed, but 
Obrador remains under pressure, especially with regards to high 
and rising flows of irregular migrants from Central America.
Latin America remains in a state of flux. This is due to a balanced 
mix of foreign pressures towards the region (especially from the 
two big powers, the US and China) and domestic developments. 
In this scenario, room for the EU appears somewhat limited, 
due in part to its developmentalist approach that doesn’t allow it 
to effectively tackle more pressing but also more sensitive issues 
such as security, democracy, and human rights.
Latin America is indeed at a crossroads. Forced to choose 
between the US and China, many countries in the region will 
continue to attempt to juggle between the two partners, rather 
than taking a specific side. Judging by the past, this course of 
action might yet prove to be the most sustainable. And in the 
current multifaceted, unpredictable world, this could be the 
best outcome that a country might wish to achieve.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director
1.  America First: 
     The Death of Pan-Americanism 
Loris Zanatta
Does the Trump administration have a policy towards Latin 
America? Many were asking that question when Trump was 
elected back in 2016, and everyone is still asking that now, as 
his presidency draws to a close. During the election campaign 
he railed against Latino migrants, pledged to build a wall along 
the border, declared war on the free trade agreements with 
the countries in the region, called for war on terrorism and 
drug trafficking, threatening anyone unwilling to cooperate, 
and visited Miami to launch his ritual attacks against Cuba, 
Venezuela and the ALBA allies. No one was clear as to what 
overarching vision or perspective held those issues together – 
except for one aspect: in one way or another, they all satisfied or 
reassured a segment of the electorate whose vote he was seeking. 
All in all, rather than a strategy, Trump’s policy towards 
the region seemed to be an offshoot of his domestic policy 
and founded on short-, indeed very short-term, interests and 
objectives. Democracy, development, economic freedom, 
human rights and multilateralism – the ideals of two hundred 
years of Pan-Americanism and the pillars of the liberal order 
built from the ashes of the twentieth-century wars – were 
conspicuous by their absence. Like obsolete tools, they lay 
forgotten in the junk room for old and useless things. In 
a nutshell, everything suggested that Trump cared little or 
nothing for relations with Latin America. But then, his mantra 
was “America First”. And America was him.
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Four years on, it seems that those first impressions were well-
founded, in other words the Trump administration does not 
have a Latin America policy nor is it particularly bothered to 
have one. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, feeling he had a 
duty to define it, stated that in Latin America the White House 
acts with “realism, restraint and respect”. But the remedy was 
worse than the disease since these principles are so vague, and 
so fit for all places and all eras, that they cover everything and 
the opposite of everything – a clear case of all talk and no 
substance. With the 2020 presidential elections now looming, 
to Trump, Latin America is still exactly what it was four years 
ago: a topic to bring up at his convenience if and when it serves 
the purpose of securing a second term in office – nothing more.
Big Stick
While Trump had no real policy, he at least had some objectives 
in Latin America. Needless to say, those objectives were useful 
to boost his popularity at home as well as “American primacy” 
more generally, and to protect “the American people” from the 
damage caused to their economic conditions by globalisation 
and to their “identity” by immigration. The first objective – 
stopping illegal immigration – was and is still so obsessive and 
recurrent as to obscure all the others. And since migrants have 
to cross the long, porous and dangerous border with Mexico to 
get into the United States, part of that objective is to induce the 
neighbouring state to do its bit to stop the flow. 
This is a longstanding and complex issue, and it takes 
some daring to pass sententious remarks about it and propose 
simple solutions to it. Yet this is precisely what Donald Trump 
attempted to do: the bull charged straight into the China shop, 
oblivious to any collateral damage as long as he could score 
immediate successes. He brandished the stick and waved the 
carrot. He imposed the law of might is right. Why should 
that be surprising? In a world where there is so much ranting 
against international “bureaucracies” and the ineffectiveness of 
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multilateralism, and where “sovereignty” is a fashionable fetish, 
this is the predictable result: the most powerful lays down the 
law. We thus saw Trump threatening Mexico with punishing 
tariffs on its exports to the US and raising the prospect of 
getting rid of the North American free trade area. 
How did it turn out? For Trump, quite well on the whole. He 
“granted” Mexico membership of a new free trade agreement, 
a deal of vital importance to his neighbour. It is somewhat 
worse than the old NAFTA, but not critically so. In exchange, 
Trump obtained President López Obrador’s pledge to act as his 
guard not just on the border between their two countries but 
also, and more importantly, on the one between Mexico and 
Guatemala, the crossing point for migrant caravans from Central 
America heading north. This deals a serious blow to the Mexican 
president’s “progressive reformist” image. But it was a price he 
had to pay. 
Is it a solution? Is it the panacea for such a large-scale problem? 
This problem, we ought to remember, is intertwined with a series 
of other major challenges, including violence in the countries 
along the isthmus, human and drug trafficking and the hopes 
of many young people for a better future. Obviously the answer 
to these questions is no. In order to sweeten the pill, the Trump 
administration launched a “plan” for Central America – it is not 
the first and it won’t be the last. Will it work? Partly it will and 
partly it won’t, like the others. 
It might be argued that this is not a farsighted policy 
and that its horizon does not stretch beyond the November 
2020 presidential elections. This is true. But there is nothing 
particularly new about that. Like other American presidents 
before him, Trump is sceptical about the capacity of the 
countries in the region for self-governance and their ability 
to create stable democracies and generate prosperity. It is not 
his business, he thinks: let them sort it out by themselves, as 
long as they do not offload their problems on the United States 
through migration. If they do that, the stick will come down. 
America First. 
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À la Carte Democracy
While Trump has inherited unilateralism and pessimism about 
the democratic virtues of Latin American countries from the 
Republican tradition, he has absorbed from the neoconservative 
tradition the evangelical mission and pedagogical drive to teach 
them to “elect the right man” – at least in words. Trump voices 
the coarsest, most erratic, bombastic and sterile version of this 
mix, as well as its least credible expression. 
His objective, he claims, was and remains the spread of 
freedom and democracy across the Western hemisphere. It 
is hard to disagree with that, in view of the appeals for help 
coming from inside Venezuela and Nicaragua, and the cry 
of distress among the diaspora elicited by those countries’ 
incompetent as well as criminal regimes. And what about 
Cuba? Has anything changed as a result of Obama’s open hand 
policy towards Havana? Repression is just as widespread as it 
was before, economic freedom remains narrow in scope and at 
the regime’s discretion, and the rule of law is still a pipedream. 
Meanwhile, Cubans are fleeing and dying as they do so, amid 
the world’s indifference, while the regime’s agents act as the self-
appointed praetorian guard of their “Bolivarian” allies. 
Whether driven by the Founding Fathers’ libertarian ideals 
or by the alluring prospect of winning the Latino vote in 
Miami, Trump promptly went on the offensive, riding the 
momentum of the war on populist dictatorships. That is all well 
and good. But how? And with what effects? With what kind 
of credibility? The “how” is easy to see: carrot and stick, once 
again – not a particularly sophisticated strategy but usually 
effective, nonetheless. The stick takes the form of “sanctions”. 
These are next generation sanctions, dubbed “smart” sanctions, 
which are much more targeted than they used to be in that they 
specifically hit the accounts and interests of corrupt officials 
while attempting to limit the negative effects on the population. 
All this, compounded by fiery words and resounding threats: 
all options are open, including military intervention, ran the 
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warning delivered to Nicolás Maduro. And what about the 
carrot? It is also there, although unseen. It is imperative to 
persuade the mice to leave the sinking ship and to urge collusive 
military personnel to turn their backs on the regime, perhaps in 
return for leniency or impunity.
What are the “effects” produced by this strategy? None, to 
date. The vast protests in Venezuela and Nicaragua have been 
suppressed with deadly violence, Maduro and Ortega are still in 
power, and support for Juan Guaidó has not led to the widely 
expected military uprising. As could easily be foreseen, Trump’s 
belligerent rhetoric has remained just that. The barking dog did 
not bite: there are no plans for US military intervention, nor 
is it in anyone’s interest that there should be one. Meanwhile, 
however, Trump’s empty warmongering has had the adverse 
effect of fuelling the “anti-imperialist” narrative of Bolivarian 
dictatorships, which portray themselves as the victims of US 
imperialism, handing them on a silver platter exactly what they 
feed off. It has also weakened the cause of the group of Latin 
American countries that had led the encirclement Caracas. A 
masterstroke of incompetence. Driven by what? By his eagerness 
to please his base and to spearhead a crusade which should be 
seen to be led by Latin America’s democracies – never by the 
United States. America First, just for a change.
Let us be clear, there would be no sense in blaming Trump 
for the authoritarian drive of Latin America’s Bolivarian 
regimes. It is also too soon to assess whether and to what degree 
it has been weakened by his pressures. This drive is their own 
peculiar feature, the result of their history and an offshoot of 
their particular systems – indeed, at this point, everyone ought 
to honestly accept the evidence that Latin America’s populist 
movements are left unscathed by aggressive and conciliatory 
policies alike. Castroism, Chavism, Peronism and the like are 
not authoritarian because US aggressiveness has made them so. 
They are an expression of an ancestral hatred of liberalism and 
capitalism, rooted in the region’s Hispanic and Catholic past, 
and they usually enjoy vast popularity. They have an enemy and 
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they want an enemy, and that enemy cannot but be the United 
States, which has historically been the standard-bearer of 
liberalism and capitalism. In this respect, the effects of Trump’s 
war of words against Maduro and of Obama’s “do nothing 
policy” towards Castro are just the same: none. Neither will an 
aggressive policy encourage them to become moderate, nor will 
a conciliatory policy prompt them to liberalise. “Transition?” 
Fidel Castro would ask indignantly. Towards what, when we 
have built “Paradise”?
So, is everything the United States does against authoritarian 
populism in Latin America pointless and immaterial? Is Trump 
reaping the handful of dust from Venezuela that so many of his 
predecessors reaped from Cuba, whether they extended a hand 
of friendship or shook their fist? Partly. Nevertheless, if Trump’s 
policy was less small-minded than his America First strategy, 
and if he retained something of the old Pan-American ideals, 
he might accomplish more and achieve better results. How so? 
For the cause of liberal democracy to thrive in the region 
it has to be propelled by Latin American drivers. For Latin 
American democracies to prevail over populist movements they 
need to enjoy prestige, join forces and act independently of the 
United States – in other words, they need to be the vehicles of a 
genuine Pan-Latin American democratic mission. What could 
Trump do to benefit this cause? Firstly, he should not seek to 
lead crusades and should play a secondary role. Secondly, he 
should act cooperatively and multilaterally, and encourage the 
establishment of a large-scale democratic coalition in Latin 
America. Thirdly, he should project an image of the United 
States as a democratic and liberal power, with confidence in 
democracy and freedom. Trump is the very embodiment of the 
rejection of all three of these conditions. Whether he likes it or 
not, this makes him the best ally of Bolivarian populists and the 
worst partner for democratic governments.
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God Protect Me from My Friends
The final, broad and necessary objective that the Trump 
administration set out to achieve in Latin America back in 2016 
was to foster development and create prosperity. How? Through 
free trade and the market, legal security and free enterprise, the 
fight against corruption and the war on drug trafficking. Words 
of wisdom. Empty words. Four years on, the situation is bleak: 
the region’s economic growth is sluggish, private investments 
are low, free trade is faltering, corruption has a corrosive effect 
on governments, and criminal gangs control vast areas and 
powerful financial networks. 
Once again, blaming this on Trump would be puerile. The 
“imperialists” who believe in the omnipotence of the United 
States and in its boundless capacity to push Latin America 
along the road of progress are in this respect the mirror image 
of Latin American “anti-imperialists”, who are convinced that 
all their ills – from poverty to violence and from corruption to 
inequality – is caused by Yankee “exploitation” and “selfishness”. 
Both are pointing the finger at the other, but both of them 
are off the mark. Two centuries of Latin American history and 
one century of US plans to “develop” and “democratise” Latin 
America should have taught both sides that Latin America is the 
master of its own destiny – for better or, alas, usually for worse 
– and that each time Washington has ventured to take the lead, 
the US has ended up “in tow”, dragged into spectacular failures 
and appalling quagmires.
For all that, however, it is patently obvious that Trump has 
made his own contribution to hindering its progress. Unable to 
harm his enemies politically, he has proved far more skilful in 
putting a spanner in the works for his friends economically. In 
the name of America First, naturally. When he came into office, 
the countries in the region, or at least a significant number of 
them, were going through a “cultural revolution”. Free trade, 
the old bugbear of the robust nationalist and protectionist Latin 
American tradition, had made a breakthrough. The process 
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started with Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico – the members 
of the Pacific Alliance –, which opened up most to the world 
and had benefited from this. Then, from 2015, it continued 
with Argentina, where Mauricio Macri was attempting to break 
the rigid economic autarchy imposed by the Peronists. Finally it 
was the turn of Brazil, the old protectionist elephant, which the 
government Minister Paulo Guedes sought to make slightly more 
open to the winds of free trade and competition from 2018.
Since free trade is a key feature of US exceptionalism, one might 
well have expected Washington’s approval and cooperation in 
this respect. From Bill Clinton on, all US presidents negotiated 
trade deals with various countries in the region. During the 
golden age of the Washington Consensus, they had even 
dreamed of ALCA, a vast trade area stretching “from Alaska to 
Tierra del Fuego”. But just as ALCA was scuttled by ALBA and 
the nationalist reaction led by Hugo Chávez, Latin America’s 
openness to trade is now being dealt blow after blow by Donald 
Trump. This is further confirmation, if any were needed, that 
he has much more affinity with the anti-liberalist ideas of his 
supposed “enemies” than with the timid liberalism of his ill-
used “friends”. 
He spared them nothing. To the rare Latin American admirers 
of the open society and free economy, it was like hearing the 
pope cursing, or the Church defending heresy. They expected 
the US to be their natural ally and staunch supporter but instead 
they found the most obstinate adversary. To make his position 
clear, Trump immediately struck his first blow by withdrawing 
from the Trans Pacific Partnership. Then he dealt his second 
blow by demanding the renegotiation of NAFTA. Since then, 
his tune has never changed. Among other things, he announced 
on Twitter that he would impose tariffs on Argentinian and 
Brazilian aluminium and attacked Colombian President Iván 
Duque, his closest and most faithful ally in the region. There 
are neither friends nor enemies in the world of America First: 
there are only the “people”, Trump’s people, and the race for the 
White House.  
Latin America and the New Global Order20
The Cost of Hegemony
We might ask whether the fact that the Trump administration 
has no policy towards Latin American is a good or a bad thing. It 
might actually be better to have no policy rather than a wrong or 
a very bad policy. Playing things by ear may expose policymakers 
to terrible mistakes and catastrophic outcomes but it can also 
open the way to healthy adjustments and to greater flexibility 
than a rigid ideological approach would allow. Also, this is not 
the first time that Latin America ends up at the bottom of the 
list of US geopolitical interests. Between the end of World War 
Two and the Cuban revolution, the region was the Cinderella 
of US global policy. From 2001 to this day, the tune has always 
been the same: Washington neglects the Western hemisphere, 
is the persistent grumble one hears across the region. Funny: 
after spending their lives denouncing US “interference”, how 
can they now complain about US “indifference”? 
Yet to Latin America – or to that large portion of it which, 
after so much suffering and struggling, and opposing and 
ranting against the liberal order, has finally adapted and 
integrated – this is a trauma. Latin America’s diplomatic services 
are at their wits’ end, they are bewildered and disoriented. And 
the friendlier they are towards the United States, the greater 
their disappointment. There is a crank behind the wheel in 
Washington, the bitterest among them are whispering. Trump’s 
popularity figures speak for themselves: his approval rating in 
Latin America is just 16 percent. Considering that in some 
countries where people still believe that the US will rush to 
their aid, such as Venezuela, over 30 percent of people approve 
of him, we can easily infer that elsewhere his popularity comes 
close to zero. America Last.
It is not that he has no fans, let us be clear about that. He 
certainly has! A few but passionate small or big aspiring Trumps 
are springing up throughout the region. Like him, they are keen 
to impose – to the sound of prayers and jeers – the age-old 
virtues of “the people”, the enduring interests of “the nation” 
America First: The Death of Pan-Americanism 21
and the eternal moral principles of “God”. Bolsonaro is the 
best-known and most glaring example of this, though not the 
only one. The worst thing, or the misconstruction, is that they 
call themselves “liberals”. But while the “enemies” have the 
enemy they want, i.e. him, the “friends” do not have the friend 
they want, i.e. the Unites States. Hence, the most affected by 
this, rather than Trump, is the liberal civilisation that the US 
has hitherto embodied, and the ideals of democracy, progress 
and freedom of the best Pan-American tradition – in short, the 
ideals of the Wilsonian tradition that the likes of Roosevelt, 
Kennedy, Carter and Clinton tried to spread across the Western 
hemisphere, frequently clashing head-on with the stiff resistance 
of Pan-Latin American nationalism. How do we explain the 
fact that the United States is repudiating these ideals just when 
they have taken root in Latin America more than they have 
ever done in the past? How are we to interpret the fact that 
the US has given up the quest for liberal hegemony just when 
liberalism in the Western hemisphere needs it most?
The fact is that hegemony is costly. It entails being prepared 
to make small, immediate concessions in return for major 
systemic benefits; accepting a compromise solution in order 
to gain an ally; and investing in resources in order to avert a 
threat. The hegemon is willing to make sacrifices for its ideals, 
and to fight for its friends and against its enemies. Having 
emerged triumphant from World War Two, empowered by the 
democratic ideology it sought to spread across the world like 
a new religion, and with a manufacturing system with endless 
production and innovation potential, the United States believed 
it was its duty and its mission to shoulder the political as well 
as the economic cost of hegemony, with both its privileges 
and its burdens. This is ultimately what the liberal order was 
founded on, a liberal order in which in one way or another we 
are still living. That choice went somewhat against the grain, 
given America’s history of unilateralism and isolationism. But 
it reflected the spirit of the age, the sterner stuff its ruling class 
was made of. 
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Since then, a lot of water has gone under the bridge. The 
global balance of power has shifted and the players have 
multiplied. The cost of hegemony has grown and its popularity 
has waned, in the United States as across the world. Some US 
presidents tried to share the hegemony, expand the foundations 
of the liberal order and take in new-comers, educating them to 
espouse its rules and embrace its spirit – sometimes successfully, 
other times less so. But not Trump. Trump is the first US 
President to give the thumbs down to and turn his back on the 
order his country founded. He believes that the order whose 
cost was once worth sustaining has turned against the interests 
of the “American people”. They, in his view, are the real victims 
of “liberal globalisation” and of the predatory rise of emerging 
powers that are undermining their identity and prosperity. And 
no one can do more to destroy that order, by repudiating its 
ideological and institutional underpinnings, than the country 
that founded it. Is this what is happening?
Fatherless but Free?
As the saying goes, not all evil comes to harm. Who knows 
whether this might apply to Trump? Who can tell whether, 
as sometimes happens in history, his coming to power might 
actually trigger a “virtuous genetic mutation” of the original 
goals; whether, as a reaction, it might actually facilitate Latin 
American integration; and whether it might open up spaces for 
a powerful return of Europe in Latina America and of Latin 
America in Europe? Who can say? To be optimistic, one might 
think along those lines. 
Is it not the case that what restrained Latin America’s 
confidence in the liberal order was its status as a Pax Americana? 
Is it not the case that Latin American countries have often 
been divided according to whether they were for or against US 
leadership? And is it not the case that the accusation of being 
the “watchdogs” of the US empire and Washington’s “useful 
idiots” has always been a huge weight hanging over the few, 
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timid liberal countries of Latin America? Why, then, should 
we not think that being “fatherless”, in the sense of not being 
under US hegemony, might be an opportunity rather than a 
setback? Could the loss of its “father” be a chance for Latin 
American liberalism to come of age and build the model and 
choose the allies best suited to it? 
Seen in this light, the Trump presidency could be a kind of 
providential “liberation” for Latin America. It could provide 
the ideal springboard for forging a new and more influential 
role for itself in the multipolar world that is emerging, as the 
United States runs out of steam or stops assuming the burden 
of leadership. There are some signs of this already. One of 
them is the swift signing of the free trade agreement between 
MERCOSUR and the European Union, after years of slow 
and sterile negotiations. The geopolitical significance of this 
treaty has escaped no one: while Trump, appealing to America 
First, is laying the North Atlantic axis to waste, what is to stop 
the centuries-old axis across the South Atlantic from growing 
stronger? The free trade treaty is actually just the tip of the 
iceberg, only the most glamorous event in a thick agenda of 
exchanges and meetings between Europe and Latin America, 
which had not sought one another or shown this level of interest 
in dealing with each other since time immemorial. 
The enthusiasm and optimism sometimes goes even further. 
The new window of opportunity in Latin America opened by 
Trump’s nationalism applies not only to Europe, an opportunity 
that would benefit the liberal order as well as integration in 
Latin America. The involvement of China, which has long been 
sweeping across the region, would also produce this virtuous 
effect. Is it not the case that while China is not a liberal power, it 
has no intention of undermining the pillars of the international 
order and has always been careful not to cross the red line that 
would set Washington on high alert? Is it not an advantage for 
Latin America, for the first time in history, to be able to rely 
on a great power from outside the Western hemisphere that 
has the capacity to counterbalance US hegemony? Does it not 
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give Latin America greater room for manoeuvre? Does it not 
multiply its opportunities?
Perhaps. But looming behind each of these reasons for 
optimism is a shadow that casts doubt on it, a caveat that turns it 
into an empty hope. Take the case of Europe. Can the European 
Union truly stand as a bastion of the liberal order that Trump 
is abandoning to its fate? Does it really have the strength, the 
strategic vision, the political will and the unity required to fill 
the gap left by America’s “retreat”? It would be great, for anyone 
who believes it, but the hope is unfounded. That is partly 
because Latin America remains a remote and exotic horizon for 
most European countries – the bulk of Europe, the one with a 
German tradition, has very different international priorities that 
it regards with greater interest or concern than Latin America. 
And part of the reason is that the Old Continent, no less than 
the United States, is going through a serious crisis of rejection 
of the liberal order, both domestically and internationally. The 
idea that Europe can pick up the baton dropped by the United 
States in Latin America is merely a pipedream, as yet. The test-
bed will be the course of the free trade treaty as it makes its 
way through the EU member states’ national parliaments for 
ratification. More than a triumphant march, it promises to be a 
path of trials and tribulations, judging from the first rejections 
that have already come in.  
One might argue that China faces none of the issues that 
are weighing Europe down in Latin America. True. Who can 
deny that China is currently at the centre of the Western 
hemisphere’s political and economic life? Who can doubt that 
it will be increasingly so, and that it is China’s natural destiny 
to fill the spaces left unattended by Trump? That is all well and 
good: it is a tangible reality, and these are sensible prophecies. 
But the question is whether China’s influence will foster 
Latin America’s development, whether it will benefit regional 
integration, whether it will strengthen or erode the liberal order 
in the region and whether or not democracy will benefit from 
it. I am not so sure that it will.
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Latin China
When Trump indulges in navel-gazing and plays things by ear, 
when he bangs his fist on the table and changes course from 
one day to the next, the Chinese have a feast. Unlike the United 
States, China seems to be prepared to pay the cost of hegemony 
– hence its influence in Latin America keeps growing. So, 
Pompeo complains about it? So, he rants against the “yellow 
tide” and pressures his allies to resist it? So, a new anti-Chinese 
“consensus” is developing in Washington? They only have 
themselves to blame, people say south of the Rio Grande. 
That is also what the Democratic candidates in the race for the 
White House think: our retreat from Latin America, they argue 
in unison, our failure to defend “American values”, have paved 
the way for China’s advance in the Western hemisphere. 
What is China doing that the US is not doing but which 
Latin American countries would like it to do? To begin with, 
it invests and lends money. From 2000 to 2017, Chinese 
companies invested some US$109 billion in Latin America, 
and Chinese banks lent the region a further US$147 billion. 
In no time at all, Beijing has become the region’s second largest 
trading partner, and the largest trading partner for many key 
states. This is obviously a not gravy train. Unlike Western 
capital, Chinese capital is not tied to minimum requirements 
in terms of environmental or labour standards. It is backed by 
the state, and the Chinese state, driven primarily by a political 
strategy, is not as concerned as the private investor about the 
solvency of the country it invests in. Those who celebrate the 
inflow of so much new capital at the beginning often end up 
complaining that they are hamstrung by debt and have lost 
their sovereignty later. One just has to look at Venezuela, whose 
huge debt to China has forced it to sell off to it significant 
portions of its resources, and ultimately its future. Many 
have just one word to describe this: Neocolonialism. But the 
substance remains the same: greedy for investments and hungry 
for capital, Latin American countries are queuing up in front of 
Latin America and the New Global Order26
Chinese embassies, which in turn splash money around, invite 
and court their hosts, donate public works and pay bribes. In a 
region where the end of the boom in the price of raw materials 
has left many victims on the ground, this is manna from heaven. 
No one can resist the Chinese lure, not even Bolsonaro, who 
lashed out against China during his election campaign. But it 
didn’t take him long to change his mind and grab a piece of the 
Chinese cake.
But besides money, infrastructure and raw materials, there 
is also something else that China has set its mind on. Chinese 
influence is not made of business alone. It has been even less so 
since Xi Jinping launched his “new long-term strategy”, which 
is more assertive and more ambitious than the previous one. No 
one believes in the myth of a non-political and non-ideological 
China anymore. Like all powers, China too has its legitimate 
political preferences and objectives. What are they exactly? We 
merely have to observe its actions in the region. It courts everyone 
but has a weak spot for illiberal regimes and Bolivarian populist 
leaders – because they resemble China, they fight the “Yankees” 
and they, more than anyone else, welcome China with open 
arms. The fact is that Venezuela and Cuba are its favourite clients 
and love draws them together over and beyond filthy lucre. 
All this is enough for the United States to conclude that 
a serious challenge to its hegemony in the hemisphere is 
underway, and for Washington to toughen its stance towards 
Beijing. In the short-term, it is neither obvious nor likely that 
this will lead to any major tensions, since the State Department 
is more eager to condemn Chinese “expansionism” than the 
White House is to check it through stronger engagement in 
the region. That is because China treads carefully and avoids 
stepping on too many toes; it talks a great deal about economics 
but is far more prudent when it comes to political and military 
matters. But there is another, more solid reason, encapsulated 
by the remark of one Latin American leader who said “Please 
don’t ask us to choose between the United States and China, 
you wouldn’t like our answer”.
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And herein lies the real point: it lies in what Latin American 
countries, their governments and their public opinions believe, 
expect, desire and fear. Whatever Trump does or does not do, 
whatever Europe may or may not do, and whatever China 
will surely do, everything will be filtered through local history, 
through the dynamics of Latin America and the logic – often 
unfamiliar to external players – that drives them. This is what 
we need to focus on to assess the regional effects of these global 
transformations, to envision what may be the fate of the liberal 
order in Latin America and to consider what the prospects for 
Latin American democracy and integration might be. 
Divided at Birth
What do Latin American countries want? What do they expect 
from the global system as a “Latin American community”? At 
first glance, they all seem to seek the same thing, namely the 
Patria Grande, or Great Fatherland, Latin American unity; they 
all seem to share the goal of having prosperous economies and 
solid democracies. But not only is this easier said than done; 
not only are there historical tensions and competitions and a 
diversity of interests cutting through the region. The challenge is 
far greater than that: there has never been a consensus – there is 
not one now and there are no signs that there will be one in the 
future – on what the Great Fatherland that they all call for should 
be or what form it should take, and even less on how to achieve 
development or on the meaning of democracy. 
On the one hand, put simply, there is the liberal tradition. 
The Great Fatherland envisaged by this tradition is founded 
on the principles of the liberal order: multilateralism, 
representative democracy and free trade. Should it be achieved, 
this integration process would involve adherence to common 
rules and institutions while respecting the political and 
ideological pluralism of the member states, provided they fulfil 
the requirements of democracy. It would not matter very much 
whether the individual states were run by socialist, conservative, 
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liberal or Catholic governments, since the liberal project is 
underpinned by institutions, not ideology. As such, it is not 
necessarily incompatible with US Pan-Americanism, nor does 
it imply a biased hostility towards Washington. This kind of 
united Latin America would be stronger vis-à-vis the United 
States but would not be its enemy. 
On the other hand, there is its great, eternal enemy: Pan-
Latin Americanism, a nationalist and populist tradition 
hostile to Pan-Americanism and its values. Its idea of the 
Great Fatherland is the antithesis of the liberal one. The major 
Latin American populist movements have all cherished this 
ideal and passed the mission to build it down the generations; 
and all their descendants are still calling for it. Rather than 
an integration project, theirs is an idea of fusion, and while 
integration takes place between different players and is 
underpinned by institutions, fusion takes place between like 
players held together by a shared ideology. Hence the necessary 
condition for such a fusion is the emergence of “national and 
popular” governments – “revolution” in every single country, 
whether in the ballot box or the streets and squares. Its premise 
is unanimity rather than pluralism. 
The Pan-Latin American myth is grounded in a visceral and 
absolute anti-Americanism, no matter who is in the White 
House and regardless of Washington’s aims and proposals. 
Latin American populists are locked in a struggle against the 
United States not for what America is, i.e. the hegemon, but 
what it stands for, i.e. liberal civilisation. What unites us, Pan-
Latin American populists used to say and still say today, are 
“language, culture and religion” – in a nutshell, their Hispanic 
past. And just as the historical enemy of Hispanic Christianity 
was “Anglo-Saxon Protestantism”, which eroded and subdued 
it, the heirs of this Protestant tradition are their present-day 
enemies: liberalism and capitalism. It is not surprising that 
the principles of liberal democracy are foreign to their idea of 
“democracy”, or that they are ill-disposed towards multi-party 
systems, the separation of powers and individual rights. It is 
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even less surprising that they despise and fight the ethics of 
capitalism, pointing their finger at its inherent “sins”, which 
the Hispanics have always ascribed to the “Anglo-Saxons” and 
see themselves as being immune from: selfishness, materialism 
and individualism. 
So, just as within each country this tradition claims to 
embody the pure “people” constantly fighting against the 
corrupt “oligarchy”, in the Western hemisphere it seeks to 
build the Great Fatherland upon the ashes of the empire of the 
United States and its allies. As Latin American populist leaders 
frequently put it, it is a case of “proletarian” nations pitted against 
“plutocratic” nations. Needless to say there can be no possible 
synthesis between liberal integration and populist fusion: it is 
either one or the other. The Latin American political dynamics 
revolves around this cleavage, and any change of government 
tips the balance from one side to the other. 
Americas First
All this, in conclusion, takes us back where we started from, 
namely to the effects of Trump’s “retreat” in Latin America. 
China, the major beneficiary of this, is not merely an economic 
challenge for the United States but also an ideological thorn in 
the side. China’s very nature obviously makes it so, but even 
more critical in this respect is the fact that Beijing is a powerful 
source of support for Latin America’s populist movements, the 
age-old enemies of the liberal order in the region. To them, 
China is a natural ally, the vehicle of a vast global coalition 
against Western liberalism that they can link up with. After all, 
does China not embody a political regime and a development 
model that are very opposite of the liberal and capitalist ones? Is 
it not what they are also pursuing? Its mix of communism and 
Confucianism reminds them of the Christian socialism that 
they idealise and feed on, and of the vehement anti-liberalism 
that they preach and practice. In the Western hemisphere this is 
and will continue to be the greatest challenge facing the United 
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States; it is China’s strongest tool to help them gain power; and, 
finally, it is the greatest and most imminent danger threatening 
Latin America’s fragile liberalism.
If these are the issues at stake, and if this is how matters 
stand, then the effects of Trump abandoning Pan-American 
principles seem a great deal more serious, more far-reaching and 
more enduring than he and his fans imagine. The effects of his 
mandate on Latin America prove that the liberal cause still needs 
strong and credible US leadership, a leadership that is proud of 
its values, namely democracy, free trade, multilateralism and 
individual rights. Today more than ever before, Latin America’s 
democrats need the United States to stand by their side, and 
they need the United States to be prepared to pay at least some 
of the costs of hegemony and to forge a vast coalition with their 
allies in the region. This is not the way Trump thinks, but there 
will be no America First without Americas First. 
2.  Europe and Germany 
     on the Relaunch of EU-LAC Relations
Gian Luca Gardini
At the beginning of 2019, EU-Latin America and Caribbean 
(LAC) relations, although cordial as always, seemed to have 
reached a stalemate. Three significant topics on the bi-regional 
agenda were at a standstill. Firstly, no interregional political 
dialogue between the two regions had taken place since 2015, 
highlighting all the shortcomings of a traditional mechanism 
of EU diplomacy: region-to-region political summits. 
Secondly, EU diplomatic efforts to facilitate a resolution of the 
Venezuelan crisis had lost momentum, and European unity 
in crucial foreign policy matters seemed once again to be a 
chimera, with the EU losing ground as a credible international 
broker. Thirdly, negotiations for a trade agreement between 
the European Union and the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur), the trading bloc formed by Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay (Venezuela is currently suspended from 
the organisation), were not making substantial progress and the 
risk of yet another blow after twenty years of unsuccessful talks 
was a likely outcome.
In addition to these specific difficulties, the international 
context was not particularly propitious either. On the European 
side, the European Union and its model of regional governance 
are actually losing attractiveness in Latin America, and perhaps 
beyond. Brexit showed that centrifugal forces do exist in 
Europe and that the European integration effort, so cherished 
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and admired in Latin America too, is increasingly criticised and 
unable to tackle key problems. For instance, the immigration 
issue and the tragedy of life losses in the Mediterranean Sea 
have found wide resonance in the Latin American media and 
have revealed Europe’s inability to find common responses. The 
low growth rates and slow recovery from the 2008 economic 
crisis characterising a large portion of the EU members, and in 
particular the Eurozone, call into question Brussels’ ability to 
address topical common challenges effectively. 
At the same time, on the Latin American side, a number 
of issues have made relations with the EU less smooth than 
in the past. The Venezuelan crisis turned into such a divisive 
issue that it split Latin America into two camps on virtually 
every point of the regional agenda. This divide resulted in 
new and contested regional initiatives, such as the Lima 
Group or Prosur1, the paralysis of other regional schemes and 
initiatives, such as ALBA, Unasur and Celac2, and the practical 
impossibility to reach regional consensus or to speak with one 
voice internationally. This contributed to the calling off of 
any bi-regional summit with the EU. The expectations for the 
2019 round of South American elections, including Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay, also made the regional political 
scenario quite uncertain and thus scarcely suitable for unity or 
major initiatives, also considering the end of the left-leaning 
1 The Lima Group was created in 2017 and brings together a number of  Latin 
American countries and Canada to broker a peaceful resolution of  the crisis in 
Venezuela. The Forum for the Progress and Development of  South America, 
Prosur, is a proposal launched in 2019 by Presidents Piñera of  Chile and Duque 
of  Colombia to create a South American political bloc replacing the left-leaning 
Union of  South American Nations (Unasur).
2 The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, ALBA, is a regional integration 
scheme launched in 2004 by President Chavez of  Venezuela and Castro of  Cuba 
to promote an endogenous model of  development as an alternative to projects 
based on free trade. The Community of  Latin American and Caribbean States 
(Celac) is a political organisation launched in 2011 by all 33 countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean to have the continent to speak with one voice with 
the major global partners, including the EU. 
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political cycle that had characterised the region between 2003 
and 2015. 
By the end of 2019, in spite of and contrary to this unpropitious 
scenario, the prospects for a relaunch of EU-LAC relations are 
surprisingly – and perhaps paradoxically – promising. The 
effects of Brexit have thus far been quite limited in the EU 
and have had no tangible impact on Latin America. As a result 
of the flux of immigrants and refugees fleeing the Venezuelan 
disaster, other Latin American countries have learned the hard 
way how difficult it is to coordinate responses regionally or to 
find a region-wide solution to the question of immigration3. 
Economic difficulties in Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela have 
also made it hard to find any easy or effective answers. This has 
somehow tempered disappointment in Latin America with the 
EU’s own difficulties in managing key regional issues. 
Most of all, a set of new initiatives coming from Europe 
will potentially be a game changer. Firstly, at the EU level, the 
new strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean announced 
by the European Commission, the agreement for a trade deal 
with Mercosur, and the newly elected European Commission 
all seem to indicate an upgrade of Latin America in the EU’s 
external agenda. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Latin 
America seems to have found a new fundamentally important 
ally in Europe. Germany has announced a new policy towards 
Latin America and the Caribbean, which makes LAC a strategic 
ally globally. Berlin is committed to implementing this policy 
bilaterally as well as via Brussels. 
Moreover, an additional unexpected factor may contribute 
to relaunching EU-LAC relations. The wave of protests that 
have been shaking Latin America since October 2019, from 
Chile and Colombia to Ecuador and Bolivia, places issues 
such as equality, quality of democracy, the rule of law, the fight 
against corruption, constitutional reforms, the environment 
3 M. Botto, “El papel del multilateralismo en la crisis migratoria venezolana”, 
Conference “¿Qué está pasando en América Latina? Una mirada desde afuera”, 
Universidad andina Simón Bolívar, Quito, 27-29 November 2019.
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and respect for human rights at the core of the Latin American 
public debate and political agenda. These are all topics on which 
the EU is particularly keen, and they are central tenets of the 
EU’s own identity and external agenda. This match, we would 
argue, may facilitate a bi-regional rapprochement and broad 
cooperation. There is a window of opportunity to strengthen 
EU-LAC relations and back common values and a common 
vision of the international milieu globally. The first section 
of this chapter addresses the issue of Brexit and its possible 
repercussions on Latin America. The second section discusses 
the 2019 EU initiatives towards LAC. The third section analyses 
the new German policy towards LAC. The concluding section 
wraps up the main arguments, thus making a case for closer 
EU-LAC relations.
BREXIT and Its Limited Consequences 
for Latin America and the Caribbean
The consequences of Brexit for Latin America will be negligible. 
Somehow, counterintuitively, Brexit might even bring benefits 
to LAC. Both the EU and the United Kingdom will be eager 
to boost their international position and conclude new trade 
and other deals to compensate for the membership loss. LAC 
may be a target for this new international campaign and may 
be able to gain advantages from it. This may already be a 
possible interpretation of the EU-Mercosur political and trade 
agreements reached in 2018 and 2019, respectively, almost 
twenty years after the beginning of the negotiations. The EU 
was keen to regain momentum internationally and re-establish 
its attractiveness as a global partner. The UK, for its part, has 
already started its own diplomatic campaign in Latin America. 
Several initiatives, such as the British Parliament’s inquiry into 
UK-Pacific Alliance prospects, demonstrate London’s increased 
attention towards LAC.
The most negative impact of Brexit for the EU, but not 
necessarily for Latin America, is the ideational one. This is the 
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first time that the EU integration process has suffered such a blow, 
and instead of deepening or enlarging, it is actually shrinking. 
However, as General De Gaulle of France famously argued, 
the UK may be more detrimental than beneficial to European 
integration4. In this case, the shrinking membership may even 
result in further deepening of integration or in greater cohesion 
and policy convergence at the European level. If this were the 
case, the EU’s power of attraction would not be particularly 
damaged. In any case, the appeal of regionalism – the promotion 
of which is a cornerstone of the EU’s global policy – is already 
on the decline in Latin America for internal reasons. The lack of 
truly shared interests and policy convergence in Latin America 
has already hampered most regional projects, such as ALBA, 
Unasur and Celac. Mercosur and the Andean Community5 are 
also struggling. Actually, members often advocate a dilution 
rather than a strengthening of their regional commitments. The 
ideational ripple effect of Brexit in Latin America is thus rather 
limited, as the crisis of regionalism in this area is essentially the 
result of domestic or at best regional dynamics. The ideational 
impact of Brexit should not be overestimated.
A different question has to do with the potential uncertainty 
of the Brexit process and the economic instability that this 
may generate in the medium and long term in Europe and 
beyond. The results of the December 2019 general elections in 
the UK, with the clear victory of pro-Brexit conservative leader 
Boris Johnson, should speed up the Brexit deal and make the 
separation effective in early 2020. While this may be deplorable 
in principle, it should at least prevent economic instability on the 
European markets and a possible contagion effect elsewhere. But 
even if one wanted to assume a pessimistic post-deal scenario, 
while economic instability in Europe might affect especially 
4 C. Schweiger, “The Reluctant European: Britain and European Integration Since 
1945”, in C. Schweiger, Britain, Germany and the Future of  the European Union. New 
Perspectives in German Studies, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 14-42.
5 The Andean Community is a political and trading bloc created in 1969 and 
currently composed of  Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
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those Latin American countries that have a free trade agreement 
in place with the EU, this effect would be rather limited. 
Free trade agreements are in place between the EU and Peru, 
Colombia, Central America, Mexico and Chile. To date, very 
few of these countries have taken significant advantage of the 
agreements. For these countries and also for others, such as 
Brazil and the Mercosur members, the EU is and will remain 
an important trade destination. Currently the EU represents 
almost 20% of Brazil’s foreign trade, 15% of Argentina’s and 
18% of Colombia’s but, for instance, only 11% of Mexico’s. 
Brexit will not affect the situation more than other factors, such 
as the economic growth in Asia that has made China the top 
trading partner for Brazil, Peru, Chile and Uruguay, according 
to the WTO. The UK accounts for no more than one tenth of 
the total Latin American trade with the EU. This share may 
continue also outside the EU framework. Trade-wise, no major 
consequences are foreseeable for Latin America.
The uncertainty generated by Brexit may have a larger impact 
on investments, and indirectly on foreign debt and to a limited 
extent on trade too. International investors prefer stability and 
fear uncertainty. This may have an indirect repercussion on 
Latin America. If the solidity and reliability of the European 
financial system were questioned, international investors might 
decide to get rid of their stocks denominated in Euros and buy 
US dollars instead, thus increasing the value of the US currency. 
LAC exports overall may become more competitive, but imports 
would in turn become more expensive. The overall trade result 
might be positive nonetheless, but foreign debt would be 
negatively affected. On the one hand, the cost of debt repayment 
denominated in US dollars would increase. On the other, a rise 
of the dollar would cause a hike in interest rates, thus making 
access to financial resources on the international markets more 
difficult and costly for LAC. 
Considering Latin American history, the debt issue is perhaps 
what raises most concern. The following mechanism would be 
generated: the increased demand for US dollars, due to the flight 
Europe and Germany on the Relaunch of EU-LAC Relations 37
from the euro, would increase the value of the dollar, thus raising 
the amount of capital available for investments in US dollars. 
These could be made in the US (where there is at present a 
strong economic recovery accompanied by policies favourable to 
capital and investments pushed by the Trump administration), 
in Asia (where there are still relatively high growth rates), or in 
the Middle East (where risks are high but so are returns). To be 
able to compete with these destinations, LAC would inevitably 
have to offer higher interest rates. The attraction of investment 
would result in higher debt, not only due to the higher value 
of the dollar but also the higher interest rates. The good news 
is that this has not happened since the Brexit referendum in 
2016, and with a Brexit deal now within sight, it seems even 
more unlikely to happen.
If one considers the UK side, there is no reason for concern 
in Latin America. The continent’s exports to the UK represent 
about 0.65% of the total exports from the region. Figures are 
slightly higher for Colombia (2.5%) and Brazil (1.7%). The 
British business magazine LatAm Investor has suggested that the 
UK may be opening up to new trade deals with Brazil, Mexico 
and Argentina6. Brexit could in fact generate benefits for LAC, 
as British companies may look for new suppliers. Currently 
73% of all UK agricultural imports come from the EU, so 
Brexit may favour LAC producers to replace those in the EU. 
Yet, enthusiasm on the Latin American side has to be tempered. 
This optimistic scenario depends on two critical conditions: a) 
the type of exit that the UK will finally conclude with the EU, 
that is, with or without a deal on trade barriers and customs; 
b) the capacity of LAC producers to adapt to and quickly meet 
the higher food production standards that will likely exist in the 
UK also after Brexit.
Two more issues deserve attention: British investments in 
LAC and LAC citizens in the UK. British investments in Latin 
America are more significant than trade. If the British pound lost 
6 How Will Brexit Impact Latin America?, LatAm Investor, 6 October 2016.
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value because of Brexit, then British investments in the region 
may decrease, but only in the short term. In the medium and long 
run, the search for new opportunities may prevail. Finally, Latin 
American citizens living in the UK have nothing to fear. They 
will only be affected if they hold an EU passport. For the others, 
nothing will change. For EU citizens, too, an agreed solution is very 
likely. Overall, Brexit may end up affecting primarily the image of 
the UK. Latin America has always admired the EU’s achievements 
and the perception of the country that jeopardises them may not 
benefit.
Brexit is no doubt a blow to the European integration process. 
However, it is also an opportunity to rethink regionalism, not 
only in Europe. Perhaps an important lesson for both European 
and LAC regionalism is that the greatest accomplishment lies 
in rising again after you fall rather than in never falling. What 
seems to be lacking in integration processes is the citizens’ sense 
of belonging to and ownership of them. They do not generate 
empathy. European public opinion does not reject European 
integration per se, but increasingly for the way in which it has 
been conducted and turned into integration between banks and 
bankers rather than peoples. What is being missed is the ultimate 
meaning of regionalism, which is not and must not be an end 
in itself but an instrument for the interests and wellbeing of the 
participating communities. Why integrate and for what purpose? 
To achieve the inclusive economic and social development of our 
societies. Without both the economic and social components 
together, and without inclusion and the equitable and fair 
distribution of costs and benefits, there is neither integration nor 
cohesion, be it at the local, national or regional level.
Integration, cooperation and even just the regional 
coordination of public policies may greatly help to achieve the 
goals of a society but are not a replacement for them. Regional 
integration is one among many options in foreign policy and 
international insertion. Overcoming the shortcomings of the 
current model of regionalism, both in Europe and LAC, can 
help achieve the ultimate goals of our societies. First of all, this 
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implies a frank discussion and consensus on what these goals 
are. Maybe the most important legacy of Brexit for EU-LAC 
relations is yet to come and depends on whether and how the 
EU will recover from the Brexit fallout. A steady recovery with 
a strong EU-coordinated response to the current challenges 
of European societies, emphasising European values and 
pursuing inherently European ultimate goals, has the potential 
to reactivate the bi-regional relations and spread the shared 
preference for cooperative multilateralism globally. For all these 
reasons, Brexit has the paradoxical potential to lead to stronger 
EU-LAC relations.
New EU Initiatives and Circumstances
The year 2019 could be a decisive one for the relaunch of 
EU-Latin America and Caribbean relations. A new set of 
major circumstances and key initiatives at the EU level have 
the potential to be a game changer. In April 2019, after ten 
years of silence, the European Commission issued a new 
communication on the European Union, Latin America and 
the Caribbean aimed at designing the pillars of a new EU 
approach towards the region. In June of the same year, the 
European Union and Mercosur reached agreement on a trade 
deal. Finally, at the end of the year a new Commission, on paper 
more favourable to Latin America, took office. All this creates 
a number of opportunities to upgrade and strengthen the bi-
regional relationship. However, each of these opportunities 
comes with its own challenges and limitations, and it is up to 
the two parties involved to display the political will to grasp the 
momentum.
The Commission’s Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council on EU-LAC relations is entitled 
“Joining forces for a common future”7. Rarely have EU 
7 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council – European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean: joining forces for a common 
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documents shown such consistency between the title – and 
the slogan associated with it – and the content. The argument 
made is very compelling: the European Union and LAC share 
common values and interests, beyond rhetoric, and a stronger 
partnership is vital to the preservation of such values and 
the defence of such interests in the face of challenges at the 
global level. The opening statement of the document, which 
is a reference to the 2016 EU global strategy on foreign and 
security policy8, is an additional indication of the strategic value 
of the Joint Communication. Three key aspects stand out.
The first is a call for the re-politicisation of their relations. 
This of course does not mean to advocate a partisan or 
confrontational approach to the issue, but on the contrary 
a genuine return to the political nature of the relationship. 
While trade and other technical matters are important, and 
this is fully acknowledged in principle and in the diplomatic 
practice throughout the document, the strategic value of the 
Commission’s reflection is a central tenet of the document. The 
Commission analyses the unprecedented level of integration, 
not only economic, between the two regions. It also identifies 
key challenges to EU and LAC interests, such as the increasing 
presence of China internationally, the evolving position of the 
United States and the pressing need to adapt to digitalisation, 
preserve the environment and guarantee social justice as well as 
democratic institutions. The Commission calls for a renewed 
and ambitious commitment by the EU and Latin America to 
working together to preserve multilateralism and a rules-based 
global order.
The second important aspect is the policy orientation of the 
document and its call for action. The Joint Communication 
is not just a list of principles, values or challenges, but a well-
thought-out and innovative reflection on how to translate 
all this in practice. An interesting point is the combination 
future”, April 2019.
8 European Commission, “A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security Policy. Strategy”, June 2016.
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of traditional instruments and innovative and tailor-made 
solutions. This opens the way to going beyond the established 
summit system of political dialogues. It invites states on the two 
shores of the Atlantic, as well as the EU institutions, who want 
closer cooperation, to experiment with new formats. In a partial 
revision of its recent development aid policy, the Commission 
also places emphasis on cooperation with the more advanced 
developing countries in Latin America as an amplifier of the EU’s 
efforts. It also accepts the need to simplify its cooperation tools 
while making them more flexible and responsive to the needs of 
the receiving partners. 
The third major element is the emphasis on societal issues 
and the role of civil society. The EU proposes an engagement 
with LAC governments and regional organisations as well as 
civil society at large, think tanks, local authorities, the business 
sector, cultural organisations, representatives of academia 
and the youth. The focus on the concerns of the citizens, 
accountability and transparency as drivers of EU cooperation 
is perfectly echoed by the demands of street protests in many 
Latin American countries. The agenda, values and approach of 
the EU make it the ideal partner to work together with Latin 
American institutions to meet the social and political aspirations 
emerging from the mass demonstrations in several Latin 
American countries in the closing months of 2019. Europe and 
the EU are international points of reference for democratic, 
social and living standards. This is why Latin American citizens, 
not only the poor but increasingly the expanding middle class as 
well as the elites, have taken to the streets. This is a perfect time 
to boost the bi-regional partnership through the four pillars 
proposed by the Joint Communication: prosperity, democracy, 
resilience and effective global governance. 
The political agreement reached in June 2019 on a trade 
deal between the European Union and Mercosur is another 
potential game changer in bi-regional relations. After twenty 
years of negotiations, the EU could be the first major trade 
partner of Mercosur to have a free trade area in place with the 
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South American bloc, a fact that former Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker defined as “historical”9. This would create 
a free trade area of around 780 million consumers. Most of 
all, the agreement addresses in a fundamental way the link 
between trade and the strategic issues discussed above. The 
agreement reaffirms the commitment of both parties to rules-
based international trade at a time of increasing protectionism 
and impending trade wars. It also includes important clauses 
on labour and environmental protection, committing the 
signatories to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on 
climate change. The sticky issue of agriculture, which had long 
delayed the agreement, has substantially been addressed, with 
a good dose of pragmatism and with the satisfaction of both 
parties: most agricultural and dairy products will enter the 
respective markets free of customs duties but subject to quotas.
Nonetheless, this rosy picture has to be tempered. There 
is no signed agreement yet. What the parties agreed upon in 
June 2019 is a political approval in principle. Both parties will 
now go through a legal check of the agreed content to reach 
the final version of the Association Agreement, which includes 
a political and cooperation section as well as a trade section. 
Only then will the formal text be signed and presented to the 
European Parliament and the EU member states for approval. 
This is before the ratification process even starts. Here is where 
obstacles could most likely arise. 
On both sides, there are resistance fronts. In Europe, France, 
Ireland and Poland have already expressed their reservations 
about the willingness of the counterpart to meet environmental 
targets and the possible repercussions on the European 
agricultural sector. The recent personal clashes between 
Presidents Macron of France and Bolsonaro of Brazil have not 
improved the atmosphere. On the Mercosur side, the Bolsonaro 
administration may be more favourable to concluding a free 
9 European Commission, “La UE y el MERCOSUR llegan a un acuerdo en materia de 
comercio”, Press Release, 28 June 2019.
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trade agreement with the United States first. This adds to 
Bolsonaro’s threat to exit Mercosur and his economy minister’s 
scepticism about Mercosur’s usefulness for Brazil’s development 
and international strategy. In Argentina, the mild resistance 
of the business sector accompanied the statements by newly 
elected President Alberto Fernandez against the agreement 
and his willingness to renegotiate it. In spite of a later back-
paddle by Fernandez, who has now fully acknowledged the 
agreement on trade, and Bolsonaro’s signs of openness, the road 
to implementation will be at least tortuous and may last an 
additional couple of years. Still, this is a positive development 
after a long stalemate.
The third and final promising step is the formation of the 
new European Commission, which took office in early 2020. 
The appointment of Ursula von der Leyen of Germany as 
President and Josep Borrell of Spain as High Representative 
for European Foreign and Security Policy, the equivalent of a 
foreign minister, are positive signals for Latin America. Von 
der Leyen is very close to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
and the German government has recently relaunched its Latin 
America policy very strongly, making a serious commitment 
to the continent. These steps will be discussed at length in the 
next section. Echoes of this favourable German position should 
reach Brussels, and von der Leyen is likely to back it. Borrell is 
a very experienced politician, who has already served as foreign 
minister of Spain, a country that has always had a strong 
interest and a leading role in Latin America. Borrell himself is 
considered a friend of Latin America. 
This all sounds good, but there are also reservations. Von 
der Leyen’s debut as President has been plagued with several 
problems that culminated in the delay of both her team’s 
confirmation and the whole Commission’s inauguration. It may 
take time to regain the lost political capital and the support of 
the European Parliament. At his confirmation speech before the 
European Parliament, Borrell listed his geographical priorities 
for the EU’s external projection in addition to relations with 
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the US, China and Russia, the big players. Latin America 
was as usual last, following the Balkans, Ukraine, the EU 
neighbourhood area, Africa and Asia. In spite of these challenges, 
the Joint Communication, the agreement on the EU-Mercosur 
trade deal and the composition of the new Commission are all 
positive news for the future of EU-LAC relations.
A New Champion for Latin America: 
Germany’s New Policy Towards LAC
Perhaps the most significant advance of the last few years for 
the future of EU-LAC relations is the shift in policy and vision 
adopted by Germany in May 2019. Berlin has identified Latin 
America as a key partner for its international strategy. This gives 
the bi-regional relations two big assets. Firstly, the partnership 
now enjoys the full support of the EU’s single most powerful 
political and economic player. This means that their relations 
may now count on a credible and reliable leader, recognised 
at both the European and international levels. Secondly, 
when Germany pursues an objective, it generally achieves it. 
This means that the ability and willingness to implement an 
ambitious bi-regional agenda may be greatly enhanced. This 
would contribute to overcoming the gap between ambition 
and results that has often weakened the bi-regional political 
dialogue in the past. 
Germany’s policy shift towards Latin America is the result 
of a broader revision of German foreign policy and Berlin’s 
international posture. From several sides there have been 
calls for a more assertive role for Germany in Europe and 
internationally10. The reasons for Germany’s traditional 
reticence to take bold positions at the international level are 
coming under increasing criticism. History certainly plays a 
central role, and Germans feel uncomfortable about leading 
10 J. Smith, “German foreign policy is stuck in neutral”, War on the Rocks, 18 February 
2019.
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overtly because of their past. Wariness of German assertiveness 
also characterises some small and large European states. The 
German national character and decision-making style are also 
important. Decision-making processes are generally consensual 
and tend to avoid open confrontation. Also and consequently, 
the preferred leadership style in the country is quiet leadership, 
rooted in consensus building and persuasion. The result has 
long been a sensation of undue silence or inadequate response. 
However, Germany is not inactive. It just moves quietly. 
Moreover, when it does so, the outcome is generally noticeable.
The calls for a more proactive role have not gone unanswered. 
A rethinking of the country’s international role and vital 
interests has taken place. The assumptions that had driven 
Berlin’s foreign policy from the fall of the Wall up to a few 
years ago – that is, a policy convergence towards open markets 
and liberal democracy at the global level and the absence of 
any real challenges or threats to Germany’s national interests 
– have been shaken11. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 
was the turning point. This resulted in Berlin’s determined 
reaction, including its lead in the adoption of EU sanctions 
against Moscow. The 2015 refugee crisis, the bold emergence 
of China – Germany’s largest trading partner but also one far 
from consistent with the post-Cold War expectations of Berlin 
and the West – and the election of President Trump in the US, 
shook Germany’s reading of the world as a global community 
and prompted a serious reassessment of the international milieu 
and the country’s role within it. This is still an ongoing process, 
and Berlin’s new Latin America strategy may well be a preview 
of further results to come.
In May 2019 Foreign Minister Heiko Maas called for a major 
Latin America-Caribbean conference in Berlin. Twenty-four 
foreign ministers from LAC attended. On the occasion, Minister 
Maas presented Germany’s new vision, with tangible initiatives, for 
11 T. Beggar, “The world according to Germany: Reassessing 1989”, The 
Washington Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 4, 2018, pp. 53-63.
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LAC12. Minister Maas insisted on how geography shapes identity 
and perceptions, but promptly added that geography is not 
everything and that we are not prisoners of it. Today, digitalisation 
has reduced distances, hashtags can trigger global debates, flows 
of goods and data have increased interconnectedness and people 
are more mobile than ever. In today’s global “cosmopolis”13, the 
concept of neighbours is no longer solely determined by distance 
but increasingly by connectedness, openness to learn from each 
other and sharing values and interests. Germany believes that 
LAC and Europe can be neighbours in the world of the twenty-first 
century. Both regions are strongly democratic, closely connected 
in cultural terms and committed to international rules, human 
rights, economic openness and fair social and environmental 
standards. This neighbourhood has to be read as a natural strategic 
alliance to preserve those values and international rules that have 
greatly benefited both Germany and Latin America in the post-
Cold War era.
The picture of the current global scenario and its challenges for 
Germany outlined by Maas was surprisingly direct in diplomatic 
terms and strongly consistent with the one depicted in the 
European Commission’s Joint Communication. The German 
Foreign Minister plainly stated that Germany needs allies in the 
current uncertainty and explicitly mentioned those players that 
undermine, or may undermine, international certainty. China 
uses its economic might offensively to exercise political pressure, 
including in Europe and Latin America. Russia uses military 
force to present political outcomes as a fait accompli. Finally, 
the United States, a cornerstone of the existing liberal order 
and an established key ally of Germany’s, has become a factor 
of unpredictability, as the withdrawal from the Paris Climate 
Agreement and the protectionist trade policy demonstrate. 
12 H. Maas, Opening speech by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas at the Latin America-Caribbean 
Conference, German Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, 28 May 2019.
13 T. Garton Ash, Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World, Yale, Yale 
University Press, 2016.
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In this framework, Germany feels unprecedentedly exposed 
and shaken. Quoting the famous Colombian writer Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez, a beloved author in Latin America and 
internationally, Minister Maas used the metaphor of “the 
solitude of Latin America”, that sensation of marginalisation 
and powerlessness in a world where the strong prevail over the 
weak. Maas empathised with Latin America and suggested 
that the feeling of solitude is shared by Europe in the current 
global scenario. He acknowledged that neither Europe nor 
Latin America are superpowers. The decisive question for both 
regions is whether they want to be subjects or objects of global 
policy. If one wants to be heard, one needs allies. Out of this set 
of realisations – Minister Maas explicitly remarked – Germany 
decided to place Latin America and the Caribbean higher up on 
its own foreign policy agenda and that of the European Union. 
This is a very significant shift in Germany’s conception of itself 
and the world compared to the post-Cold War years and up to 
now. Latin America is a strategic and necessary partner for this 
vision. Concrete implementation is already underway. 
Germany has recently undertaken tangible initiatives in several 
sectors and forums. In 2019 it identified over 80 concrete projects 
in Latin America ranging from migration to scientific cooperation 
and multilateralism. In the field of environmental protection, 
Germany and the Dominican Republic cooperated to put climate 
change and security on the UN Security Council agenda. Berlin 
is helping Costa Rica to launch green e-mobility projects. In the 
field of good governance and the rule of law, Germany agreed 
to cooperate closely with Mexico against forced disappearances, 
and to contribute substantially to the fight against impunity and 
corruption in Guatemala and Honduras. Germany has taken 
a proactive role in the peace process in Colombia via both the 
ad hoc UN Trust Fund and its own German-Colombian Peace 
Institute (Capaz). Following the recent wave of protests in Chile, 
the Chilean and German governments are in talks to see how 
and where Germany could contribute to improving the situation 
in the country, namely with regard to a new constitution. On 
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the economic front, the Association of German Chambers of 
Commerce expects German exports to LAC to increase by 5% 
in 2019, investments are on the rise, and German businesses are 
expected to employ over 600,000 people in the region. Germany 
is not necessarily a benefactor, but it perceives its renewed 
engagement with LAC as an essential tool to advance its interests 
and preferences internationally.
German concrete action also perfectly coincides with the 
pillars of the European Commission’s Joint Communication: 
prosperity, democracy, resilience and global governance. As 
in the Joint Communication, strong emphasis is placed on 
stimulating and supporting civil society, a cornerstone of both 
European and German identity and international projection. 
In 2019 Germany launched a network of Latin American 
women, Unidas. The Goethe Institute, the main instrument 
of German cultural diplomacy, is expected to intensify its 
activities in Latin America and to broaden its agenda. The 
German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) has recently 
launched new programmes in Ecuador and Paraguay. Cultural 
diplomacy, broadly understood, and the reinforcement and 
spread of shared values are at the centre of German action in 
Latin America. Moreover, this is done with a respectful attitude. 
In the words of Minister Maas, Germany is prepared to play a 
role “where help is wanted”14.
Finally, Germany is explicitly committed to upgrading LAC’s 
position in the EU agenda. The consistency between Germany’s 
vision and action on the one hand, and the EU’s analysis and 
principles on the other, is remarkable. One can hardly think 
that this is accidental. It is more likely that there is a link 
between the German input and the EU Joint Communication. 
Germany is “100 percent behind the efforts of the European 
Commission”15. Prime Minister Angela Merkel, for instance, 
was among the seven European heads of state and governments 
14 H. Maas (2019).
15 Ibid.
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who signed an official letter of support for the European 
Commission to conclude the trade deal with Mercosur. During 
negotiations, the German government actively worked with 
other EU member states within the Council and bilaterally 
with Mercosur members in order to bring the talks to a 
positive conclusion. Berlin is now committed to facilitating the 
ratification process. For Germany, bilateral and EU channels 
are complementary. This is not an “either-or” question, it is 
a “both-and” approach16. With German support, EU-LAC 
relations have an additional strong advocate.
Conclusion
At the end of 2019, conditions for the relaunch of EU-
LAC relations seem particularly favourable. Brexit has not 
substantially damaged the power of ideational and diplomatic 
attraction of the European Union in Latin America. New 
developments in Europe suggest a likely upgrading of LAC 
in the EU’s external agenda. The content and spirit of the 
Commission’s Joint Communication on Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the political agreement on a trade deal with Mercosur 
and the composition of the new European Commission are all 
positive signals in this direction. Most of all, Latin America can 
now count on a powerful new sponsor in Europe. Germany 
has revisited its foreign policy towards the region and decided 
to place Latin America higher up on its external agenda. This 
is part of a broader reconfiguration of Germany’s role in the 
world. Berlin considers LAC a key strategic ally in its efforts 
to preserve the liberal international order based on open 
economies, free trade and respect for democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law.  
16 German Foreign Ministry, Written interview with the author, 16 December 
2018 via email, 2019.
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The case for a renewed EU-LAC partnership is strong. This is 
certainly about the preservation and spread of common values 
and interests, yet it goes beyond that and involves a broader 
vision of the international community and how to govern it. 
There are several countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia 
that would welcome a third, middle way of international 
governance as an alternative to the US-China duopoly. The 
current US model is based on double standards, unilateralism 
and self-interest. The Chinese approach largely rests on unfair 
competition, illiberal governance and the use of economic might 
to force political outcomes. A European approach, shared and 
supported by Latin America, enshrined in a fair, rules-based 
multilateral system could gain many followers. Ultimately, it 
could result in more equitable and more prosperous societies. 
The EU is not perfect, but we should cherish it nonetheless. 
It is by all means preferable to a pre-EU scenario or to a US- 
or China-dominated world. The 2020 US elections and the 
2020 German semester of EU presidency may well be defining 
moments for both EU-LAC and international relations overall.
3.  China’s Engagement 
     in Latin America: Prospects 
     Still Short of Expectations?
Mario Esteban, Ugo Armanini
Economic development in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC 
or China) is one of the major international processes of the XXI 
century. It has fostered China’s engagement in many sectors 
worldwide, reaching countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) together with a positive diversification of the region’s foreign 
relations1. China-LAC relations have been mainly economic and 
in rapid expansion, as spelled out in the China-LAC Cooperation 
Plan’s targets to reach US$500 billion in bilateral trade and US$250 
billion in bilateral stock of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by 
20252. Their significance is also reflected in the several strategic 
partnerships established with 10 LAC countries, including Brazil, 
Mexico, Argentina, and Chile3, the institutionalisation of the China-
CELAC4 Forum, and more recently by the enlargement of the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI). In November 2017, Panama became 
the first LAC country to officially endorse the BRI, and China now 
sees the region as a “natural extension” of and an “important 
participant” in the Maritime Silk Road5.
1 M. Esteban, China en América Latina: repercusiones para España, Elcano Royal 
Institute, 2015, p. 11.
2 China-CELAC Forum, Cooperation Plan (2015-2019), 23 January 2015.
3 Y. Li and X. Zhu, The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sustainability, 11, 2019.
4 Community of  Latin American and Caribbean States.
5 M. Myers, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: What Role for Latin America?”, 
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LAC integration within the initiative is only a new stage of 
China’s multidimensional – economic, political, institutional 
and military – engagement in the region with global and 
regional implications, opportunities and risks. Long-term 
concerns about dependence and reprimarisation of Latin 
American economies now fall in a new context of diversification 
of China’s financial engagement, while China-LAC relations 
face other uncertainties amid United States-China geopolitical 
tensions and LAC political cycles.
Economic Relations
The bulk of China-LAC relations are still mainly economic. 
They encompass trade, increasingly diversified investments, as 
well as financing mainly aimed at infrastructure and energy 
projects, reflecting the three pillars of the “1+3+6” China-
CELAC cooperation framework.
Trade
China has become a major partner of LAC countries, having 
displaced the European Union as the region’s second trade 
partner and catching up with the US in South America. From 
2000 to 2015, China’s share in LAC exports and imports 
rose from 1% to 10%, and from 2% to 18%, respectively6. 
Despite a drop from 2013 to 2016, LAC-China trade has since 
recovered with an average 16% growth rate making it likely to 
reach the US$500 billion trade target by 2023-247. China has 
Journal of  Latin American Geography, vol. 7, no. 2, 2018, pp. 239-243, cit. p. 240, 
doi:10.1353/lag.2018.0037.
6 N. Hamaguchi, J. Guo, and K. Chong-Sup (eds.), Cutting the Distance : Benefits and 
Tensions from the Recent Active Engagement of  China, Japan, and Korea in Latin America, 
Singapore, Springer, 2018, p. 12.
7 G.C. Prieto, A. Figueredo, and L.L. Rodríguez, “El comercio de China con 
América Latina: panorama de reprimarización” (“China’s trade with Latin 
America: a repression scenario”), in E. Pastrana Buelvas and H. Gehring (eds.), 
La proyección de China en América Latina y el Caribe, Bogota, Editorial Pontificia 
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signed three Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with Chile, Peru, 
and Costa Rica. A feasibility study on an FTA with Colombia 
is still pending, while negotiations on the China-Panama FTA 
entered their fifth round in April 20188.
Fig. 3.1 - LAC trade in goods with China and the US, 
2002-18, US$ billion
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, compiled by authors
Universidad Javeriana, Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 2017, pp. 219-266, cit. p. 
224.
8 K. Koleski and A. Blivas, China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, 2018, p. 
7; Ministry of  Commerce, The 5th Round Negotiation of  China-Panama FTA 
Held in Beijing, People’s Republic of  China, 28 April 2019.
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Fig. 3.2 - LAC trade in goods with China, 
the US, and the EU, total and by sub-regional group, 2018, 
US$ billion
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, compiled by authors
Trade between China and LAC has been driven by China’s 
demand for commodities, fostering the region’s economic 
growth, reducing its macroeconomic imbalances and 
mitigating the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. For China, 
LAC has become a major supplier of primary goods, and 
both a promising digital and export market and investment 
destination. Benefits vary across the region favouring Southern 
Cone commodities exporters like Brazil, where they partly 
translate into a positive trade balance and terms of trade, while 
they prove less certain for Central America and Caribbean 
countries. Notably, Brazil remains China’s main partner and 
has traditionally been the principal recipient of Chinese foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Latin America (see Figure 3.6) while 
Mexico consensually offers a case of significant competition 
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with China, especially in the US market9 with negative socio-
economic consequences including a net loss of 395 thousand 
jobs from 2000 to 201410. However, China-Mexico relations 
have been improving, supported by China’s financial capacities 
and its likely contribution to the Mexican industrial sector11.
Fig. 3.3 - LAC main trade partners with China, 2018, US$ 
billion and % of foreign trade
Balance of trade
Value Share Value Share Value Share Value
Brazil 100.7 23.3 63.9 26.4 36.8 19.4 27.1
Mexico 96 10.2 7.4 1.6 88.5 18 -81.1
Chile 42.9 28.5 25.3 33.5 17.6 23.4 7.7
Peru 23.5 25.6 13.2 27.7 10.3 23.3 2.9
Argentina 16.3 12.8 4.2 6.8 12.1 18.5 -7.9
Colombia 14.1 15.2 3.6 8.6 10.5 20.8 -6.9
Venezuela 6.5 12.8 5.1 14.5 1.3 8.9 3.8
Ecuador 5.1 11.4 1.5 6.9 3.6 15.6 -2.1
LAC 331.6 15.2 127 11.9 204.6 18.5 -77.6
ImportsExportsEconomy Bilateral trade
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, compiled by authors
Despite real economic benefits, China-LAC relations suffer 
from long-term asymmetries. First, while China has become a 
major export market and supplier for LAC countries, the latter 
are mainly secondary partners as is the case for top economies 
like Brazil and Mexico. Second, and more importantly, China-
LAC trade presents sectoral asymmetry as the region LAC 
essentially exports low-value commodities to China, while 
importing Chinese manufactured goods. 
9 W. Fei, “Competition for Export Share in American Market Between China 
and Major Latin American Countries: 2001-2010”, in Y. Chai and Y. Yue (eds.), 
Sino-Latin American Economic and Trade Relations, Singapore, Springer, 2019, pp. 
165-182, cit. p. 179. 
10 J.M. Salazar-Xirinachs, E. Dussel Peters, and A.C. Armony  (eds.), Efectos de 
China en la cantidad y calidad del empleo en América Latina: México, Perú, Chile y Brasil, 
Lima, Organización internacional del trabajo, 2018, cit. p. 21.
11  M. Esteban (2015), pp. 16-17.
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Fig. 3.4 - LAC exports to China and the World, 
by sector, 2010-18, % of total
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
International Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean 2018. 
Santiago, Chile, United Nations, 2018d, p. 18-19; ECLAC (2016), p. 26-27; ECLAC, 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 2011-12: Continuing 
crisis in the centre and new opportunities for developing economies, Santiago, 
Chile, United Nations, 2012, pp. 50; 53, compiled by authors
Since 2010, LAC exports to China have comprised over 90% of 
commodities or natural resource-based manufactured goods, in 
stark contrast with the overall structure of LAC foreign trade. 
From 2005 to 2014, commodities amounted to between 80% 
to 90% of exports from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Peru to China, and up to 98% in the case of Venezuela. By 
contrast, China’s exports to these countries consisted of 55% 
to 85% of medium or high technology goods12, pointing to a 
crucial regional challenge associated with exports diversification. 
Such asymmetries entail several risks for LAC economies. One 
12 N. Hamaguchi, J. Guo, and K. Chong-Sup (2018), pp. 13-14; G.C. Prieto, A. 
Figueredo, and L.L. Rodríguez (2017), pp. 231-251.
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risk is the area’s significant dependence on the Chinese economy 
and vulnerability to external shocks, including a deceleration of 
Chinese growth that may reverse the macroeconomic and social 
benefits achieved during the boom period. A similar situation 
occurred in 2013-15 when volatility of commodity prices led to 
a slowdown in China-LAC trade and a 23% fall in LAC exports 
to China13. In addition, China’s economic transition may affect 
LAC exports, prompting LAC countries to adapt to a reframed 
demand for consumer, agricultural, and touristic goods. China’s 
share of LAC total agricultural exports increased from 2% to 
14% over the 2000-15 period, surpassing both the EU and the 
US as main export markets. Countries like Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay already own major shares in the Chinese 
market14. Among others, Brazil already supplies more than half 
of Chinese soybean imports. Yet, agricultural exports may not 
be the optimal silver lining as they involve small possibilities of 
productive transformation for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
In fact, most of LAC agricultural exports are commodities with 
low added value while processed goods constitute a limited share 
of the total15.
The current structure of China-LAC trade (commodities 
in exchange for manufactured goods) is indeed crucial since, 
together with China’s economic competition and LAC loss 
of export competitiveness in manufactured goods, it may 
have already slowed down or even reversed LAC industrial 
development, leading to a decrease in the share of LAC 
manufactured products in global export markets16. There 
have been several signs of a renewed reprimarisation in the 
region, affecting countries like Colombia, Peru, Venezuela17 
13 K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 7.
14 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
International Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean 2017, United Nations, 
Santiago, Chile, 2017, p. 142.; N. Hamaguchi, J. Guo, and K. Chong-Sup (2018), 
p. 23; K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 22.
15 ECLAC (2017), p. 134.
16 W. Fei (2019), p. 178-180; K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 10.
17 G.C. Prieto, A. Figueredo, and L.L. Rodríguez (2017), pp. 253-261.
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and Brazil, where the share of manufactured goods in exports 
declined from 57% to 39%, while the share of raw materials 
climbed from 26% to 45% over the 2001-10 period18. Such 
a situation has engendered socio-economic drawbacks with a 
labour market favouring low qualified jobs and displacing more 
qualified ones19. 
While the BRI may not bring about significant changes to 
the current state of affairs, as China’s trade and investments 
have long been deployed outside the initiative, the same may 
not hold true for the US-China geopolitical tensions and trade 
war causing a new set of economic uncertainties. Although 
trade diversion may create short-term opportunities –favouring 
LAC goods in the Chinese and US markets  – LAC countries, 
especially commodity-oriented nations of South America, 
would be affected by financial uncertainties, the induced 
deceleration of the Chinese and global economy  as well as the 
weakening of the multilateral trade system20. Further, despite 
China’s interest for supply diversification21, the US-China 
deal is expected to unilaterally benefit US agricultural exports 
possibly at the expense of LAC export potential. 
Financial relations
Parallel to trade, China’s financial engagement in Latin America 
and the Caribbean has consolidated and recently evolved 
towards more diversified investments with a greater involvement 
in regional infrastructure projects.
18 M. Esteban (2016).
19 J.M. Salazar-Xirinachs et al. (2018), p. 26.
20 O. Canuto, “Latin America Is Not Benefiting from the U.S.-China Trade War”, Americas 
Quarterly, 2019; M. Myers, R. Barrios, L. Hua, L. Krohn, and C. Parodi, Will Slower 
Growth in China Put Latin America at Risk? , The Dialogue, 23 August 2019. 
21 J.-M. Chaumet, “Le conflit commercial sino-états-unien, une reconfiguration 
du rapport de forces alimentaire mondial?”, Revue internationale et stratégique, 
vol. 114, no. 2, 2019, pp. 28-40, cit., pp. 36; 38-39, doi:10.3917/ris.114.0028; 
M. Myers et al., (2019).
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Investment
Chinese investments in Latin America and the Caribbean have 
been a relatively recent phenomenon, which has only gained 
significance since 2010. To date, China has secured bilateral 
investment agreements with a dozen of LAC countries. Despite 
higher growth rates, Chinese FDI stocks are lower than those of 
the US and the EU22  which remain the leading investors in the 
region accounting for 70% of total FDI23, including mergers 
and acquisitions24. Vice-versa, LAC’s FDI into China remain 
modest, almost 13 times lower than China’s FDI into LAC 
(see Figure 3.5) due to the area’s traditional orientation towards 
regional, American and European markets, geographical 
distance, cultural differences and LAC limited financial 
capacities25.
Brazil has by far been the major beneficiary of China’s 
investments in Latin America and the Caribbean even if it has 
suffered from a global decrease in inward FDI owing to the 
economic recession and the volatility of commodities prices, 
while Chile became the major recipient of Chinese FDI in 
201826. 
22 W. Grabendorff, “América Latina en la era Trump ¿Una región en disputa entre 
Estados Unidos y China?”, Nueva Sociedad, vol. 275, 2018, pp. 47-61, cit. p. 58.
23 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign 
Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2018, United Nations, Santiago, 
Chile, 2018, p. 39.
24 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign 
Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2019, United Nations, Santiago, 
Chile, 2019, p. 41.
25 M. Esteban (2015), pp. 45-48.
26 E. Dussel Peters, Monitor of  Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 
2019. Mexico, Red ALC-China, 2019, pp. 2; 6.
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Fig. 3.5 - LAC FDI from and to China, 2002-18, US$ billion
Source: E. Dussel Peters, Monitor of Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 2019, Mexico, Red ALC-China, 2019, cit. p. 5; 2018, p. 2; National 
Bureau of Statistics (2002-18). China Statistical Yearbook 2002-18, Beijing, 
People’s Republic of China, compiled by authors27
Until recently, China’s FDI was highly concentrated, with 
90% aimed at extractive activities during the 2010-2015 
period. This raised several issues including competition and the 
aforementioned risk of reprimarisation, while providing low 
economic benefits due to negligible added value and limited 
spill over effects. Although LAC trade with China has a positive 
impact on growth, the impact of Chinese FDI, on the other 
hand, seems to have been negligible28.
27 Figures of  IFDI “stocks”, ie China’s FDI stocks in LAC, correspond to cumulative 
IFDI flows during the period as compiled by E. Dussel Peters. Although not directly 
comparable, they provide useful estimates to compare orders of  magnitude.          
28 J. Timini and A. El-Dahrawy Sánchez-Albornoz, The impact of  China on Latin 
America: trade and foreign direct investment channels, Bank of  Spain, 2019, pp. 4-5.
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Fig. 3.6 - LAC FDI flows from China, 2008-18, % of total
Source: E. Dussel Peters (2019), cit. p. 6; ECLAC (2018b), cit. p. 56, 
compiled by authors
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In addition, this pattern of overconcentration goes hand 
in hand with social and environmental concerns. Notably, 
Chinese companies in LAC are associated with greenhousegas 
emissions and water consumption29. Furthermore, this has 
pushed LAC national regulation to the limit, fostering intra-
governmental conflicts between energy and environmental 
ministries30. However, LAC countries have not been passive 
and have issued several policy responses encompassing social 
and environmental measures31. 
Fig. 3.7 - China’s FDI in LAC, by sector, 2000-18, % of total
Source: E. Dussel Peters (2019), cit. p. 7, compiled by authors
29 R. Ray, K. Gallagher, A. López and C. Sanborn (eds.), China and Sustainable 
Development in Latin America: The Social and Environmental Dimension, New York, 
London, Anthem Press, 2017, pp. 7-11.
30 L. Lowe, “La dimensión ambiental de las inversiones directas de China en América 
Latina y el Caribe”, in E. Pastrana Buelvas and H. Gehring (eds.), La proyección 
de China en América Latina y el Caribe, Bogota, Editorial Pontificia Universidad 
Javeriana, Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 2017, pp. 339-361, cit. pp. 351-352.
31 R. Ray et al. (2017), pp. 12-13.
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Natural resources remain a significant target for China’s FDI as 
shown by recent acquisitions in Argentina and Chile accounting 
for an estimated 45.6% of the global production of lithium32. 
Yet, the first China-CELAC ministerial summit and the China-
Latin American and Caribbean Countries Cooperation Plan 
(2015-2019) both provided indications of an evolution in 
China’s FDI. Since 2012, Chinese FDI has notably shifted 
towards the service sector (mainly power generation) that 
amounted to US$33.4 billion and more than 50% of the total 
Chinese FDI from 2012 to 201733. Thus, Chinese investments 
are no longer mainly driven by a search for natural resources. 
They also aim to directly benefit from LAC domestic markets in 
terms of transfer of overcapacity, cost reduction, and increased 
competitiveness, offering economic opportunities at a time 
when China’s domestic economy is slowing down34. 
This diversification is reflected by the engagement of Chinese 
firms in a broad range of sectors including shipping (COSCO), 
renewable energies (Sinovel), the agricultural sector (China 
National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation), the financial 
sector (Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China), and telecommunications, with Huawei and ZTE 
engaged in the telecommunications networks of at least 24 LAC 
countries35.  
Financing
China’s financial relations have progressively evolved from 
extraction-based investments towards more diversified FDI, but 
also funding of infrastructure projects, science and technology 
32 K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 14.
33 Ibid., p. 13.
34 W. Oosterveld, E.  Wilms and K. Kertysova, The Belt and Road Initiative Looks 
East. Political Implications of  China’s Economic Forays in the Caribbean and the South 
Pacific. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2018, p. 19
35 N. Hamaguchi, J. Guo, and K. Chong-Sup (2018), pp. 25-28; K. Koleski and 
A. Blivas (2018), pp. 14-15.
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projects, within the institutional framework of the Belt and Road 
Initiative.
Since 2005, it is estimated that loans from Chinese policy 
banks to LAC have amounted to more than US$141 billion, 
with flows frequently above the aggregates from traditional 
multilateral actors like the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank36. In addition, China has also provided 
US$12 billion in official development assistance, mainly 
composed of debt relief in favour of Cuba. Chinese loans have 
mainly targeted the energy (US$96.9 billion) and infrastructure 
(US$25.9 billion) sectors, and provided a welcome source of 
revenues for countries with limited financing capacities like 
Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela. LAC financial needs allowed 
China to become a significant lender of last resort for several 
countries in the region, owning up to one third of Ecuador’s 
total public debt and 15% of Venezuela’s public external debt37. 
Loans and project financing have been concentrated in a 
limited number of countries, mainly Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, gathering three 
quarters of the projects from 2000 to 2017, and 85% of their 
total value38. Venezuela benefited from almost half of China’s 
loans to the region, US$67 billion39, but the country now faces 
reduced financial support since it is experiencing a severe socio-
economic crisis. 
Financing has primarily consisted of non-concessional loans 
provided by the China Development Bank. China’s financing 
meets a non-conditionality principle, but it consists of tied 
loans which imply a compulsory supply of Chinese goods 
and services40 at the expense of competitive tenders. LAC 
36 P. Zhang (2019). 
37 K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 11-12.
38 J.M. Salazar-Xirinachs et al. (2018), p. 233.
39 A. Bermúdez Liévano, China’s Belt and Road advances in Latin America’s Andean 
region, Dialogo Chino, 18 June 2019. 
40 S. Wintgens, “Chine-Amérique latine et Caraïbes : Un défi normatif  pour l’Union 
européenne? », Politique Européenne, vol. 60, 2018, pp. 134-173, p. 159.
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progressive integration within the BRI highlights a new step 
in the institutionalisation of China’s engagement in LAC 
infrastructure and energy projects. This follows a long-term 
interaction with regional institutions like the Inter-American 
Development Bank or the Caribbean Development Bank and 
the creation of specific financing mechanisms including the 
China-Latin America Cooperation Fund, the China-LAC 
Industrial Cooperation Investment Fund or the Special Loan 
Program for China-LAC Infrastructure Project. 
China’s financing also targets high value-added sectors, as 
highlighted by its scientific and technological cooperation. 
Since 2008, China has developed, launched and operated 
several satellites for Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. It also 
operates ground stations in Chile and Argentina, which have 
contributed to China’s exploration of the dark side of the moon 
and the deployment of the Beidou satellite navigation system41. 
China has developed joint scientific projects like the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences’ South America Centre for Astronomy 
(CASSACA) in Chile, recently framed as part of the BRI, and 
the Joint Laboratory for Space Weather in Brazil42.
Apart its environmental and social impact, China’s financing 
raises concerns on the host countries’ debt sustainability. 
Nevertheless, this risk may be limited to small and already highly 
indebted countries. For the others, Chinese loans appear to be 
a good alternative43 probably insufficient to trigger systemic 
debt issues in most Latin American economies. On the other 
hand, lack of conditionality may jeopardize the sustainability 
and long-term viability of development projects as well as the 
achievement of necessary reforms and good governance in LAC 
countries.
41 K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), pp. 17-18.
42 L.O. Chauvin and B. Fraser, “South America is embracing Beijing’s science silk road”, 
Nature, vol. 569, 2019, pp. 177-179, cit. p. 178.
43 A. Bermúdez Liévano (2019); W. Oosterveld, E.  Wilms and K. Kertysova 
(2018), p. 23.
Latin America and the New Global Order66
In that respect, Ecuador may prove to be a relevant case 
study. Non-conditional Chinese loans allowed President 
Rafael Correa’s administration to pursue social44 but financially 
unsustainable policies dependent on extractive activities45 and 
leading to high levels of deficit and public debt while postponing 
the necessary economic reforms required to compensate the 
end of the commodities super cycle. Failure to renegotiate 
“oil-for-loans” deals with China compelled Ecuador to turn 
to multilateral institutions and undertake economic reforms, 
throwing it into a major socio-economic crisis46.
As for the BRI, it remains unclear whether the initiative 
would catalyse greater Chinese financing or engagement in 
LAC infrastructure projects. Besides, economic difficulties and 
political uncertainty may lower the appeal of major projects 
for fiscally constrained LAC governments, while China could 
manage the issue by developing smaller but more predictable 
infrastructure projects47.
44 L. Herrera-Vinelli and M. Bonilla, “Ecuador-China Relations: the Growing 
Effect of  Chinese Investment on Ecuadorian Domestic Politics, 2007-
2016”, Journal of  Chinese Political Science, 24, 2018, pp. 623-641, doi:10.1007/
s11366-018-09588-6.
45 R. Aidoo, P. Martin, M. Ye, and D. Quiroga, “Footprints of  the Dragon: China’s 
Oil Diplomacy and its Impacts on Sustainable Development Policy in Ecuador 
and Ghana”, International Development Policy, vol. 8, no. 1, 2017, doi:10.4000/
poldev.2408; Reuters, “How China took control of  Ecuador’s oil”, Financial Post, 26 
November 2013. 
46 G. Escribano, Ecuador y los subsidios a los combustibles, Elcano Royal Institute, 2019; 
K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 27; A. Valencia, “Ecuador seeks renegotiation of  
China oil sales, loans”, Reuters, 24 October 2017. 
47 H. Niu, “A strategic analysis of  Chinese infrastructure projects in Latin 
America and the Caribbean”, in P. Dussel, A.C. Armony, and S. Cui (eds.), 
Building development for a new era : China’s infrastructure projects in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, University of  Pittsburgh, Red Académica de América Latina y el 
Caribe sobre China., 2018, pp. 180-193, cit. pp. 190-191.
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Political Relations
As a corollary, China-LAC relations have also expanded, 
producing global and regional implications. They encompass 
military diplomacy, with a rising geostrategic dimension within 
the geopolitical competition between China and the United 
States. 
Global governance
China and Latin America and the Caribbean have engaged in 
global cooperation in multilateral fora, including the United 
Nations (UN) and the G20, promoting similar interests and 
principles like the concept of differentiated responsibilities 
between developed and developing countries, and pushing for 
the reform of traditional international institutions. However, 
China-LAC, and more specifically China-Brazil cooperation, 
also falls within renewed frameworks of governance which 
make more room for emerging economies, including the group 
of BRICS48 or the New Development Bank. The BRI may 
also provide new mechanisms and platforms for international 
governance through high-level dialogues. The last Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation (BRF), held in Beijing in 
April, gathered thirty high-level LAC officials. To date, 18 of 
the 33 LAC countries have already joined the initiative (see 
Figure 3.8). Notably, recent diplomatic shifts from Taiwan to 
the PRC have led to official participation in the BRI, as the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama, all endorsed 
the initiative. On the other hand, the top four LAC economies, 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, which amount for 
75% of the region’s GDP, have yet to join the initiative.
48 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
Latin America and the New Global Order68
Fig. 3.8 - The BRI in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2019
Source: A. Bermúdez Liévano, China’s Belt and Road advances 
in Latin America’s Andean region, Dialogo Chino, 18 June 2019. 
China and Latin America and the Caribbean have engaged in 
global cooperation in multilateral fora, including the United 
Nations (UN) and the G20, promoting similar interests and 
principles like the concept of differentiated responsibilities 
between developed and developing countries, and pushing for 
the reform of traditional international institutions. However, 
China-LAC, and more specifically China-Brazil cooperation, 
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also falls within renewed frameworks of governance which 
make more room for emerging economies, including the group 
of BRICS49 or the New Development Bank. The BRI may 
also provide new mechanisms and platforms for international 
governance through high-level dialogues. The last Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation (BRF), held in Beijing in 
April, gathered thirty high-level LAC officials. To date, 18 of 
the 33 LAC countries have already joined the initiative (see 
Figure 3.8). Notably, recent diplomatic shifts from Taiwan to 
the PRC have led to official participation in the BRI, as the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama, all endorsed 
the initiative. On the other hand, the top four LAC economies, 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, which amount for 
75% of the region’s GDP, have yet to join the initiative.
Chinese engagement in Latin American and the Caribbean 
also has implications at the global level, for instance, by 
promoting LAC as a global actor through cooperation with 
the CELAC50. It is worth noting that emphasis on the China-
CELAC Forum as a platform out of the range of US influence 
does not entail competition with other regional organisations 
including the Organization of American States (OAS), or 
prejudice for multilateral governance, as the CELAC’s ordering 
principles  include human rights, democracy, the respect of 
international law and the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals. Furthermore, China has actively engaged 
in more “traditional” LAC organizations contributing to 
multilateral governance. Concerns about China’s seemingly 
specific approach to development cooperation should also 
be tempered. Despite being non-conditional and tied, 
China’s involvement is committed to both the Millennium 
Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals, 
and the guiding principles of Chinese international aid partly 
coincide with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. China 
49 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
50 S. Wintgens (2018), p. 144.
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would in fact have significant incentives to cooperate with 
DAC51 donors, including increased experience in aid evaluation 
and follow-up mechanisms as well as enhanced capacity to 
manage the socio-economic impact of projects, increasing both 
the sustainability of Chinese cooperation and China’s image52. 
This points to significant room for cooperation, all the more 
given LAC’s investment gap in infrastructure which amounts to 
6% of the region’s Growth Domestic Product (GDP)53.
Yet, China-LAC cooperation may not deliver the way 
LAC countries might hope. Despite an official South-South 
framework of cooperation, the structure of bilateral exchanges 
rather echoes patterns and issues traditionally associated with 
North-South trade. Furthermore, although the development of 
emerging economies and their cooperation generate structural 
changes within the international system, deep asymmetries are 
still at play, mostly in China’s favour54. Unless a major leap is made 
in economic development and integration, China’s engagement 
seems rather unlikely to substantially enhance the international 
role and visibility of LAC countries. Relations with China do not 
guarantee a significant role in global governance and the current 
interaction between China and the United States may jeopardize 
the global system of economic governance. In fact, the US-China 
trade war highlights the current crisis of the multilateral trading 
system, fostered by concerns over the Chinese economic model 
and by US unilateral policies, including tariffs and the blockade 
51 Members of  the Development Assistance Committee of  the OECD.
52 M. Esteban and A. Pérez, “Chinese financing of  Latin American development: 
Competition or complementarity with traditional donors?”, in E. Woertz (ed.), 
Reconfiguration of  the Global South: Africa, Latin America and the Asian Century, New 
York, Routledge, 2017, pp. 217-236.
53 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
International Trade Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean 2019, Santiago, Chile, 
United Nations, 2019, p. 159.
54 A.E. Abdenur, Navigating the Ripple Effects: Brazil-China Relations in Light of  the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Vestnik of  Saint Petersburg University, International 
Relations, vol. 12, no. 2, 2019, pp. 153-168., cit. p. 155, doi:10.21638/11701/
spbu06.2019.203.
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of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body. The 
latter is threatening the WTO dispute resolution system55 to 
which LAC countries have proved their commitment against 
China: from 1995 to 2017, top LAC economies accounted for a 
quarter of the anti-dumping cases against this country56.
Geostrategic rationale
For both parties, China-LAC relations provided an opportunity 
to diversify political and economic relations and partly reduce 
dependence on traditional partners, notably the United States. 
This process went hand in hand with the institutionalisation 
of the bilateral relations, through platforms like the China-
CELAC Forum, the China-Caribbean Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Forum or the China-Caribbean Consultations. 
China’s engagement has proved to be non-confrontational, and 
partly due to the relative strategic and economic “void” left by 
the EU and the US in the region. This made it easier for China 
to emerge as a significant partner for LAC countries, to the 
point of appearing as a key figure in political processes like the 
Venezuelan crisis57.
US-China geopolitical competition may disrupt this 
relatively innocuous panorama, as President Donald Trump’s 
Administration has adopted a more suspicious stance 
towards China. Official declarations and documents, like 
the 2017 National Security Strategy or the US Southern 
Command’s 2019 posture statement, expressed concerns 
about China’s engagement in LAC especially when it comes 
to connectivity infrastructure like the Panama Canal58 or 
LAC telecommunications networks59. US diplomacy has 
55 S. Jean, M. Philippe, and A. Sapir, International trade under attack : What strategy for 
Europe ?, Notes du conseil d’analyse économique, vol. 46, no. 1, 2018, pp. 1-12. 
56 N. Hamaguchi, J. Guo, and K. Chong-Sup (2018), pp. 15-16.
57 A. Bermúdez Liévano (2019).
58 Congressional Research Service, China’s Engagement with Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Washington, 2019.
59 K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 15.
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also warned that the BRI and China may be pursuing “debt-
trap diplomacy”. Yet, the US position does not appear to be 
echoed in LAC countries. Despite a restatement of the Monroe 
doctrine, the US have failed to offer a credible alternative to 
China’s engagement, and President Trump’s foreign policy 
may indeed have carried a relative isolationism towards Latin 
America and the Caribbean60.
Regardless of the  potential truce in the US-China trade war, 
all the more uncertain since US endorsement of Hong-Kong’s 
democratic claims, LAC countries should assume that the Sino-
American geopolitical competition will be a long-lasting one. 
Although the implications of such a competition have yet to be 
seen in the region, LAC has a clear interest in maintaining its 
economic relations with China, especially because the United 
States could not compensate China’s market opportunities61 
Therefore, it is advisable for LAC countries to proactively 
prevent a zero-sum geopolitical competition from affecting 
regional development, not least because infrastructure projects 
offer significant opportunities for multilateral cooperation given 
LAC’s major financial needs. A shift towards more inclusive, 
transparent and competitive bidding processes could disconnect 
infrastructure development from geopolitical positioning 
between China and the US while addressing BRI shortfalls 
reflected in an overrepresentation of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in BRI projects62. Enhancing transparency, 
competition and maintenance of a level-playing field would not 
only increase quality governance but also better respond to the 
interests of LAC debtor countries.
60 N. Hamaguchi, J. Guo, and K. Chong-Sup (2018), p. 8.
61 K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 27.
62 P. Zhang (2019).
China’s Engagement in Latin America 73
Security and Defence
To date, China’s has adopted a low-profile position and 
engagement in the field of defence and security, but has 
nevertheless increased its cooperation in these domains which 
offer efficient economic and diplomatic opportunities. China’s 
2016 Policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean focussed 
on cooperation, especially in promoting military exchanges 
with LAC countries, including visits of high-ranking officials 
and military training. This document also encompassed non-
traditional security fields, as well as trade and technological 
cooperation63. Security cooperation with LAC countries 
enables China to establish alternatives to Western security 
structures; it also offers levers of influence in non-military 
areas64. China’s high visibility military diplomacy initiatives 
include humanitarian missions like the dispatching of the Peace 
Ark hospital ship in 2011, 2015, and 201865.
“Traditional” military cooperation covers the supply of 
military equipment, assistance and training. Chinese military 
exports to the region have significantly increased in volume 
and sophistication, but they remain at moderate levels with 
China ranking only fifth behind the US, Russia, France, and 
Germany. China provides LAC with an affordable alternative 
to western sources and, more importantly, with a way to bypass 
western restrictions on arms sales while securing technology 
transfers66. ALBA67 countries, mainly Venezuela, have greatly 
benefited from China’s military exports, and China has become 
Venezuela’s largest military provider since 2014, supporting its 
efforts in modernising military forces and infrastructures68. 
Although, China’s engagement does not seem to pose any 
direct or immediate threat to US interests, US officials have 
63 W. Oosterveld, E.  Wilms, and K. Kertysova (2018), p. 39.
64 M. Esteban (2015), p. 19.
65 K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 20.
66 M. Esteban (2015), p. 21; K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), pp. 20-21; 29; 39-40.
67 From Spanish Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, i.e. 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of  Our America.
68 M. Esteban (2015), p. 20; W. Oosterveld, E.  Wilms and K. Kertysova (2018), p. 41.
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expressed concerns over China’s significant access to dual-use 
fields such as telecommunications networks or space programs 
which could “facilitate intelligence collection, compromise 
communication networks, and ultimately constrain [US] ability 
to work with [its] partners”69. Uncertainties still surround several 
projects like Argentina’s US$50 million Chinese-funded satellite 
and Patagonia space mission control centre opened in March 
2018 and operated by the China Satellite Launch and Tracking 
Control General department of the People’s Liberation Army70. 
US concerns also crystallise around China’s engagement in 
the Panama Canal likely to “create[s] commercial and security 
vulnerabilities for the United States”71.
China And LAC Regional Integration 
Despite China’s preference for bilateral frameworks and the 
existence of some diplomatic and institutional constraints, like 
Paraguay’s official recognition of Taiwan within Mercosur72, 
China’s engagement and its contribution to LAC’s economic 
growth has indirectly benefited regional organisations, which 
have acknowledged the importance of their economic relations 
with China, and Asia-Pacific in general. More specifically, 
China’s foreign policy in Latin America also incorporates an 
increasingly multilateral dimension, building on a long-term 
engagement with regional organisations and institutions like 
Mercosur, The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Inter-American Development 
Bank, or the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino). China’s 
69 K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), p. 29.
70 L.O. Chauvin  and B. Fraser (2019), p. 179.
71 K. Koleski and A. Blivas (2018), pp. 18; 25.
72 For the Spanish Mercado Común del Sur and Portuguese Mercado Comum do Sul, i.e. 
the Common Market of  the South. L. Bizzozero and S. Wintgens, “The politico-
normative approach of  the EU and China towards Mercosur: a positive-sum 
game?”, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, vol. 119, 2018, pp. 265-286, cit. pp. 
268 and 280, doi:10.24241/rcai.2018.119.1.265.
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shift towards infrastructure projects may also help LAC countries 
address their critical infrastructure deficit which hampers the 
region’s growth and development, by bolstering connectivity, 
exports capacities and logistic costs reduction, and contributing 
to regional sustainable development and achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals73. 
However, real and perceived regional fragmentation due to 
productive and political differences is jeopardizing common 
positioning towards China at the risk of prolonging current 
shortfalls and imbalances74. The recent deployment of the Belt 
and Road Initiative may entail economic benefits, but also 
negative effects. Enhanced connectivity, economic production 
and exchanges, may increase both Chinese goods penetration 
and competition in LAC markets, as well as competition with 
other economic regions that are more successful in benefitting 
from the BRI’s potential75. Hence, there is an urgent need for 
strategic thinking to boost infrastructure development and 
exports competitiveness, including lowering production and 
improving technological and added value, to overcome the 
current lack of regional or sub-regional strategies76. Such a 
need is even more significant as the current displacement of 
the geopolitical and geo-economic centre of gravity toward Asia 
and “Greater Eurasia” not only erodes the position of the US 
in the international system, but also affects LAC economies by 
potentially keeping them in the “periphery”77. 
Overcoming the challenge of regionalism would greatly 
depend on LAC political cycles whose convergence have proved 
to be essential in fostering favourable regional frameworks and 
73 Y. Li and X. Zhu (2019).
74 E. Tzili Apango, “Antecedentes y proyecciones del Foro China-Celac y su 
influencia en la dinámica hemisférica”, in E. Pastrana Buelvas and H. Gehring 
(eds.), La proyección de China en América Latina y el Caribe Bogota, Editorial Pontificia 
Universidad Javeriana, Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 2017, pp. 155-169, cit. pp. 
160-162.
75 P. Zhang (2019). 
76 M. Myers (2018). 
77 A.E. Abdenur (2019), pp. 164-166.
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South-South cooperation, and might influence the positioning 
of LAC countries with respect to China and the US. This issue 
has been particularly salient in the case of Brazil, especially in 
the wake of the rapid and recent political changes in the country. 
Although the transition from the left-wing governments of Luiz 
Lula Inácio da Silva and Dilma Rousseff to the conservative one 
of Michel Temer did not entail significant changes regarding 
Brazil policy towards China and Chinese investments, Jair 
Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign and (re)alignment with US 
foreign policy casted some doubts on the future of China-
Brazil relations. Yet, despite his unprecedented official visit to 
Taiwan and initial anti-China rhetoric, to date, Brazil’s policy 
towards China has ultimately favoured continuity over change, 
helped by pragmatism, financial and electorate interests and the 
moderate stance of several members of the Bolsonaro presidential 
Administration78 as highlighted during reciprocal visits of the 
heads of state in October and November 2019. Furthermore, 
China has proven to be a convenient partner amid international 
criticism against President Bolsonaro’s social and environmental 
policies. China has also provided reliable, and unique, foreign 
support during the recent auction of the pre-salt oil deposits, 
with a 20% participation of China National Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Development Corporation (CNODC) in the 
Aram block and a combined 10% participation of CNODC 
and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
in the Buzios field79. Hence, despite US pressure, especially 
against Huawei’s involvement in Brazil telecommunications 
networks, Brazilian authorities have expressed their will to stay 
away from US-China disputes80. 
78 Ibid., p. 161; O. Stuenkel, “In Spite of  Bolsonaro, China Quietly Deepens its Influence 
in Brazil”, Americas Quarterly, 12 November 2019. 
79 M. Parraga, G. Slattery, and M. Nogueira, Big oil stuns Brazil in back-to-back 
auction flops. Reuters, 17 November 2019; B. Harris, C. Pulice, and A. Schipani, 
“Brazil’s blockbuster oil auction falls flat”, Financial Times, 6 November 2019. 
80 “Bolsonaro says wants no role for Brazil in U.S.-China trade war”, Reuters, 14 
November 2019.
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Conclusion: Will China Live Up To  
Latin American’s Expectations? 
China’s multidimensional engagement in Latin America and the 
Caribbean has been steadily increasing and has recently started to 
present welcome features, including a diversification of China’s 
FDI beyond extractive activities and a proven involvement in the 
region’s infrastructures. China’s engagement has also fostered the 
diversification of LAC political, economic and security relations, 
seemingly contributing to a more pluralistic international order 
and a moderation of the United States regional hegemony. 
LAC officials have expressed positive views regarding China’s 
engagement, both at national and regional level. Accordingly, 
China has been praised as a “benchmark for innovation and 
development and [as a source of ] invest[ment]” by Ecuador’s 
President Lenin Moreno, and, within the CELAC, the BRI 
has been framed as a significant opportunity for development 
cooperation81, diversification, and improvement of the quality of 
China-LAC trade and financial relations82.
81 Declaración de Santiago de la II Reunión Ministerial del Foro Celac-China: 
‘Celac-China: trabajando por más desarrollo, innovación y cooperación para nuestros pueblos’, 
22 January 2018. 
82 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative is an Opportunity for Inclusive and Sustainable Investments: 
ECLAC, 7 December 2018a.
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Fig. 3.9 - Positive opinions on China in LAC top economies, 
2016-18, % of respondents
Source: Latinobarómetro, compiled by authors
LAC authorities see China as a crucial partner for development, 
echoing globally positive public perceptions of the country. 
Favourable opinions on China are indeed a majority in LAC’s 
eight major economies (84% of the region’s total population) 
and are growing, except in Ecuador and Peru, in contrast with 
the deterioration of the image of the US. Yet, challenges persist, 
including a primarisation of LAC’s export structure, patterns 
of dependency, a certain lack of transparency and relative 
uncertainties regarding China’s financing in the region. High 
hopes could very well fall short from expectations, especially at 
a time of deceleration of the Chinese economy and amid the 
long-term US-China geopolitical competition and political, 
social and economic uncertainties in the region, ranging from 
the Venezuelan crisis, to sluggish growth in Brazil and recent 
civil protest in Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador. 
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Fig. 3.10 - Share of respondents willing 
to increase economic or international relations 
with China, the US, and the EU, in LAC top economies, 2017, % 
of total
Source: Latinobarómetro, compiled by authors
Ultimately, Latin American countries bear the responsibility 
to determine a precise and strategic vision of what to expect 
from China, as well as how to implement favourable policies 
to promote long-term, responsible and sustainable economic 
growth83. To this end, it should be convenient to also strengthen 
relations with third actors, especially the EU, which has thus far 
distanced itself from the US-China trade war. Third-country 
and triangular cooperation should prove particularly useful to 
ensure higher quality products and services, better social and 
environmental standards, and increase participation of private 
actors, while improving economic efficiency. LAC shares EU 
83 M. Myers (2018), p. 242.
Latin America and the New Global Order80
interests and concerns regarding the protection of an “open, 
multilateral and rules-based trading system”84 challenged by US 
unilateral policies, China’s statist model of development and any 
discriminatory agreements the two superpowers may reach.
84 ECLAC (2018a).
4.  The First Year of the  
     Bolsonaro’s Foreign Policy
Guilherme Casarões 
When former army captain and lawmaker Jair Bolsonaro was 
elected President of Brazil, many thought they would watch a 
rerun of a sad Latin American soap opera from the 1970s, which 
starred presidents in military uniform and contained scenes 
of violent suppression of civil liberties1. While he has never 
hidden a nostalgic admiration for the military dictatorships 
of the region, which he often (mistakenly) pictures as an era 
of orderly societies and economic prosperity, time has shown 
that Bolsonaro’s image is not quite that of the leader of a junta. 
Despite having many generals in his cabinet, including Vice-
President Hamilton Mourão, Bolsonaro is, above all, a culture 
warrior2.
As such, he is engaged in a crusade to bring God, the nation 
and the (traditional) family back into the political mainstream. 
More than undertaking liberal reforms or fighting corruption, 
the centrepiece of Bolsonaro’s strategy is to reconstruct Brazilian 
culture as a mixture of nationalism, religious fundamentalism 
and an old-fashioned hatred of communism. As his most popular 
slogan goes, “Brazil above everything, God above everyone”.
To this end, Bolsonaro needs to warp the basic rules of 
the democratic game in Brazil, otherwise known as a secular, 
1 “Jair Bolsonaro, Latin America’s Last Menace”, The Economist, 20 September 2018. 
2 C. Liyanage, “The Rise of  a Culture Warrior: Jair Bolsonaro’s far-right revolution”, 
CARR Blog Series, 2 December 2019. 
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peaceful and pluralistic country. In the far-right parlance, 
Bolsonaro is playing the game of “metapolitics” – which may 
be broadly defined as an attempt to bring about profound and 
lasting political transformation by spreading ideas and cultural 
values across society3.
Foreign Policy as the Centrepiece 
of Brazil’s New Identity
Foreign policy, as much as education and arts, lies at the heart 
of the metapolitical game. A new Brazilian culture requires 
projecting a new identity to the world. Brazil’s renewed identity, 
in turn, redefines the fundamental aspects of its international 
relations, including priorities, allies and enemies.
Bolsonaro’s foreign policy envisions a world of strong and 
sovereign nations as opposed to one marked by multiculturalism 
and open borders. It places Brazil solidly in the (cultural) West 
and aspires to join the battle to regenerate its Judeo-Christian 
foundations; it seeks to forge alliances with other far-right 
governments in the world, starting with Trump’s America, 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel and Viktor Orbán’s Hungary; and it 
has declared war against the spectres of globalism and socialism.
The members of the so-called “anti-globalist” troika are 
Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo, Presidential Adviser Filipe 
Martins and Bolsonaro’s son and lawmaker Eduardo Bolsonaro, 
who is also the chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee. 
Under the influence of philosopher-turned-guru Olavo de 
Carvalho4, they have been responsible for the most thorough 
departure from Brazil’s diplomatic tradition since the Republic 
began. From the United Nations to Greenpeace, from Leonardo 
di Caprio to Greta Thunberg, Bolsonaro’s Brazil wishes to break 
off with any institution, ideology or value that might threaten 
3 B. Teitelbaum, “Daniel Friberg and Metapolitics in Action” in M. Sedgwich 
(ed.), New Thinkers of  the Radical Right, New York, Oxford University Press, 2019.
4 B. Winter, “Jair Bolsonaro’s Guru”, Americas Quarterly, 17 December 2018. 
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what they claim is the true conservative nature of the Brazilian 
people.
Oddly enough, this rupture seems to include the wholesale 
rejection of climate change and basic human rights, dismissed 
by Bolsonaro’s foreign policy team as “globalist” and “leftist” 
conspiracies. As deforestation rages and indigenous people are 
killed by illegal loggers, miners and land-grabbers, the international 
community holds its breath5. For one, the government’s decision 
to turn a blind eye to the massive fires in the Amazon rainforest 
led to some strong international reactions such as claiming that 
Brazil was “a bigger threat than either Iran or China”6 and asking 
who would “invade Brazil to save the Amazon”7.
A Tug of War within the Government
Anti-globalists, in charge of reconstructing Brazil’s identity, 
sit uncomfortably alongside free-market advocates from the 
administration’s economic team. Led by Finance Minister Paulo 
Guedes, they work closely with Brazil’s agribusiness giants, 
which constitute the country’s most profitable sector, and have 
been struggling to pass liberalising reforms and boost Brazilian 
exports. The only ideology they care about is unchecked 
liberalism.
Bolsonaro’s free-marketeers know very well that Brazil 
cannot broker any major free trade agreement – as the one 
between Mercosur and the European Union – without a clear 
commitment to human rights and environmental standards. 
Moreover, they are aware that growing alignment with the 
United States and Israel might hamper good trade relations with 
5 A. Pagliarini, “The Amazon is burning – and it’s Bolsonaro’s fault”, Jacobin, 25 August 
2019. 
6 T. Bellstrom, “Brazil is a bigger threat than either Iran or China”, The New 
Republic, 26 July 2019.
7 S. Walt, “Who Will Invade Brazil to Save the Amazon?”, Foreign Policy, 5 August 
2019. After the controversy sparked by the article’s title, it was later changed to 
“Who Will Save the Amazon (and How)?”.
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some of Brazil’s most important partners, like China and Arab 
countries.
The government’s top military officials have also been 
disgusted at the ideological paranoia of anti-globalists. Despite 
initial attempts by Vice-President Mourão to put foreign policy 
back on track8, Bolsonaro’s generals have been downgraded to a 
secondary status after several clashes with the president’s closest 
aides, including Bolsonaro’s sons and Presidential Adviser Filipe 
Martins. Perhaps the most dramatic episode of this estrangement 
was the firing of (retired) General Santos Cruz, who served as 
Bolsonaro’s secretary of government, over accusations of him 
being a traitor and a “globalist”9.
There seems to be a lot of wishful thinking as to whether 
Bolsonaro’s military and economic aides would be the “adults 
in the room”10 in checking the international affairs team, which 
is sometimes jokingly referred to as the government’s “lunatic 
fringe”11. To be sure, Guedes and other pragmatic government 
officials have been trying to advance an ambitious trade and 
investment agenda with European, Chinese and Arab officials, 
while the military have temporarily prevented Brazil from 
openly supporting regime change in Venezuela and moving 
the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem. But the fact is that anti-
globalism remains as the key driving force of Brazil’s new 
foreign policy, reflected in Bolsonaro’s attitudes toward new 
and old partners, his growing suspicion of multilateralism and 
his efforts to change South America’s regional order.
8 “Não é o caso de comprar brigas que não podemos vencer, diz Hamilton Mourão” , (“It’s 
not a case of  buying fights that we can‘t win, says Hamilton Mourão”), Folha de 
S. Paulo, 23 November 2018.
9 “Bolsonaro fires key moderate who warned of  dangers of  ‘extremism’”, The 
Guardian, 13 June 2019.
10 O. Stuenkel, “How Bolsonaro’s Rivalry with His Vice President Is Shaping Brazilian 
Politics”, Americas Quarterly, 18 April 2019. 
11 “Brazilian diplomats ‘disgusted’ as Bolsonaro pulverizes foreign policy”, The Guardian, 
25 June 2019. 
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The Two Pillars of Bolsonaro’s  
Foreign Policy Design
Deus Vult! Bringing christianity back in
Bolsonaro’s conservative, anti-globalist foreign policy has 
overlapping religious and ideological elements. Sometimes it is 
presented as a purely Christian endeavour, a view consistent 
with his recurring claims that Brazil is a “Christian nation” 
and with the (loose) alliance of Catholic and Evangelical 
conservatives that backed Bolsonaro’s election bid12. The new 
president’s decision to hand the ministry of Human Rights over 
to an Evangelical pastor, Damares Alves, was a clear sign that 
the transformation of Brazil’s human rights policies would start 
at home.
Such changes had to be in line with a renewed diplomatic 
strategy. Ambassador Ernesto Araújo’s willingness to be at the 
forefront of Brazil’s “spiritual rebirth”13, which involved “talking 
about God in public” and forging an unlikely pact with the 
world’s major Christian powers – the US and Russia14 – are said 
to have been decisive for his appointment as Foreign Minister. 
In his inaugural speech, Araújo, a practicing Catholic, said that 
the hatred of God in Western societies, or “theophobia”, was 
destroying mankind15.
As a result, two of Bolsonaro’s foreign policy goals were to 
promote Christian values and to protect Christians across the 
world. These objectives have had a direct impact on Brazil’s 
12 C. Osborn, “Bolsonaro’s Christian Coalition Remains Precarious”, Foreign 
Policy, 1 January 2019.
13 E. Araújo, “Now We Do”, The New Criterion, January 2019. 
14 “Futuro Chanceler Propôs a Bolsonaro Pacto Cristao com EUA e Rússia” (“Future 
Chancellor Proposed Bolsonaro Christian Pact with USA and Russia”), Folha de 
S. Paulo, 16 December 2018. 
15 Discurso do ministro Ernesto Araújo durante cerimônia de Posse no Ministério das Relações 
Exteriores – Brasília, 2 de janeiro de 2019 (Speech by Minister Ernesto Araújo during 
the inauguration ceremony at the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs - Brasília, 2 January 
2019), Ministry of  Foreign Affairs – Speeches.
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multilateral policies, especially regarding human rights. 
Departing from Brazilian traditionally progressive positions, 
the new president chastised non-governmental organizations 
and humanitarian activists, and reversed its UN vote on 
reproductive health rights, gender issues and Israeli human 
rights violations against Palestinians16.
“Our votes at the UN will be in accordance with the Bible”, 
declared Bolsonaro at a meeting with evangelical leaders, 
adding that his decisions would be guided by the verse John 
8:32: “Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set 
you free”17. The same verse was also quoted in Bolsonaro’s UN 
speech, as it is in most of his public statements.
The Christian turn of Brazil’s foreign policy has also 
affected its strategic partnerships. Brazil allied with Poland in 
negotiations that led to the establishment of the “International 
Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based 
on Religion or Belief ”18. A few months later, the Bolsonaro 
administration wholeheartedly supported the Alliance for 
Religious Freedom, an initiative spearheaded by President 
Trump and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. It also 
promoted the event “Rebuilding Communities: ensuring a 
future for persecuted Christians” together with Hungary. Once 
again, Araújo blamed the cultural atmosphere in the West, 
which “does not care about Christianity”, for the persecutions 
of Christian populations worldwide19.
16 J. Chade, “Viés ideológico transforma votos do Brasil na ONU”, UOL, 26 
September 2019. 
17 “Bolsonaro diz que Brasil passou a votar na ONU seguindo a Bíblia”, O Globo, 
11 April 2019.
18 J. Chade, “Governo Bolsonaro denuncia na ONU perseguição contra cristãos” 
(“Bolsonaro government denounces persecution against Christians at UN”), 
UOL, 7 September 2019.
19 Palavras do Ministro Ernesto Araújo no evento “Rebuilding Communities: 
Ensuring a Future for Persecuted Christians” – Nova York, 27 de setembro 
de 2019 (Remarks by Minister Ernesto Araújo at the event “Rebuilding 
Communities: Ensuring a Future for Persecuted Christians” - New York, 27 
September 2019), Ministry of  Foreign Affairs – Speeches.
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Finally, religious beliefs might partly explain Brazil’s immediate 
recognition of Senator Jeanine Añez as the interim President 
of Bolivia after Evo Morales fled the country under pressure 
from the armed forces. Amid popular turmoil over allegations 
of electoral fraud, Añez took office brandishing a giant leather-
bound Bible and announcing that “the Bible has returned to the 
presidential palace”, in clear defiance of Morales’s attempts to do 
away with the Christian foundations of Bolivia.
Añez was backed by charismatic far-right politician and 
civic leader of the wealthy Santa Cruz province, Luis Fernando 
Camacho. With constant mentions of “the power of God”, he 
rose to prominence as “the Bolivian Bolsonaro” and was one 
of the key figures behind Morales’s ousting20. A few months 
before the controversial Bolivian elections, the regional 
Catholic activist held a meeting with Brazilian anti-globalists 
Araújo and Martins, and a leaked audio of Camacho suggested 
that he might have received instructions from Brazil on how to 
organise the opposition against Morales21.
Conservatives of the world, unite!
Most of the time, however, Bolsonaro’s foreign policy displays an 
ultraconservative ideology that goes well beyond defending the 
Christian faith. Perhaps the most visible feature of Bolsonaro’s 
international strategy is teaming up with other conservative 
leaders around the world. During the presidential campaign, 
Bolsonaro clearly advocated stronger ties with the United States 
and Israel, primarily for electoral reasons. After all, he wanted 
to associate his own image to Donald Trump’s, as the nation-
loving underdog who ultimately spoke on behalf of the silent 
majority, and the relationship with Israel seemed critical for 
Bolsonaro to charm Evangelical voters.
20 “How Bolivia’s Evo Morales Was Brought Down With the Help of  an Obscure 
Conservative With a Bible”, Time, 15 November 2019. 
21 “Opositor boliviano esteve no Itamaraty e no Planalto” (“Bolivian opponent 
was at Itamaraty and Planalto”), Valor Econômico, 12 November 2019. 
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As Bolsonaro got elected and formed his foreign policy 
cabinet, however, it became clear that relations with Washington 
and Tel Aviv were part of a more sophisticated design, which 
involved the establishment of a conservative front with other 
far-right leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Poland’s 
Andrzej Duda and Italy’s Matteo Salvini.
If Bolsonaro’s guru Olavo de Carvalho was the mastermind of the 
Brazilian anti-globalist thinking, it was former Trump adviser and 
far-right ideologue Steve Bannon who turned it into a full-fledged 
international strategy. Their fingerprints are all over Bolsonaro’s 
international alliances, whose main goal is to wage a permanent 
war against globalist and socialist forces across the planet22.
The best antidote to globalism, so the theory goes, is nationalism. 
Therefore, another objective of Bolsonaro’s international plan is 
to strengthen the role of nations as opposed to supranational 
values and institutions. Araújo and other foreign policy makers 
never hid their fascination for the ultranationalist governments 
of Israel, Hungary and Poland. “We admire those who fight for 
their country and those who love themselves as a people […]. 
The problem of the world is not xenophobia, but oikophobia – 
to hate one’s own home”, philosophised the Foreign Minister as 
he took office23.
Bolsonaro’s Brazil went as far as to propose, again together 
with Orbán’s Hungary, that the national identity be considered 
a fundamental human right. “Global or transnational issues 
cannot serve as pretext to impose policies detrimental to 
national institutions or that violate national identity”, both 
countries stated in a joint communiqué24.
22 G.R. Tsavkko, “Bolsonaro and Brazil court the Global Far-Right”, NACLA, 21 
August 2019. 
23 “Discurso do ministro Ernesto Araújo durante cerimônia de Posse no 
Ministério das Relações Exteriores” “Speech by Minister Ernesto Araújo during 
inauguration ceremony at the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs”),  Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs, 2 January 2019.
24 “Comunicado Conjunto Brasil-Hungria – Visita Oficial do Ministro dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros e Comércio Exterior da Hungria, Péter Szijjártó – Brasília, 8 de outubro de 
2019”, (“Brazil-Hungary Joint Communiqué - Official Visit of  the Hungarian 
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Religious and nationalist worldviews explain Brazil’s 
unprecedented contempt for multilateralism. The basic claim 
is that most policies set forth by multilateral institutions are 
formulated and implemented by a globalist bureaucracy that 
utterly disregards national interests, values (including religious 
ones) and particularities. UN-led agendas of multiculturalism 
and migration would permanently endanger these values.
Bolsonaro’s negative attitude towards international 
organizations was already clear in the presidential race, when 
he launched one of his most remarkable anti-UN rants: “If I am 
elected president, I’ll leave the UN, which is a useless institution. 
It is a gathering of communists”. The then candidate was furious 
at a UN Human Rights Committee decision requesting that 
Brazil take all necessary measures to ensure that his arch-rival 
Lula could fully exert his political rights – and therefore run for 
president from prison.
As the campaign progressed and his anti-globalist rhetoric 
became more consistent, Bolsonaro specified that he would not 
pull out from the UN, only from its Human Rights Committee, 
as well as from some international treaties supposedly damaging 
to Brazilian sovereignty, such as the Paris Agreement and the 
UN Global Compact for Migration. While pressure from 
economic groups ensured that Bolsonaro would adhere to the 
climate deal, he withdrew from the migration pact – which had 
been signed by the previous administration just a few weeks 
earlier – as his first foreign policy decision. By so doing, Brazil 
joined a group of five conservative countries that had rejected 
the pact from the outset – the US, Israel, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland.
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Péter Szijjártó - Brasília, 8 
October 2019”), Nota 255, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs. 
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Bolsonaro’s New Global Friends 
(and Some Accidental “Frenemies”)
A blessed friendship with Israel
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the first 
nationalist leader Bolsonaro tried to court. As presidential 
elections approached, Israel became Bolsonaro’s strongest link 
with Evangelical voters, who generally consider support for 
the Jewish state as part of the Biblical prophecy of the second 
coming of Christ. Trump’s decision to transfer the US embassy 
to Jerusalem, in December 2017, gave Bolsonaro a tangible 
foreign policy platform to campaign in Evangelical churches 
across the country25.
Not only did Bolsonaro’s vow to move the Brazilian embassy 
to Jerusalem resonate strongly with his Evangelical base, 
but it also provided Netanyahu with a potential diplomatic 
breakthrough. Almost a year after Trump’s announcement, only 
Guatemala and Paraguay had followed his lead, while other 
allies like Hungary, Australia and the Czech Republic remained 
reluctant. Brazil’s recognition of Israeli claims over the Holy 
City could be a game changer for the Prime Minister as he ran 
for re-election26.
In a clear sign of goodwill, Netanyahu was one of the few 
foreign leaders to attend the Brazilian president’s inauguration, 
together with Viktor Orbán. The Israeli premier also rushed to 
send humanitarian aid to the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais 
following the Brumadinho dam disaster in late January 2019.
But the pinnacle of this blossoming relationship was 
Bolsonaro’s trip to Jerusalem, just one week before Israel’s 
general elections. Both sides were enthusiastic about it. By 
25 G. Casarões, “Eleições, política externa e os desafios do novo governo” 
(“Elections, foreign policy and the challenges of  the new government”), 
Pensamiento Propio, vol. 24, 2019, pp. 49-50.
26 Y. Trofimov, “Global Positioning Helps Israel’s Netanyahu in Election and 
Beyond”, Focus on Israel, vol. 19, no. 16, 2019.
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choosing Israel for one of his first international presidential 
trips, the new Brazilian President, whose approval ratings at 
home were falling, hoped to convey the image of a responsible 
statesman with a robust foreign policy agenda. Netanyahu, on 
his part, thought that the Brazilian embassy transfer would 
be the trump card to secure his stay in power. Bolsonaro even 
became the first foreign leader to be accompanied by the Israeli 
Prime Minister on a visit to Jerusalem’s Western Wall27.
However, thanks to pressure from the agribusiness and 
military sectors, which were dismayed at Arab and Islamic 
threats to boycott Brazilian halal products, Bolsonaro fell short 
of announcing the embassy move. Instead, he promised to open 
a trade and investment office in Jerusalem, along the lines of 
other conservative governments.
While the Brazilian president’s decision frustrated Netanyahu, 
who since then has experienced a long and turbulent period 
of political indecisiveness, both countries have decided to 
maintain good relations. At the launching ceremony of Brazil’s 
trade and investment office in Jerusalem, in mid-December 
2019, Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro cited a Biblical verse 
to reiterate his government’s pledge to relocate the embassy, 
“because we do believe that whoever blesses Israel will be 
blessed, and whoever curses Israel will be cursed”28. 
“The United States and Brazil above all”
No nationalist leader fascinated the Bolsonaro administration 
more than Donald Trump. Bolsonaro and his closest aides have 
always looked up to the US President as the man who challenged 
the political establishment on his path to the presidency. As a 
presidential hopeful, Bolsonaro enjoyed promoting himself as 
the “Tropical Trump” and mimicked Trump’s electoral tactics, 
rhetoric and mannerisms29.
27 “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Visits Western Wall with Netanyahu”, Haaretz, 1 April 2019. 
28 “Brazil opens trade office in Jerusalem, hailed as harbinger of  embassy move”, 
The Times of  Israel, 15 December 2019.
29 “For Trump, Brazil’s President is Like Looking in the Mirror”, The New York Times, 
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Foreign Minister Araújo went as far as to hail him as the 
saviour of Western civilisation. In a controversial article 
published in late 2017, Araújo, then an unknown diplomat, 
claimed that Trump’s vision of a “world of sovereign and 
independent nations” was the key to saving the West from 
its moral decline and to restoring the West’s faith in God, the 
family and the nation30.
It came as no surprise that relations with Trump became the 
cornerstone of Bolsonaro’s foreign policy. As soon as Bolsonaro 
won the elections, he rushed to announce that his first 
international presidential trip would be to the US31. Therefore, 
the new president’s much-acclaimed trip to Washington, which 
took place in mid-March 2019, had a deep symbolic function, 
as Bolsonaro hoped to showcase – primarily to his own political 
base – the alignment between the two far-right leaders.
Yet, the extreme optimism with which the new Brazilian 
government sought to establish a special relationship with 
Washington was in stark contrast with the pragmatism of 
President Trump, to whom Brazil was not exactly a priority. 
Knowing that Bolsonaro would go great lengths to nurture this 
friendship, the US President successfully brokered the use of 
the Alcantara rocket launch base, over which negotiations had 
been stalled for almost two decades, and swayed Brazil into 
forgoing its special status at the World Trade Organization. 
In exchange, Trump promised to support Brazil’s bid to join 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and to reopen US markets to Brazilian beef32.
19 March 2019. 
30 E. Araújo, “Trump e o Ocidente”, Cadernos de Política Exterior, vol. 3, no. 
6, 2017. A fully translated version to English is available at https://www.
centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2019/01/07/brazils-new-foreign-minister-gives-
profound-philosophical-base-to-trumpian-populism/
31 In fact, Bolsonaro’s first trip abroad as President was to Davos, Switzerland, 
where he attended the annual World Economic Forum meeting.
32 Office of  the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement from President Donald J. 
Trump and President Jair Bolsonaro”, 19 March 2019. 
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Besides the bilateral give-and-take, the US saw Brazil as an 
important pawn in the regional geopolitical chessboard. This 
explains Trump’s decision to grant Brazil the status of a major 
non-NATO ally. Despite this being a primarily symbolic move, 
it seemed sufficient to ensure Bolsonaro’s long-term loyalty. 
At the end of the state visit, then National Security Advisor 
John Bolton tweeted: “We’re proud to make Brazil a Major 
Non-NATO Ally, and look forward to working with them on 
Venezuela, Iran, and China. A great meeting with a strong new 
strategic partner!”33.
Bolton’s tweet was revealing of what the Trump administration 
wanted from Brazil: an ally to overthrow the Maduro regime 
in Venezuela, to bring to an end Iran’s activity in the region 
(especially through Hezbollah, which is considered an Iranian 
proxy) and to curb China’s growing trade and technology 
presence in Latin America.
Bolsonaro diligently adhered to US policies towards Venezuela 
and Iran. As for the former, during his trip to Washington, 
the Brazilian President seconded Trump in asserting that “all 
options were on the table” for addressing the Venezuelan crisis. 
While Brazil’s military and diplomatic establishment rejected 
the use of force against Nicolás Maduro, Bolsonaro, his son and 
Congressman Eduardo34 and some close aides often flirted with 
the possibility.
Since Bolsonaro did not consider Iran a strategic priority, he 
thoroughly supported US policies to curb the Islamic Republic’s 
actions. It could even be useful for strengthening ties with Israel 
while at the same time pleasing Iran’s Arab rivals in the Gulf. 
So, in early February 2019, Foreign Minister Araújo attended 
the US-led Middle East peace conference in Warsaw, which in 
practice was a controversial gathering of Trump’s allies to exert 
33 John Bolton on Twitter, 19 March 2019, https://twitter.com/ambjohnbolton/
status/1108099037536882688.
34 “Eduardo Bolsonaro fala sobre força militar na Venezuela e causa polêmica” 
(“Eduardo Bolsonaro talks about military force in Venezuela and causes 
controversy”), Jornal Nacional, 22 March 2019. 
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diplomatic pressure to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Brazil 
was so eager to jump on the US bandwagon that it offered to 
host the 2020 “anti-Iran” conference35.
On top of this, Eduardo Bolsonaro, who chairs the House 
Committee on Foreign Relations, suggested that Brazil should 
start considering Hezbollah, a close Iran ally, as a terrorist 
organization. Earlier in 2019, under Washington’s influence, 
both Argentina and Paraguay had done the same36. The 
suggestion caused dismay among Bolsonaro’s military and 
diplomatic aides, who believed confronting Iran could make 
Brazil a target of international terrorism.
The best friend Chinese money could buy
China, in turn, was a much more delicate issue for Bolsonaro. 
Not only had China been Brazil’s largest trading partner for 
a decade, with commerce reaching US$100 billion annually, 
it was also responsible for Brazil’s massive trade surpluses. 
Brazilian diplomats, military officials and farmers did not hide 
their anxiety when Bolsonaro, who was already leading the 
polls in the 2018 presidential race, made repeated attacks on 
China for trying to “buy Brazil”. 
Earlier that year, a parliamentary trip to Taiwan had 
infuriated the Chinese government, which claimed Bolsonaro 
and his fellow lawmakers had challenged China’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Even though the Xi administration 
acted very carefully once Bolsonaro got elected, the state-owned 
newspaper China Daily published some editorials painting a 
bleak picture of the future of Brazil-China relations if the new 
Brazilian President kept borrowing from Trump’s playbook37.
35 “Brasil sediará evento do governo Trump sobre paz no Oriente Médio” 
(“Brazil to host Trump administration event on Middle East peace”), Gazeta do 
Povo, 13 September 2019. 
36 “Paraguay recognizes Hamas, Hezbollah as terror groups, drawing Israeli 
praise”, The Times of  Israel, 20 August 2019. 
37 “China part of  the solutions not part of  Brazil’s problems”, China Daily, 2 
January 2019.
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Caught in the tug of war between his foreign policy and 
economic teams, Bolsonaro remained largely silent about China 
for his first months in office. But he did not seem to censure 
his fellow anti-globalist advisers, who kept denouncing the 
“Chinese threat”. Foreign Minister Araújo for one, in a keynote 
speech to Brazilian diplomats, declared that Brazil would not 
“sell its soul” to maintain soybean and iron ore exports, and 
suggested that the long stagnation of the Brazilian economy 
was somehow related to the trade partnership with China38.
Conversely, other government officials have struggled to 
keep a direct line open with the Chinese government. With an 
eye on shoring up exports to China and other Asian markets, 
Agriculture Minister Tereza Cristina went twice to Beijing in 
a matter of months. Vice-President Hamilton Mourão also 
visited the Chinese capital, with a promise of attracting more 
investments to Brazil’s technology, communications and infra-
structure sectors39.
Such overtures toward China were particularly meaningful as 
they attempted to reposition Brazil amid growing tensions over 
the trade war between Washington and Beijing. Since Bolsonaro 
could well tip the balance in the race for the 5G rollout in 
Latin America, China began courting the Brazilian president40. 
As fires raged in the Amazon and European leaders started to 
criticise Bolsonaro over his commitment to the environment, 
the Chinese ambassador to Brazil went to his defence claiming 
that the Amazon crisis was “a bit fabricated”41.
A month later, Bolsonaro went on an official tour of Asia, 
and the meeting with President Xi was the highlight of the trip. 
38 “A novos diplomatas, Araújo diz que país não venderá alma para exportar 
minério de ferro e soja” (“To new diplomats, Araújo says that the country will 
not sell souls to export iron and soybeans”), Folha de S. Paulo, 11 March 2019.
39 O. Stuenkel, “Can VP Mourão Fix Brazil-China Ties?”, Americas Quarterly, 21 
May 2019. 
40 A. García-Herrero, Bolsonaro’s Pilgrimage to Beijing, Bruegel, 29 October 2019. 
41 “China Keeps Quiet About the Amazon Crisis Despite Its Leverage Over 
Brazil”, The News Lens, 10 November 2019. 
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In a departure from the Brazilian President’s reluctance to build 
stronger ties with China, Bolsonaro said at a Beijing forum that 
the two countries “were born to walk together” and that the 
two governments are “completely aligned in a way that reaches 
beyond [their] commercial and business relationship”42.
Trapped between Washington and Beijing
Brazil’s renewed enthusiasm towards China was in sharp 
contrast with President Trump’s string of broken promises. 
Two weeks before Bolsonaro’s trip to Beijing, in a leaked letter 
from Mike Pompeo to OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría, 
the US secretary of state said that Washington only backed 
the membership bids of Argentina and Romania as part of the 
group’s enlargement efforts43.
Although Trump rushed to dismiss the content as “fake 
news” and to reaffirm his administration’s support for Brazil’s 
candidacy, the letter dealt a blow to Bolsonaro’s expectations of 
a special alliance with Washington. In early November 2019, 
disappointment again ensued as the US refused to lift the veto 
imposed on Brazilian fresh beef in 201744.
When Xi Jinping went to Brazil for the 11th Brics Summit, 
is seemed clear that Bolsonaro had abandoned his adamant pro-
US narrative. At a private meeting with other BRICS countries, 
the Brazilian President apologised for criticising China 
during the presidential race. Bolsonaro also signed numerous 
agreements with his Chinese counterpart and said that China 
was “increasingly a part of the future of Brazil”45.
42 Bolsonaro Meets China’s Xi in Bid to Balance Ties With U.S., Bloomberg, 24 October 
2019. 
43 Trump Says He Still Supports Brazil in OECD, Despite Letter, Bloomberg, 10 
October 2019. 
44 “Agriculture Minister Leaves USA Without Definition on Brazil’s Meat 
Exports”, The Rio Times, 21 November 2019. 
45 “Com afagos mútuos, Bolsonaro e Xi Jinping assinam nove atos” (“With 
mutual strokes, Bolsonaro and Xi Jinping sign nine acts”), Correio Braziliense, 13 
November 2019. 
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A few days after the BRICS Summit, Bolsonaro met with the 
Brazil head of Huawei, the Chinese tech giant spearheading the 
development of 5G networks46. This was in clear defiance of the 
position adopted by the US, which had imposed sanctions on 
Huawei and was still trying to pressure Bolsonaro to ban the 
company from Brazil’s 5G spectrum auction47.
Moreover, bowing to China and Russia’s position on 
Venezuela and on the ousting of Evo Morales in Bolivia (which 
took place as the BRICS heads of state gathered in Brasilia), 
the Brazilian delegation avoided bringing up the subject during 
the meetings. As a result, no mention of the turmoil in South 
America was made in the final declaration48.
Trump did not hide his disgust at Brazil’s change of heart. 
On 2 December 2019, in a message on Twitter, he accused 
Brazil and Argentina of manipulating their currencies and 
hurting American farmers. In response, the US would impose 
tariffs on steel and aluminium from both countries, a move that 
shattered previous agreements with them49.
Unwilling to admit that the unconditional alignment with 
Washington was starting to hurt the Brazilian economy, the 
Bolsonaro administration dismissed Trump’s tweet as electoral 
hot air. Deep down, they knew that the US President would 
be increasingly difficult to please as impeachment proceedings 
advanced and elections approached.
The European Union: An uneasy globalist friendship
Out of all of Brazil’s strategic partnerships, the relationship 
with the European Union was the one that raised the greatest 
46 “Depois de afagar China, Bolsonaro recebe Huawei” (“After stroking China, 
Bolsonaro accepts Huawei”), Folha de S. Paulo, 16 November 2019. 
47 O. Stuenkel, “In Spite of  Bolsonaro, China Quietly Deepens its Influence in 
Brazil”, Americas Quarterly, 12 November 2019. 
48 Ministério das Relações Exteriores, “11th BRICS Summit – Brasília 
Declaration”, 14 November 2019.
49 “Trump Says U.S. Will Impose Metal Tariffs on Brazil and Argentina”, The New 
York Times, 2 December 2019. 
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doubts. In clear contrast with his fascination for the United 
States and Israel, and with his antipathy towards China, 
Bolsonaro had largely kept silent about his views on the EU. 
“We know nothing about Brazil’s new government”, said 
Cecilia Malmstrom, the European Commissioner for Trade, a 
few days after the elections in Brazil.
Fearing that a Bolsonaro administration would step out of 
Mercosur, European and South American leaders even rushed 
to broker the inter-bloc agreement – then in its final stage – 
before the end of the year, but without success50.
Meanwhile, the choice of Ernesto Araújo as Foreign Minister 
sent a gloomy message to Europeans. In the same 2017 article 
in which he had praised Trump, Araújo criticised the very 
existence of the EU as an attempt to “sanitise” the continent’s 
past, and called Europe “just a bureaucratic concept and a 
culturally empty space governed by abstract values”51. Brazil’s 
growing closeness to conservative leaders who opposed EU 
policies, such as Hungary’s Orbán and Poland’s Duda, as well 
as the Bolsonaro administration’s apparent enthusiasm for 
Brexit, also raised European concerns over the future of the 
relationship with Brazil.
It soon became clear that Bolsonaro’s anti-globalist foreign 
policy would strain relations with European leaders. His 
insistence on abandoning the Paris Agreement, a move that once 
again seemed to mimic Trump’s playbook, led French President 
Emmanuel Macron to declare that Brazil could not quit the 
climate deal if it wanted to go on with the EU-Mercosur talks. It 
was not personal, since Macron had proposed that France should 
not sign trade agreements with countries that did not commit to 
environmental standards well before Bolsonaro got elected.
Still, some members of the new Brazilian administration 
seemed eager to pick a fight with the French president. 
In a reference to the outbreak of the gilets jaunes protests, 
50 “União Europeia se nega a ceder para atender Bolsonaro” (“European Union 
refuses to yield to meet Bolsonaro”), O Estado de S. Paulo, 9 November 2018.
51 E. Araújo (2017), p. 346.
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Bolsonaro’s international affairs adviser Filipe Martins tweeted: 
“Before defending the Paris Agreements, how about defending 
Paris first? Make an agreement with your own people before 
criticizing the Brazilian government’s decisions and interfering 
disrespectfully with our domestic issues”52.
Enemies over environmental concerns
Since Bolsonaro’s inauguration, his attitudes towards the 
environment have been at the heart of disagreements with 
European leaders. Although the President eventually decided not 
to quit the Paris Agreement (the announcement was strategically 
made on the eve of his trip to the World Economic Forum in 
Davos in January 2019), Brazil’s decision to withdraw its offer 
to preside over the 2019 UN Climate Change Conference with 
claims of “budget constraints” was seen as troubling news53.
Moreover, Brazil’s new Environment Minister Ricardo 
Salles sparked controversy as he suspended all partnerships 
and agreements with non-governmental organizations and 
slashed staff and funding from programmes and agencies such 
as Ibama, Brazil’s environmental monitoring and enforcement 
agency, upon taking office54. A few months in, Germany and 
Norway decided to halt donations worth US$70 million to the 
Amazon Fund, a conservation programme they have supported 
since 2008, over Salles’s attempts to change the fund’s rules and 
prevent NGOs from participating.
An infuriated Bolsonaro went public, suggesting that Europe 
was not in a position to lecture his administration. “Isn’t Norway 
that country that kills whales up there in the north pole?”, 
questioned the Brazilian president. “Take that money and help 
[German Chancellor] Angela Merkel reforest Germany”55.
52 F.G. Martins on Twitter, 3 December 2018, https://twitter.com/filgmartin/
status/1069645597316182016
53 “Brazil backs out of  hosting 2019 UN climate summit”, Climate Change News, 
28 November 2018. 
54 “Brazil environment chief  accused of  ‘war on NGOs’ as partnerships paused”, 
The Guardian, 17 January 2019. 
55 “Norway halts Amazon fund donation in dispute with Brazil”, The Guardian, 
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Tensions between Bolsonaro and his European counterparts 
mounted as the world turned its eyes to the devastating fires 
ravaging the Amazon forest, many of them started intentionally 
in order to clear land for farmers. A few weeks before, 
Bolsonaro had sacked the head of Brazil’s National Institute 
for Space Research over the publication of a report showing 
that deforestation was rapidly increasing. He had also cancelled 
a meeting at short notice with French Foreign Minister Jean-
Yves Le Drian to get a haircut – which he broadcast live on 
Facebook. The French Minister had met with some Brazilian 
NGOs the day before to discuss the Amazon fires.
Macron’s response to Bolsonaro’s snub came as he prepared 
to attend the G7 Summit in Biarritz, when the called the fires 
a “global crisis” that had to be addressed by world leaders. 
What followed was an embarrassing exchange of personal 
insults. Bolsonaro accused his French counterpart of having 
a “colonialist mindset” and told him to stay out of Brazil’s 
domestic affairs. Macron then accused the Brazilian President of 
lying about his commitment to climate change and threatened 
to block the EU-Mercosur deal, which had been announced 
a few weeks earlier. Resorting to well-known tactics of social 
media populism, Bolsonaro and his close aides began offending 
Macron and even went as far as to mock the appearance of his 
wife Brigitte. “I hope that very quickly [Brazilians] will have a 
president who behaves like one”, Macron said at Biarritz56.
With the major trade deal on a tightrope, Germany’s Angela 
Merkel tried to appease Brazil. Even before the feud between 
Bolsonaro and Macron, she had already declared that isolating 
Brazil would not be the best answer to halt deforestation, 
while still recognising the “dramatic” nature of the Brazilian 
environmental situation. At the G7 summit, she offered to 
mediate further negotiations with the Bolsonaro administration 
over the Amazon crisis.
16 August 2019. 
56 “Disputes Over Amazon Gets Personal for Bolsonaro and Macron”, The New 
York Times, 26 August 2019.
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Merkel’s conciliatory gesture did not prevent Bolsonaro from 
once again attacking Europeans, this time at the UN General 
Assembly. In his speech, the Brazilian President compared 
Brazil’s use of land for agriculture with France’s and Germany’s 
and dismissed criticisms over his Amazon policy as “colonialism”. 
“We […] condemn the attempts at instrumentalizing the 
environmental matter or indigenous policies toward external 
political and economic interests, especially those disguised as 
good intentions”, the Brazilian President said57.
Brazil’s Regional Puzzle:  
Dealing with “Socialist” Enemies
Jair Bolsonaro’s regional policies are primarily driven by anti-
communism, which translates into breaking with everything 
associated with former President Lula da Silva and his 
Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT). In his 
campaign platform, Bolsonaro pledged to “redirect Brazil’s 
axis of partnerships” in Latin America, placing the emphasis 
on “bilateral relations and agreements”. First of all, it meant 
that Brazil would move away from former allies like Argentina, 
Bolivia and especially Cuba and Venezuela, while moving 
closer to the conservative, pro-US governments of Chile and 
Colombia.
On a broader regional level, Bolsonaro was willing to do 
away with the integration mechanisms that had become 
associated with the PT’s foreign policy, notably the Union of 
South American Nations (União das Nações Sul-Americanas or 
Unasur), a political bloc launched by Lula and Chávez in 2008.
Bolsonaro and his aides viewed Unasur as nothing but a 
façade to advance Venezuela’s Bolivarian interests in South 
America, backed by Havana’s socialist regime. In April 2018, in 
response to the bloc’s inability to address the escalating political 
57 Ministry of  Foreign Affairs. “Speech by Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro at the 
opening of  the 74th United Nations General Assembly”, 24 September 2019. 
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and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, six countries with 
centre or right-wing governments – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Paraguay and Peru – suspended their participation 
in Unasur and went on to form the Lima Group, some months 
later, to pressure Maduro to step down.
In late March 2019, seven presidents, including Bolsonaro, 
met in Chile’s capital Santiago to launch the Forum for the 
Progress of South America (Foro por el Progreso de América 
del Sur or Prosur) as a substitute for Unasur, based on flexible 
mechanisms and a lightweight organizational structure58.
Under the guise of defending democracy on the continent, 
Prosur, which came into force six months after the presidential 
summit, was a means to isolate Maduro and Bolivia’s Evo 
Morales from the new regional architecture, as well as to 
dismantle the ambitious political integration structures that 
existed when there was a prevalence of left-wing governments 
in South America. It seemed clear that the goal of the Prosur 
founding members, which were working closely with the 
United States and the Organization of American States (OAS), 
was to exert further diplomatic pressure on the Maduro regime.
Venezuela, Cuba and the São Paulo Forum:  
Bolsonaro’s perfect external enemy
Bolsonaro nonetheless decided to take the relationship with 
Maduro to a new level of hostility. Soon after getting elected, 
Bolsonaro broke with Brazil’s diplomatic tradition and refused 
to invite two countries alone to his inauguration: Cuba and 
Venezuela. Moreover, among his first foreign policy actions 
were recognising Guaidó and providing humanitarian aid to 
Venezuelans on the border, not to mention the staunch support 
for Trump’s aggressive rhetoric toward the Maduro regime.
This new approach to Venezuela and Cuba was based on 
what Bolsonaro’s government saw as a quasi-conspiratorial plot 
58 “South America Attempts to Unite, Again - This Time Led by a Resurgent 
Right”, World Politics Review, 18 April 2019. 
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by the São Paulo Forum, or Foro de São Paulo, a conference of 
Latin American leftist parties and movements. The Forum was 
established in 1990 at the initiative of Lula and Fidel Castro 
as a platform to devise collective strategies for the left in Latin 
America, and came as a response to the end of the Cold War 
and the rise of neoliberal presidents across the region.
With the triumph of left-wing presidents in the 2000s, some far-
right commentators and politicians began seeing the Foro as an all-
powerful institution with hegemonic intentions. Unsurprisingly, 
Olavo de Carvalho was among the first to denounce it as “the 
greatest criminal plot of all time” as early as 2001. Ever since then, 
he has almost single-handedly warned of the alleged dangers posed 
by the “narco-communist” collusion between Lula da Silva, Hugo 
Chávez and Fidel Castro to Latin American politics59.
The permanent association between Venezuela, Cuba and the 
Foro has served Bolsonaro in two ways. Firstly, by claiming that 
it was the Foro that guaranteed Maduro’s survival, he took the 
weight off of China and Russia’s shoulders. That was a strategic 
move, since admitting that Chinese and Russian geopolitical 
and economic interests in Venezuela were largely responsible for 
Maduro’s permanence in power could further damage Brazil’s 
relationship with two major BRICS countries.
Secondly, and most importantly, by constructing the image 
of an omnipotent entity, the new President found his perfect 
external enemy. The spectre of Foro’s socialism was totally 
identified with Nicolás Maduro, the fiery strongman who sat 
right across the border, and with the Cuban regime. Maduro’s 
frequent collusion with Lula’s PT also gave Bolsonaro an excuse 
to threaten his political adversaries at home.
As a result, since the new Brazilian President came to power, he 
and his foreign policy team have blamed Maduro and the Foro 
for spilling oil along Brazil’s north-eastern coastline60; for popular 
59 F. Moura Brasil, “Conheça o Foro de São Paulo, o maior inimigo do Brasil” 
(“The São Paulo Forum, Brazil’s biggest enemy”), Veja, 24 March 2014. 
60 Jair Bolsonaro on Twitter, 26 October 2019, https://twitter.com/jairbolsonaro/
status/1188120331350937600
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demonstrations and riots that caused turmoil and violence in 
Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador61; for supporting armed guerrillas at the 
Colombian border62; for paving the way for the return of Cristina 
Kirchner in Argentina; and for radicalising politics in Brazil after 
Lula was released from prison in early November 2019.
These accusations have been made primarily on social 
media, mostly without backing evidence, and rapidly formed 
a narrative that spread among Bolsonaro’s supporters63. Some 
have even made it into official documents issued by Itamaraty 
and, more recently, by the Lima Group64 and the OAS65. They 
also appeared in Bolsonaro’s first address to the UN General 
Assembly, roughly 20 percent of which was spent attacking the 
PT, Venezuela, Cuba and the São Paulo Forum66.
A rough start with Argentina
Although it has been Brazil’s most important partner for 
decades, Argentina did not rank as a foreign policy priority 
for Bolsonaro. On the night of Bolsonaro’s victory, his soon-
to-be Finance Minister Paulo Guedes gave an interview in 
which he bluntly stated to an Argentinian journalist that 
neither Argentina nor Mercosur would be priorities for the new 
government, as Brazil “would not be a prisoner of ideological 
[Bolivarian] relations”67.
61 “Foro de São Paulo tenta desestabilizar Equador, diz Ernesto” (“São Paulo Forum 
tries to destabilize Ecuador, says Ernesto”), Folha de S. Paulo, 12 October 2019. 
62 “O Foro de São Paulo tem relação com os recentes protestos na América 
do Sul?” (“Is the São Paulo Forum related to the recent protests in South 
America?”), Gazeta do Povo, 23 October 2019.
63 Ernesto Araújo on Twitter, 7 November 2019, https://twitter.com/
ernestofaraujo/status/1192538229024669696 
64 “Declaração da XV Reunião de Ministros de Relações Exteriores do Grupo 
de Lima [Espanhol]”, (“Declaration of  the XV Meeting of  Ministers of  Foreign 
Affairs of  the Lima Group”), Nota 191, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, 23 July 2019.
65 “OAS Blames Chile Protests on Maduro and Cuba”, Chile Today, 27 October 2019. 
66 Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, “Speech by Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro at the 
opening of  the 74th United Nations General Assembly”.
67 “Future economy minister says Mercosur not a priority for Bolsonaro’s Brazil”, 
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Bilateral ties, therefore, seemed to get off to a bad start. 
Breaking long-standing traditions between the two countries, 
Macri did not attend Bolsonaro’s inauguration, and the new 
Brazilian President chose Chile for his first presidential trip in 
the region68. When Macri paid a visit to Brazil in January 2019, 
the press even called it a “reset” after an awkward beginning69.
Bolsonaro’s animosity toward Argentina and Mercosur was 
short-lived – and rather puerile. One of the administration’s 
promises in its first 100 days was to remove the Mercosur 
emblem from the cover of the Brazilian passport and replace it 
with the seal of the republic, as part of the Foreign Ministry’s 
anti-globalist rhetoric. However, after a few months of neglect, 
the Bolsonaro administration realised that the South American 
bloc could be the source of tangible foreign policy advantages, 
as in the case of the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement.
Things only seemed to get back on track when Bolsonaro 
went to Buenos Aires in early June 2019, at a time when Brazil 
and Argentina shared a much more complex set of interests, 
from energy cooperation to the Venezuelan crisis, but with a 
focus on economic issues. Both presidents were eager to advance 
a liberal Mercosur, acting closely with the Pacific Alliance, and 
supported each other’s bids to join the OECD70.
With plummeting approval ratings at home, both Macri and 
Bolsonaro attempted to strengthen bilateral ties in search of a 
positive agenda, particularly for businesses. That was even more 
urgent to the Argentinian president, who was running for re-
election against a dire economic backdrop, marked by soaring 
MercoPress, 30 October 2018. 
68 “Bolsonaro and Macri Look for Better Ties to Distract From Their Domestic 
Troubles”, World Politics Review, 28 June 2019. 
69 All Smiles in Brasilia as Macri and Bolsonaro Reset Relationship, Bloomberg, 16 
January 2019. 
70 Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, “Declaração Conjunta Presidencial por ocasião 
da visita de Estado do Presidente Jair Bolsonaro a Buenos Aires” (“Presidential 
Joint Declaration on the occasion of  the State Visit of  President Jair Bolsonaro 
to Buenos Aires”), 6 June 2019. 
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inflation and fears of a new default71. Macri, however, worked 
tirelessly to get the EU-Mercosur agreement through, which 
was announced with pomp and circumstance later that month.
But the foreign policy victory did not prevent Macri’s defeat 
by the left-wing Alberto Fernández/Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner ticket in the August 2019 primary elections. Fearing 
that the leftist comeback in Argentina could energise other 
left-wing leaders across the continent, including Lula (whose 
political fate was still subject to a Supreme Court ruling), the 
Bolsonaro administration began actively campaigning against 
Fernández. The day after Macri’s defeat in the primaries, 
Bolsonaro warned supporters in Brazil’s southernmost state, 
which borders Argentina: “if this leftist scum returns to 
Argentina, we might have a refugee crisis here, as we had [with 
Venezuelans] in the state of Roraima”72.
In the same week, Finance Minister Guedes threatened to 
leave Mercosur if Kirchnerism triumphed on the other side of 
the border. Finally, in an awkward metaphor, Foreign Minister 
Araújo compared Fernández to a Russian nesting doll: “you 
open it and out pops Cristina Fernandez, again you open it and 
out pops Lula, and again, Hugo Chavez”73.
If interfering with elections was absolutely unusual for a 
historically neutral Brazil, so was challenging electoral results 
in neighbouring countries. Enraged at a picture of Fernández 
celebrating his victory with an “L” hand sign that stood for “free 
Lula”, Bolsonaro said he was “concerned and afraid” of Argentina’s 
new president. Adding insult to injury, Araújo tweeted that “evil 
forces” were celebrating the Argentinian election results, whereas 
71 Fears of  Argentina Default Loom Large as Traders Dump Everything, 
Bloomberg, 12 August 2019.
72 “Bolsonaro diz que volta da ‘esquerdalha’ na Argentina pode gerar crise 
de refugiados no Rio Grande do Sul” (“Bolsonaro says return to the ‘left’ in 
Argentina may generate refugee crisis in Rio Grande do Sul”) Estado de Minas, 
12 August 2019.
73  “Alberto Fernández is like a matryoshka doll, ‘you open it and out pops, 
Cristina, Lula, Chavez...’”, Mercopress, 20 August 2019. 
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“the forces of democracy” were mourning for Argentina, for 
Mercosur and for all of South America74.
Following the spat with Argentina’s president-elect, 
Bolsonaro did not want to attend Fernández’s inauguration, 
scheduled for early December 2019, nor was he willing to send 
a senior government representative. That was just the right 
opportunity for Rodrigo Maia, the speaker of Brazil’s House 
of Representatives, to fill the political vacuum. Maia, who has 
been acting as an informal Prime Minister to ease Bolsonaro’s 
strained relationship with Congress, has struggled to contain 
Bolsonaro’s authoritarian leanings and to dispel his foreign 
policy paranoia.
A few days before Fernández took office, Maia met him and, 
in a gesture of reassurance, told him that the bilateral relationship 
would remain a priority for Brazil. This made Bolsonaro 
backtrack at the eleventh hour and send his Vice-President 
Mourão to the swearing-in of the new Argentinian president75. 
It came as a relief to lawmakers, businesspeople and diplomats, 
who feared that Bolsonaro’s hostility towards Fernández could 
thwart future agreements with Brazil’s top regional ally.
Final Remarks and Policy Recommendations
One year into the Bolsonaro administration, many of the 
trends observed during the campaign and the period of cabinet 
formation have taken a much clearer shape. When it comes to 
foreign policy, three groups struggled for space: the military, 
free-market liberals and anti-globalists. While the former 
quickly lost power as Bolsonaro started to see Vice-President 
Mourão and other cabinet generals as a threat to his own 
74 Ernesto Araújo on Twitter, 28 October 2019, https://twitter.com/
ernestofaraujo/status/1188864329141104641
75 “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Backtracks on Argentine Inauguration”, The New York 
Times, 9 December 2019.  
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political ambitions76, Brazil’s international agenda fell into the 
hands of the powerful conservative ideologues in charge of 
foreign policy making.
Anti-globalists have been the ones to pick the fights in 
Bolsonaro’s culture wars. So far, they have only made a few 
(albeit significant) policy concessions to the government’s 
economic team on China, the Arab countries and Argentina, 
who are among Brazil’s largest trading partners. Aside from that, 
Brazil’s entire foreign policy strategy is built upon Christian 
fundamentalism, nationalism and anti-communism. These 
values have been laid out in the manifesto of Bolsonaro’s newest 
political party, Alliance for Brazil, and have also inspired many 
domestic policies pushed forward by the government.
It now seems clear that, in a departure from previous years, 
Brazil is no longer swinging between the Brics and the OECD. 
In other words, Bolsonaro’s foreign policy does not follow 
Brazil’s decades-old pattern of being closer to the Global South 
at times and closer to the West at other times, but always 
keeping a collaborative and pragmatic stance towards global 
affairs.
Aside from the emerging conservative axis that the Bolsonaro 
administration has attempted to build, other countries and 
regions of the world will only matter as long as they can offer 
any trade or investment benefit. Cooperation in multilateral 
regimes will also follow the same ideological pattern. Issues that 
Brazil has traditionally been engaged in, such as climate change, 
human rights and Security Council reform, have simply been 
dropped from Bolsonaro’s diplomatic concerns.
Brazil’s new foreign policy represents a particular challenge 
to European policymakers. Bolsonaro has demonstrated that he 
is not afraid to confront his European counterparts, especially 
when he feels cornered by accusations over his policies on the 
76 B. Winter, “It’s complicated: inside Bolsonaro’s Relationship with Brazil’s Military”, 
Americas Quarterly, 17 December 2019. 
The First Year of the Bolsonaro’s Foreign Policy 109
environment, indigenous peoples and human rights. As the feud 
with Macron neatly shows, anti-globalists are using a shrewd 
strategy of bullying world leaders and portraying themselves as 
the victims to supporters at home. This, incidentally, is one of 
the sources of Bolsonaro’s stable (yet low) popularity.
Yet, the EU-Mercosur trade agreement might still be 
considered a lifeline to positive relations with Bolsonaro. 
As Brazil starts to bear a striking resemblance to Orbán’s 
Hungary, key European leaders might use trade as a means 
to pressure Bolsonaro whenever he seems to be undermining 
Brazil’s democratic institutions and/or cooperation on urgent 
global issues such as climate change. The natural channel of 
communication with the Brazilian government is Paulo Guedes 
and officials in the economic team.
Another means to foster cooperation is through Congress. 
This is novel to Brazil, as presidents and diplomats have always 
had the upper hand in foreign policy. However, European 
policymakers might benefit from the uneasy but intense 
relationship between Bolsonaro and the Brazilian parliament. 
Rodrigo Maia, Brazil’s unofficial Prime Minister, was successful 
in convincing the President that he should be more constructive 
towards Argentina. A few days later, he travelled to Geneva to 
meet representatives of the World Trade Organization and the 
UN Human Rights Commission. While it is too early to tell 
whether this will be an effective approach to relations with 
Brazil, this is surely a path to explore as Bolsonaro enters the 
second year of his tenure.
5.  The Venezuelan Crisis 
     and Its Geopolitical Dimension
Antonella Mori
Venezuela is going through a deep economic, political and 
humanitarian crisis. Gross domestic product has fallen by 65 
percent since 2014, and is projected to fall still further in 2020. 
The political-institutional clash has intensified, and so has the 
confrontation between supporters and opponents of Nicolás 
Maduro who, in January 2019, started his second presidential 
term, following elections considered by many to be neither 
free nor democratic. The opposition claims that Maduro’s 
presidency is void and is calling for new elections, recognising 
Juan Guaidó as the country’s interim leader. The humanitarian 
crisis has pushed many Venezuelans to leave their country and 
by the end of 2020 the number of emigrants could reach six 
million, almost 20% of the population. 
Venezuela’s problems are rooted in the economic and 
political choices of several decades, but the policy errors of the 
last decade alone go a long way to explain the current, dire state 
of things. Hugo Chávez, who governed the country until his 
death in 2013, is to blame for missing the opportunity offered 
by high oil prices over nearly ten years up to 2013 to wean 
the country off its vast oil reserves and create the conditions 
for sustainable and lasting development. With the country 
highly dependent on revenues from oil extraction, the sharp 
drop in the price of oil in 2014 dealt a tremendous blow to the 
economy. Nicolás Maduro, Mr Chàvez’s successor, continued 
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with the same economic policies despite the low oil prices, thus 
worsening the already difficult economic situation. 
The end of the Maduro government has been anticipated 
several times. At the time of his first presidential election, in 
2013, many expected his government to collapse within a year. 
Thirteen months later, when protests ravaged the country, his 
days were thought to be numbered. When the opposition called 
for the revocatory referendum in 2016 and then again when 
mass protests broke out in 2017, many believed once more 
that the end of Mr Maduro was just moments away. The same 
happened in 2019, when the opposition united to support 
Juan Guaidó: a large number of foreign countries recognised 
him as the legitimate caretaker, and the Americans tightened 
economic sanction against the country, encouraging the belief 
that a change of government was imminent.
Now, early in 2020, the most likely scenario is that no change 
will take place in the near future. There are a number of reasons 
for this: firstly, the external and internal pressures to oust Mr 
Maduro are fading away, while the government’s crackdown on 
internal dissent is proving effective. Secondly, the expected drop 
in domestic production in 2020 – the seventh consecutive year 
of contraction – will not be as large as in 2019, thus giving the 
government some respite. Third, despite the sanctions imposed 
by the United States since January 2019, some foreign currency 
has nevertheless arrived in the country. Friendly countries – 
primarily Russia – are helping with the export of oil; proceeds 
from the sale of gold and from probable illicit trafficking in 
drugs, weapons and minerals also keep flowing in. Furthermore, 
Maduro, who has a knack at tilting the political playing field 
in his favour, will probably manage to regain control of the 
National Assembly at the next legislative elections. Finally, 
Maduro has shown in recent months that, in order to maintain 
power, he is willing to change some Chavist policies. In mid-
2019, the country abandoned its currency controls and as a 
result the official exchange rate is now close to the black-market 
rate. Also, use of the dollar in domestic transactions has been 
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gradually liberalised. The growing de facto dollarization of the 
economy has led to less price instability, which in turn has 
increased the availability of goods. At the end of January 2020, 
news even circulated that Maduro was considering selling shares 
in the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), to 
foreign oil companies that already operate in the country, such 
as the Russian Rosneft, the Spanish Repsol, and the Italian Eni. 
The internal political clash between supporters of Maduro and 
Guaidó is mirrored by two opposing sides at the international 
level: backing Guaidó and calling for new elections are the 
United States, Canada, many Latin American and European 
countries. Russia, China and Cuba stand behind Maduro 
and criticise external interferences in Venezuela’s affaires. 
While this is an ideological and geopolitical clash, significant 
economic interests are also at stake. The United States is keen 
on re-establishing a safe and stable oil supply in the region, on 
having privileged access to other natural resources in which the 
country is rich, such as coltan and gold, and on reducing the 
flow of migrants from Venezuela moving towards its borders. 
Russia and China, who have lent to and invested heavily in 
Venezuela in these past, are working to preserve the value of 
their assets. Partial proof of the ideological nature of the clash 
between the Chavisti and the opposition comes from how 
Mexico, Argentina and Bolivia have acted in recent months. 
Following the election of presidents Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador and Alberto Fernández, Mexico and Argentina, who 
had previously sided with the Lima Group against Maduro, 
have both shifted to a more neutral position. Bolivia, on 
the other hand, which supported Maduro throughout the 
presidency of Evo Morales, has now aligned itself with the 
Lima Group in support of Guaidó.
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The Evolution of the Catastrophe
Economic and social collapse
When elected president of Venezuela in 2013, after the death 
of Hugo Chàvez, Nicolás Maduro inherited a country with 
a deteriorating economic and social situation – a totally new 
context after almost a decade of major improvement. Between 
the years 2000 and 2012, Venezuela’s gross domestic product 
grew on average by 4.3% a year and the share of the population 
living under the poverty line dropped from 44% to 23.9%, 
although this reduction in the poverty rate came to halt in 
2011. In his final years, however, Hugo Chàvez introduced 
heterodox and populist economic policies: high inflation was 
fought through price controls on many goods while monetary 
growth was let to run free; a system of multiple fixed exchange 
rates was put in place, subject to frequent devaluations; and 
a fast pace of social spending was maintained, compromising 
public finances. Large oil exports and the consequent strength 
of the bolivar, the national currency, also contributed to the 
progressive de-industrialisation of the country, which was 
importing most goods, even basic staples, since the national 
agricultural and industrial production could not keep pace 
with demand. Private companies outside the oil and refinery 
industries, not very competitive to start with, were further 
disadvantaged by the poor state of the country’s infrastructure 
and faced an unfavourable business climate: in the Doing 
Business 2013 ranking, compiled by the World Bank, Venezuela 
was in 180th place out of 185 countries, coming last in the 
whole of Latin America and the Caribbean, even after Haiti.
The last years of Hugo Chávez’s government were tough for 
the economy but his first years were highly successful in the 
fight against poverty and in the inclusion of marginalised and 
disadvantaged segments of the population – the poor, women, 
children and indigenous people. In 1999, almost half of 
Venezuela’s population was living in poverty, about 10 percent 
more than in the early 1990s; and although Venezuela was still 
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one of Latina America’s countries with the least unequal income 
distribution, during the 1990s income distribution in Venezuela 
had become significantly more uneven. Starting in 2003, 
the Chávez governments promoted social programmes (the 
misiones) in a number of sectors, including education, health, 
worker training and the development of micro-enterprises. 
The misiones pursued precise objectives on a very large scale. 
For example, four educational initiatives were implemented: 
the Misión Robinson I intended to eradicate illiteracy, the 
Misión Robinson II, aimed at completing primary education 
for all those who knew how to read and write, the Misión 
Ribas designed to help students to complete their secondary 
studies and, finally, the Misión Sucre aimed at guaranteeing 
free university education to all young Venezuelans through 
the construction of new universities. The success of the fight 
against poverty and for the inclusion of marginalised sections 
of the population in the social, economic and political life of 
the nation is a very important factor in explaining the popular 
support that Maduro and Chavismo in general still command.
Oil has always cast a long shadow over Venezuela’s economy 
and not surprisingly, given that the country has the largest proven 
oil reserves in the world. In the past few decades, in particular, 
economic cycles in Venezuela were closely related to international 
oil prices: when oil prices ran high, GDP grew rapidly, while low 
oil prices spelled stagnation or even recession for the country. 
These booms and busts hindered the development of non-oil 
industries, disadvantaged also by the foreign exchange rate, 
which was pushed higher by the influx of dollars from the sale 
of oil (an example of the so-called “Dutch disease”). When oil 
prices were high, Venezuela recorded significant revenues from 
its oil exports, but Chávez did not put aside any of these earnings 
to cope with periods of low oil prices; rather, the country in 
these years was an active borrower on the international capital 
markets. Most of the proceeds were spent on social programmes, 
with little dedicated to productive investments in the oil or 
non-oil sectors. For as long as the state failed to commit to 
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investments in productivity, the difficult business environment 
also discouraged private investments. Private companies, 
both domestic and foreign, were also hindered by regulatory 
instability, high corruption and an industrial policy with a 
penchant for nationalisations and expropriations. 
In 2013, at the beginning of his presidency, Nicolás Maduro, 
who had defeated the opposition candidate, Henrique Capriles, 
by a very thin margin, faced a difficult situation, characterised 
by low economic growth, high inflation – between 20% and 
30% per year – and worsening public finances. After just a 
year of his presidency the situation had become a lot more 
serious: the economy had gone into recession, inflation had 
jumped to 60% and the fall in the price of oil had cut deeply 
into public resources and imports. During this period, public 
demonstrations against Maduro and his distorting and opaque 
economic policies started to become frequent. In order to fight 
inflation, rather than placing checks on monetary growth, 
Maduro imposed price controls directly in the shops. The 
exchange rate, for long fixed at unrealistic levels, became further 
distorted by a new system of multiple exchange rates, all of 
which were far below that of the national currency on the black 
market. The management of public finances remained opaque, 
with a considerable share of the state’s revenues and expenditures 
kept off-budget, and therefore at the government’s disposal 
without institutional checks. The few official macroeconomic 
statistics issued were not vetted by external bodies like the IMF.
By mid-2014 the price of a barrel of Venezuelan oil had 
fallen from about US$100 to about US$40, bringing about a 
collapse in export earnings, official reserves and tax revenues. 
Despite this slump in public revenues, Maduro kept public 
spending high, financed by the central bank’s printing of 
new money. Monetisation of the large public deficit boosted 
inflation, which quickly became hyperinflation: consumer price 
inflation exceeded 400% in 2017 and by 2018 had reached 
65,000% (IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2019). The 
sharp drop in exports and official reserves forced the country 
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to drastically reduce its imports, with the consequence that 
even basic food items became scarce. Several sources (NGOs, 
think-tanks) started reporting cases of malnutrition, especially 
among children, and inadequate basic health services caused by 
a scarcity of doctors and medicines. 
Nicolás Maduro’s government bears full responsibility for this 
economic meltdown, though this might not have come about if 
oil prices had not fallen so sharply. The government acted as if it 
could control economic outcomes by decree. Greedy producers 
and retailers were blamed for the high inflation, and the price 
controls adopted as a solution inevitably brought about further 
distortions and another drop in production. The volatility of 
the exchange rate was seen as the fault of foreign countries and 
international speculators: the solution was therefore to adopt 
a regime with a multiplicity of fixed exchange rates depending 
on what use was to be made of the foreign currency. By the end 
of January 2018, for example, there were two official exchange 
rates: DIPRO, for imports of food and medicine, was fixed at 
10 bolivars for 1 US dollar, and DICOM, for currency auctions, 
at around 3,336 bolivars for 1 US dollar: all the while on the 
black market it actually took about 235,000 bolivars to buy 
one single US dollar. The huge difference between the official 
DIPRO rate and the black-market rate created opportunities for 
illicit earnings by government officials, who could buy dollars 
at the official exchange rate set for the import of essential goods 
and resell them on the black market. 
Data on oil production, by far the largest source of both export 
and fiscal revenues, confirm the sharp decline in economic 
activity. Venezuela’s crude oil production slumped from 2.3 
million barrels per day (mbpd) in January 2016 to 1.6 mbpd in 
January 2018 (US Energy Information Administration data). 
Back in 2000, oil production was running at 3 mbpd. This 30% 
decline in oil output in the space of just two years has further 
reduced the inflow of dollars to the country, slashing essential 
resources for the imports of goods and public spending. The 
negative consequences are exacerbated by the lack of even 
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basic goods and the scarcity of public services like transport, 
electricity, water and telecommunications. For a long time, 
Maduro denied the plight of his people and refused international 
aid. Only after the United States imposed new sanctions on the 
country in 2019, a move widely criticised internationally, did 
Maduro finally decide to accept humanitarian aid, arguing that 
the emergency had been created by the sanctions. 
Venezuelan authorities stopped publishing macroeconomic 
statistics several years ago but the IMF continues to publish 
its estimates. According to the IMF, GDP contracted by 18% 
and 35% respectively in 2018 and 2019 (IMF, World Economic 
Outlook, October 2019). Aside from economic data, the flow 
of people leaving the country points to a humanitarian crisis: 
according to UNHCR-IOM, in November 2019 the number 
of Venezuelan migrants in the world has reached 4.6 million; 
the vast majority of these, approximately 3.8 million, have 
emigrated to other Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
especially Colombia and Peru. Those who remain in Venezuela 
continue to suffer for the lack of basic goods and services, 
galloping inflation, crime and violence. According to the 
July 2019 report of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Michelle Bachelet, Venezuelans are experiencing serious 
violations of human rights, erosion of the rule of law and the 
dismantling of democratic institutions.
The political-institutional crisis
During the first two years of Nicolás Maduro’s presidency, the 
government and opposition clashed head on. The government 
repressed dissent, to the point of arresting the opposition 
leader, Leopoldo López, in 2014, and Antonio Ledezma, mayor 
of Caracas, in 2015. Some anti-government demonstrations 
turned extremely violent, and dozens of demonstrators died in 
clashes with the police and army. President Maduro also claimed 
to have evidence of an international conspiracy, orchestrated by 
the United States and Colombia, to organise a coup against 
him. The threat of a coup served Maduro well, allowing him to 
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pull together his supporters and diverting their attention from 
the plight of the economy. 
In 2015, in a very tense climate, parliamentary elections 
were held: they were to be the last free and democratic elections 
in the country. The opposition, united under the umbrella 
group Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, obtained 65% of 
the seats, and thus gained control of the National Assembly, 
Venezuela’s parliament. Emboldened by the victory, opposition 
parties began to collect signatures calling a referendum 
to revoke the president’s mandate the following year. The 
Venezuelan Constitution indeed provides that in the middle 
of a presidential term, which lasts six years, a referendum 
may be called to remove the president. Hugo Chávez faced a 
revocatory referendum in 2004 and won it; Nicolás Maduro, 
fearing he would lose, used various stratagems to prevent the 
vote. Many observers believe this was a turning point in the 
confrontation between government and opposition: it marked 
an authoritarian turn, the start of a gradual abandonment of 
constitutional democracy and the centralisation of power in 
the hands of the president and his inner circle. The frustration 
of the opposition boiled over in the following months, with 
massive anti-Maduro demonstrations taking place almost daily.
Given that the opposition controlled the National Assembly, 
Maduro first tried to erode its powers, and then side-lined it 
completely by calling for the creation of a National Constituent 
Assembly. New presidential elections were due in 2018, and 
Maduro called for these to be held on 20 May. The opposition 
along with several foreign countries and international organisations 
requested postponement, arguing that the vote could not be fair 
and democratic, given that the main opposition leaders and parties 
had not been able to stand as candidates and that the vote could 
not be monitored by a credible international body. Maduro won 
the elections with a large majority, partly because a large number 
of dissenting voters decided not to vote at all. 
Those who had called for the presidential elections to be 
delayed, arguing that they would have been neither fair nor 
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democratic, naturally contested the result: in their view, Maduro’s 
second presidential term, which started on 10 January, 2019, is 
illegitimate. In early January the opposition therefore elected 
Juan Guaidó as president of the National Assembly, and later 
proclaimed him interim president of Venezuela. The Venezuelan 
Constitution indeed establishes that, in the absence of a president, 
the president of the National Assembly assumes that role until 
new presidential elections are held. And so it happens that since 
23 January 2019, when Juan Guaidó declared himself interim 
president in front of the world’s press, Venezuela actually has 
two presidents: Nicolás Maduro, backed by the Chavistas and 
the military and supported by a handful of foreign countries, 
including China, Russia and Cuba; and Juan Guaidó, backed 
by the opposition and recognised as the country’s legitimate 
leader by about fifty other countries including the United States, 
Canada, some Latin American and the European nations.
It is a weird situation, almost Cold-War-like, in which the 
position of those who are pro or against Maduro no longer 
depends on whether the 2018 vote was legitimate or on the 
responsibilities of the government for the dire state of the country 
but on their belonging to one camp or the other, the American-
led West or the Russia-China-Cuba axis. Those who oppose 
American foreign policy, and in particular its weaponisation of 
sanctions, seem to have no doubt that Venezuela’s economic 
crisis is primarily the responsibility of President Trump. Those 
who watched Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution with hope, 
lauding what it managed to achieve, insist on defending 
Maduro, irrespective of his many deficiencies. Meanwhile, 
those who have been in opposition since Chávez’s time tend to 
resist any compromise with the Chavistas. This antagonistic and 
polarised approach makes any form of negotiation extremely 
difficult. We do not know what Hugo Chávez would have done 
following the drop in oil prices in 2014 or the opposition’s 
victory in the legislative elections of 2015, but it is for everyone 
to see that Maduro has brought Venezuela’s people, its economy 
and democratic institutions to their knees.
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In 2020, Maduro has sent a clear signal that he intends to 
grab yet more power. On 5 January, the National Assembly 
appointed Luis Parra as president, replacing Juan Guaidó, 
in what the latter has called a parliamentary coup. Parra was 
elected by a total of 81 votes, including the votes of MPs 
backing Maduro. The MPs supporting Guaidó, who were 
prevented from entering the National Assembly building, met 
in the headquarters of the “El Nacional” newspaper and ratified 
Juan Guaidó as president of the National Assembly, with a total 
of 100 votes. To summarise, Luis Parra has the backing of 81 
MPs inside the Assembly’s building, and Mr Guaidó that of 
100 MPs outside. Legally, the election of the president of the 
National Assembly requires a quorum of 84, and Mr Parra fell 
short of that. Illegality begets illegality, as chaos begets chaos: 
not only are there now two presidents of the country, but also 
two presidents of the National Assembly. What seems clear is 
that Maduro is determined to gain control over the National 
Assembly. 
The Geopolitics of Oil
Venezuela’s oil exports steadily increased in the last few months 
of 2019. Washington has failed to carry out its threat of killing 
off the Venezuelan oil industry by extending sanctions to any 
foreign company that maintains trade relations with PDVSA. 
Still, many foreign companies, under the threat of such 
sanctions, have stopped or reduced their oil exports directly 
from Venezuelan ports, to the point that Russia’s Rosneft has 
become the largest broker of nation’s oil. To avoid American 
retaliations, buyers try to hide the Venezuelan origin of the oil 
through ship-to-ship transfers at sea. Also, PDVSA has given 
more leeway to its private sector partners in joint ventures, 
giving them direct management of the export of crude oil. As 
a result, in December 2019 Venezuelan oil exports returned to 
1.1 mbpd, still below pre-sanction levels but showing steady 
improvement since August 2019, when they dropped to 
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less than 0.8 mbpd. In the last quarter of 2019, Russia also 
increased exports of the diluent used to reduce the viscosity of 
Venezuelan heavy crude oil, making it easier to transport. 
The foreign companies that have resumed commercial 
relations with PDVSA claim to comply with US sanctions 
because they exchange crude oil for refined products or take 
crude oil as payment for existing debts – in other words they do 
not pay cash. This has had a significant impact on PDVSA’s cash 
flow: US refineries, which were previously its most important 
customers, mainly paid cash. The sanctions of 28 January 
2019 prohibit all US companies from having trade relations 
with Venezuela’s oil sector, although the US government has 
repeatedly renewed licenses allowing Chevron and some 
other US oil service companies to maintain business relations 
with PDVSA. This rolling licence extension is based on the 
argument that the presence of US companies is essential to 
prevent the complete collapse of the Venezuelan oil sector, and 
to facilitate the country’s recovery once Maduro is finally ousted 
from power. In fact, if Chevron were to leave its operations 
in Venezuela, it is thought that Rosneft or another Russian or 
Chinese company would simply re-activate production in less 
than two months. US-based companies and citizens cannot 
trade or sell raw or refined products from Venezuela, and these 
restrictions have a global impact because transactions cannot be 
made in US dollars. The commercial arm of Rosneft is selling 
most of the Venezuelan crude oil available for export on behalf 
of the government-owned Venezuelan oil company PDVSA. 
India and China have avoided direct purchases since the US 
administration tightened sanctions in August 2019. 
US sanctions continue to be the main risk factor for 
Venezuela’s oil industry. The United States could still decide 
to enforce them in a stricter way, for example by going after 
Rosneft. Without Rosneft’s help it would be very difficult 
for PDVSA to procure diluents, find buyers or charter ships 
willing to transport Venezuelan oil. Rosneft is clearly sustaining 
Venezuelan exports and boosting production, although the 
Latin America and the New Global Order122
Russian company says it does so in compliance with US 
sanctions.
It is likely that president Trump will direct his attention to 
Venezuela again in 2020. Venezuela – one of Cuba’s closest 
allays – is a hot topic for a considerable segment of voters in 
the key state of Florida. Up to now, Trump’s strategy has been 
unsuccessful and the Democrats could well focus on this fact 
in the run-up to the November elections. Trump may also try 
to portray his Democratic opponent as a “socialist” and use 
Venezuela’s economic collapse as an example of the fate awaiting 
America should the Democrats win. All this said, at the moment 
the US does not seem close to imposing additional sanctions 
prohibiting all trade in oil with PDVSA along the lines of those 
imposed on Iranian crude oil. 
The governments of China and Venezuela have always 
maintained direct dialogue, spurred on largely by China’s need 
for oil and Venezuela’s need for liquidity. On the Chinese side, 
the key institution is the China Development Bank (CDB) 
which, from 2007 to 2016, lent Venezuela over US$55 billion. 
China, already one of the world’s largest oil importers by the 
early 2000s, was seeking to expand and diversify its sources 
of supply and Venezuela, which had the largest estimated oil 
reserves in the world, was an obvious candidate. Hugo Chávez, 
who became president in 1999, was equally keen to increase 
the number of buyers for Venezuela’s oil exports and reduce its 
large reliance on the United States. China was a good partner 
in this sense: it had also engaged in major oil projects in the 
Orinoco basin, and in various projects in the mining sector. 
China reiterated that its interests were purely economic and 
commercial: it was seeking reliable sources of primary products 
at reasonable prices, along with markets for its own products 
and services in strategically important, high added value 
sectors like telecommunications, computers, automobiles, 
heavy equipment, logistic infrastructures, transport, military 
and aerospace. China has repeatedly stated its support for 
Venezuela’s efforts to safeguard its sovereignty, independence 
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and stability, as well as its opposition to foreign interference 
in the nation’s internal affairs. The Chinese government is 
letting Russia take a more active role in confronting the United 
States on the issue of the country’s leadership, and is striving to 
appear as a primarily economic partner. However, in a polarised 
country like Venezuela, it will likely be difficult to interpret 
China’s long-standing financial support for presidents Chávez 
and Maduro as purely economic. 
Future Scenarios
More than a year has passed since Juan Guaidó proclaimed 
himself interim president of Venezuela. There have been 
many clashes and a few negotiations between the opposing 
camps, but not much change: Nicolás Maduro remains the 
nation’s de facto president. The latest negotiations between 
representatives of Maduro and the opposition, under the 
leadership of the Norwegian government, failed. Fortunately, 
at least the International Contact Group (ICG) keeps trying to 
support a peaceful and democratic solution to the crisis. The 
ICG, established in January 2019, consists of the European 
Union and seven of its member states – France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal and Spain – the United 
Kingdom and five Latin American countries – Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Panama and Uruguay. Its aim is to arrive at 
free and fair presidential elections, through a peaceful and 
democratic process that is “Venezuelan”, i.e. not imposed from 
the outside. This process requires that full democracy in all 
its dimensions be restored, from the rule of law to respect for 
human rights, from the separation of powers to respect for the 
constitutional mandate of the country’s institutions, starting 
with the democratically elected National Assembly. All this 
said, it seems unlikely that the 2020 legislative elections will be 
free and fair. Nicolás Maduro’s moves early in the year suggest 
that his objective is to obtain control of the National Assembly, 
and to hold new elections soon after, although this means that 
Latin America and the New Global Order124
they are unlikely to be truly democratic. As in previous years, 
Maduro will probably manage to manipulate the electoral 
process so that only weak candidates will appear in the ranks of 
the opposition while making a strong appeal for the Chavista 
electorate to go to the polls. He is also likely to insist that 
the main responsibility for the economic and social crisis lies 
with the “American imperialists” and their sanctions and that 
the situation has been improving thanks to the political and 
economic policies of the past few months. Perhaps it is time for 
the Venezuelan opposition to reconsider its strategy and enter 
into discussions with the Chavistas: Guaidó’s attempt to replace 
Maduro as president seems to have failed mainly because the 
latter still has the support of the military and much of the 
population.
6.  Mexico’s New Foreign Policy: 
     Between Pragmatism and Principism
Rafael Velázquez Flores
In 2018, the beginning of a new presidential administration in 
Mexico brought great expectations of change and continuity 
in domestic and foreign policy. This new term is particularly 
significant for Mexico because, for the first time, the president 
comes from a leftist political party. Moreover, the chosen 
candidate, Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), won 
the election by an ample margin, obtaining 53% of all votes 
nationally. No president has received such support in recent 
times and this gave the president real democratic legitimacy on 
taking office. 
Interest in change and continuity in foreign policy is relatively 
new for scholars of the Mexican political system. Years ago, no 
one worried about who was going to win the election because 
Mexico had a system with one dominant party. From 1930 to 
2000, the official party, Partido Revolucionario Intitucional 
(PRI), always won the presidential elections, gained all the seats 
in Congress and held all the state governorships. So, the Mexican 
political system was characterised by strong presidentialism, 
with power centralised in the Head of State. This led to no great 
expectations about radical changes in foreign policy because the 
system reproduced some degree of continuity in Mexico’s foreign 
relations. Interest in studying such patterns arose in 2000 when 
the PRI lost the presidential election for the first time in almost 
70 years. Since then, variations and continuities have occurred. 
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In this context, the main purpose of this chapter is to analyse 
Mexico’s foreign policy under a leftist administration at the 
beginning of a six-year term. The key argument is that, in 
his first year in power, AMLO’s foreign policy has had three 
key characteristics. First, there has been a pattern of change 
and continuity. His administration has maintained some 
international policies implemented by past governments and, 
at the same time, it has transformed others. Secondly, the new 
administration has adopted a pragmatic approach and, at the 
same time, has developed a foreign policy based on Mexico’s 
traditional tenets, such as non-intervention, self-determination, 
peaceful dispute resolution and so on. Thirdly, the first year of 
the AMLO administration has seen a pattern of conflict and 
cooperation, particularly with the United States. 
This paper is divided into five parts. The first one provides 
a brief historical background to help understand Mexico’s 
contemporary foreign policy. The second describes the basic 
elements of the new administration’s foreign policy planning. 
The idea is to identify the key goals. The third part examines 
Mexico’s relations with the United States in the first year of 
President Andrés Manual Lopez Obrador. The goal is to 
find the main patterns for such diplomatic interaction. The 
next section analyses Mexico’s foreign policy towards Latin 
America, especially Venezuela and Bolivia since they have been 
controversial for Mexico both domestically and internationally. 
The last part reviews other regions such as Europe, Africa 
and Asia, looking particularly at Chinese-Mexican ties. Once 
AMLO took power, there was a mutual interest to further this 
bilateral relationship after Donald Trump initiated a trade war 
in which both countries were involved.
Mexico’s Foreign Policy: A Brief Background
After the Mexican Revolution at the beginning of the XX 
century, the country opted for a nationalistic and defensive 
foreign policy in response to past external interventions and 
Mexico’s New Foreign Policy 127
loss of territory. The main features of the PRI’s foreign relations 
were close ties to Latin American countries and an opposite 
approach to the United States because of its “imperialistic” 
and interventionist policies in Latin America. However, during 
World War II, Mexico worked closely with Washington to 
overcome the Nazi threat. Throughout the Cold War, the PRI 
tried to remain neutral and maintain a nationalistic approach 
in the midst of the West-East confrontation. The Mexican 
government also attempted to foster a relatively autonomous 
position vis-à-vis Washington1. The combination of solidarity 
with Latin America and independence from the United States 
was broadly supported domestically. This formula provided the 
PRI with legitimacy and political control, aspects it needed to 
consolidate power. In essence, foreign policy was primarily for 
domestic consumption2.
Mexico also participated actively in world organisations, 
predominantly on peace and cooperation issues. For instance, 
it proposed the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1967, which prohibits the 
development of nuclear energy for military purposes in Latin 
America. In the 1970s, the PRI also put forward the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, which was approved by 
the UN General Assembly in 1974. Mexico also became a leader 
of the Third World and defended weak states in international 
fora. In general, these actions gave Mexico global prestige and a 
positive image in the world arena during the Cold War.
Since the Mexican political system was characterised by strong 
presidentialism, the Executive branch largely monopolised 
the foreign policy decision-making process. There was little 
counterbalance. Congress was practically a rubber-stamping 
body, approving all foreign policy initiatives from the president. 
The Constitution allowed this as it provided broad prerogatives 
1 See M. Ojeda, Alcances y limites de la política exterior de México, Mexico, El 
Colegio de México, 1976.
2 See R. Keller “A Foreign Policy for Domestic Consumption: Mexico’s 
Lukewarm Defense of  Castro, 1959-1969”, Latin American Research Review, vol. 
47, no. 2, 2012, pp. 100-119.
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to the Executive and limited the power of the Legislative body. 
Thus, the president played a key role in the formulation and 
implementation of Mexico’s foreign policy.
At the end of the 80’s and beginning of the 90’s, Mexico’s 
foreign policy changed significantly. The country went through 
a severe financial crisis and the government had to establish 
a different economic development strategy. From a trade 
protectionist model, Mexico went towards an open market 
in which free trade and attracting foreign investment were 
key components. Then, the Mexican government opted for 
an economic integration process with North America and 
became a trade partner with the United States and Canada. In 
this context, Mexico signed the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992. 
In 2000, for the first time in 70 years, the PRI lost the 
presidential election to a conservative political party, Partido 
Accion Nacional (PAN). The new administration, headed by 
Vicente Fox, maintained continuity in foreign economic policy, 
but implemented significant changes in Mexican diplomatic 
relationships. For instance, the PAN sought closer relations 
with Washington, but Fox was involved in some diplomatic 
crises with Latin American countries, such as Cuba, Venezuela, 
Argentina and Bolivia. In 2006, the PAN retained power and 
the new president, Felipe Calderon, largely continued with Fox’s 
foreign policy. The PRI regained the presidency in 2012 and, in 
general terms, there were no significant changes. The Enrique 
Peña administration tried to maintain a stable relationship with 
the United States, and was one of the main critics of populist 
regimes in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela.
Presidential Campaign and  
Foreign Policy Planning 2018-2019
During the 2018 campaign, foreign policy was not a relevant 
issue. As a presidential candidate, Andrés Manuel Lopez 
Obrador paid little attention to external matters, that is, foreign 
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policy was not his priority. For instance, in a presidential debate 
on the subject, the candidate stated “the best foreign policy is 
domestic policy.” With this, AMLO sent a clear message that, 
in his administration, international relations would not be a 
public policy priority3. The issue was also not a key topic for 
the political programme of the party alliance that supported 
Lopez Obrador. One of the proposals was even Mexico would 
develop a “non-leading” and “prudent” foreign policy4. In other 
words, the idea was to keep Mexico isolated from key world 
events. In the same document, the approach was to maintain a 
foreign policy consistent with a domestic policy that responds 
to Mexico’s national interest.
In his campaign speeches, AMLO was in favour, among other 
aspects, of: respecting the human rights of migrants; protecting 
the environment; establishing a long-term strategy with Latin 
America; identifying areas of opportunity with Europe; and 
trade facilitation with Asia, Africa and the Middle East. He also 
suggested a new approach to the US-Mexican relationship, in 
which respect and cooperation would prevail. In this context, 
AMLO openly declared himself in favour of free trade and 
defended NAFTA against Trump’s criticism. This implied that, 
at least in the short term, Lopez Obrador had no intention to 
modify Mexico’s foreign economic policy. So, continuity was 
foreseeable in this sphere.
The day he won the election, AMLO received congratulations 
from many different people around the world for his 
overwhelming victory. Even the president of the United States, 
Donald Trump, congratulated him on his triumph despite 
coming from a leftist party. Most Latin American presidents 
called him to extend a special acknowledgment. As president-
elect, AMLO met high-profile representatives from foreign 
governments, such as Mike Pompeo, the US State Secretary, 
3 C. Zissi, “Signals of  AMLO’s Future Foreign Policy for Mexico”, Council of  
the Americas, July 2018.
4 R. Velazquez, “La política exterior de México en las campañas electorales a la 
presidencia de 2018”, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, May 2018.
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and many ambassadors from different countries. These meetings 
showed there was worldwide interest in Mexico´s new leftist 
administration.
As a result of the election, the new president obtained a 
“democratic bonus” that provided some “soft power” that could 
be used for foreign policy objectives. However, It seems that 
Lopez Obrador was not willing to take advantage of this. For 
example, he did not make any international visits between the 
election and his inauguration, as former presidents had often 
done. The interpretation was that AMLO did not have much 
interest in global affairs.
In his inauguration speech, Lopez Obrador declared that “in 
matters of foreign policy we will comply with the constitutional 
principles of non-intervention, self-determination, the peaceful 
resolution of conflict and international cooperation.” In a 
message to the presidents of the United States and Canada, 
AMLO proposed “to go beyond NAFTA and reach an 
investment agreement between companies and governments 
of the three nations”. With this message, AMLO outlined 
his first steps in foreign policy. First, his decisions would be 
based on traditional principles to foster friendly relations with 
all countries. Secondly, Lopez Obrador agreed with free trade, 
which implied continuity in foreign economic policy. Several 
presidents of various countries attended AMLO’s inauguration. 
The presence of several heads of state showed his power to bring 
people together and the positive image generated by AMLO’s 
unquestionable election victory.
In the National Plan for Development 2019-20245 (PND 
in Spanish), the leftist administration emphasised Mexico’s 
foreign policy tenets, meaning AMLO would conduct foreign 
relations, in his six-year term, based on the aforesaid principles, 
which are set out in the Constitution. For the Latin America 
5 In Mexico, a new administration has to, by law, delineate a National Plan for 
Development. Policy in the six-year term has to be based on such plan. See 
Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-2024, https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.
php?codigo=5565599&fecha=12/07/2019.
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region, the president proposed a friendly relationship with 
each country because of cultural and historic similarities. For 
North America, the PND admitted the United States was the 
main foreign policy priority for Mexico and that the AMLO 
government would conduct the relationship with “mutual 
respect”, “cooperation”, and “negotiated solutions to common 
problems”. The PND also stated the government would defend 
and protect Mexicans abroad, especially in the United States. 
It is evident the new administration’s foreign policy planning 
did entail certain changes, but also a degree of continuity. AMLO 
promised Mexico’s diplomatic ties would be built on traditional 
principles, but in the economic sphere, it seems his government 
is more inclined towards a pragmatic approach. 
Mexico’s Foreign Policy in the First Year 
of a Leftist Administration
Note has already been made that AMLO was not overly 
interested in world affairs at the beginning of his term. However, 
his first year has shown him international events matter for 
Mexico. In 2019, his government became involved in a few 
diplomatic crises. Most of these involved the United States, 
but there were also problems with Venezuela, Bolivia and other 
countries. These will be explored in greater detail below. 
US-Mexican Relations Under the AMLO Administration: 
Conflict and Cooperation
The US-Mexican relationship is inherently very complicated. 
Three issues dominate the bilateral agenda: migration, security 
and trade. Before NAFTA, Mexico adopted a nationalistic 
foreign policy, which caused tensions with Washington. 
Migration and security were sources of conflict because the 
Mexican government did not agree with US immigration policy 
and tried to avoid US interference in security issues. After the 
treaty, both countries began cooperating, mainly in the economic 
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sphere. During the Barack Obama administration, the bilateral 
relationship moved along with no significant complication. 
However, when Donald Trump announced he would run for 
president, he stated he would cancel NAFTA because it was 
not a “good deal” for the US. Similarly, he claimed Mexican 
migrants were rapists and drug dealers and proposed building 
a “wall” along the border to halt illegal migration and illicit 
drugs. As a result, bilateral relations were thrust into a spiral of 
conflict. 
Since he became president in 2018, Andrés Manuel Lopez 
Obrador has been very cautious in his approach to Washington6. 
From the beginning, he has stated he would not confront Donald 
Trump to avoid damaging the bilateral relationship. However, 
public opinion sees this as AMLO doing little to defend 
Mexico´s sovereignty against Washington. For example, in early 
March 2019, Donald Trump declared a national emergency at 
the border because of immigrants and drug trafficking7. His 
goal was to obtain the necessary funds to build the wall since 
the US House of Representatives, dominated by Democrats, 
had denied him the required resources. Public opinion was 
critical of AMLO because there was no official statement from 
the president or the Foreign Affairs Ministry (SRE in Spanish). 
AMLO was clearly not willing to confront Trump in an effort 
to avoid unnecessary conflict. At the end of the same month, 
Donald Trump claimed AMLO was not doing anything to stop 
migrants crossing through Mexico to reach the United States 
and so he threatened to close the border. AMLO’s response was 
very weak, saying “Trump has a legitimate right to make such 
statements”8. 
6 G. Weeks, “AMLO’s cautious foreign policy”, The Global Americans, February 
2019.
7 “President Donald J. Trump Stands by His Declaration of  a National Emergency on Our 
Southern Border”, The White House, 15 March 2019. 
8 “López Obrador calificó de ‘legítimo’ el reclamo de Trump a México por 
migrantes” (“López Obrador described Trump’s claim to Mexico as “legitimate” 
for migrants”), The World News, 28 March 2019.
Mexico’s New Foreign Policy 133
Things worsened in May when Trump threatened to impose 
new trade tariffs on Mexican goods if the AMLO administration 
failed to halt the Central American caravans crossing through 
Mexico en route to the United States9. AMLO’s swift response 
was to send Marcelo Ebrard, his Foreign Affairs Minister, to 
negotiate with the Trump administration to avoid more tariffs. 
Ultimately, both parties reached an agreement. The Mexican 
government agreed to send the National Guard to control 
the border and Washington promised to postpone new tariffs 
on Mexican exports if Central American migration slowed10. 
Public opinion was again critical of AMLO for changing his 
campaign promises since he had guaranteed respect for the 
human rights of migrants crossing the border.
Security issues were also controversial topics in the bilateral 
relationship. By the end of 2019, two events had had an impact 
on both countries. First, the Mexican authorities detained 
Ovidio Guzman, a son of the famous drug cartel kingpin, “El 
Chapo Guzman”. However, his accomplices took over several 
streets in the city of Culiacan and shot military and police 
offices to demand his liberation. Officials released him “to 
avoid a bloodbath”. Later, members of a Mexican-American 
family were killed near the US border by competing drug 
gangs. Women and kids were murdered in horrific fashion. 
These incidents proved the Mexican authorities lacked security 
control. As a consequence, Donald Trump threatened to tag 
Mexican drug cartels as “terrorist groups” to help AMLO´s 
government fight them11. Such a measure would have had 
many implications, such as US military force being used against 
those cartels. AMLO’s government and Mexican society were 
9 A. Karni, A. Swanson and M.D. Shear, “Trump Says U.S. Will Hit Mexico With 
5% Tariffs on All Goods”, The New York Times, 30 May 2019.
10 K. Sieff  and M.B. Sheridan, “Mexico is sending its new national guard to the 
Guatemala border. The mission is unclear”, The Washington Post, 10 June 2019.
11 L. Stack and K. Semple, “Trump Says U.S. Will Designate Drug Cartels in 
Mexico as Terrorist Groups”, The New York Times, 26 November 2019.
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against such a move12. Once again, conflict arose in the bilateral 
relationship.
In November, a top US government official, William Barr, the 
US Attorney General, travelled to Mexico City to settle matters 
directly with President Lopez Obrador13. These discussions 
culminated with several agreements and cooperation prevailed. 
Donald Trump vowed not to tag cartels as terrorists and Mexico 
guaranteed more collaboration on this front. Those were not 
the only arrangements. Days later, US authorities announced 
the detention of Genaro Garcia Luna, a former Secretary of 
Public Security in the Felipe Calderon administration. He was 
accused of having links with drug cartels. 
Not only was there security cooperation, but also economic 
cooperation. In December 2019, both governments announced 
a new version of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement 
(USMCA), which replaces NAFTA14. The day before AMLO 
took power in 2018, Mexico, Canada and the United States 
had signed this trade treaty after months of negotiations. 
However, democrats in the House did not totally agree with 
the first version and they did not want to approve it because 
it would have meant a triumph for Donald Trump. After days 
of tough negotiations, both governments announced they had 
reached a new understanding. This second version of USMCA 
included new rules of origin, stricter regulations to protect the 
environment, and new labour standards. Cars made in Mexico 
now need to have 70% of parts sourced in North America. 
Likewise, the Mexican government has to provide labour benefits 
for Mexican workers in its automotive industry15. These new 
12 M.B. Sheridan, “Five reasons Mexico objects to Trump’s plan to designate its 
cartels as terror groups”, The Washington Post, 27 November 2019.
13 K. Sieff, “Barr’s meeting in Mexico could be prelude to greater U.S. involvement 
against drug cartels”, The Washington Post, 5 December 2019.
14 E. Cochrane and A. Swanson, “Trump Aides and Democrats Agree on Trade 
Pact With Mexico and Canada”, The New York Times, 10 December 2019.
15 D. Lee, E. Stokols, and P.J. Mcdonnell, “White House and House Democrats 
reach accord on updated NAFTA”, Los Angeles Times, 10 December 2019.
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rules were favoured by US workers and so Democrats supported 
the measures.
This kind of cooperation was not without conflict. The 
agreement included labour attaches to monitor compliance 
with labour regulations in Mexican factories. Sectors of Mexican 
society did not agree with this measure because it was a violation 
of Mexican sovereignty. Many of Trump’s decisions involving 
Mexico were, admittedly, largely for domestic consumption. In 
2019, Donald Trump was extremely focused on re-election and 
so used Mexico as a scapegoat to woo US voters. Migration, 
trade and security are key issues for US public opinion. And 
Trump’s approach, it should be noted, is always to threaten first 
to force a better deal during negotiations. 
The pattern of conflict and cooperation is very clear in 
Mexico’s foreign policy towards the United States. When 
conflict arose, both governments were willing to negotiate and 
reach satisfactory understandings and to broadly cooperate. 
Similarly, AMLO has adopted a more pragmatic approach 
to Washington. His administration has given ground on 
migration and security issues to secure free trade. Economic 
indicators, such as GDP growth and foreign investment, are 
more important in AMLO’s view.
Mexico’s Foreign Policy Towards Latin America: 
Change and Continuity
The Latin American-Mexican relationship started well under a 
leftist administration. AMLO invited several presidents from the 
region to his inauguration on 1 December 2018. That day, he 
met with some Central American heads of state and they signed 
an agreement to establish a Comprehensive Development Plan 
(PIC in Spanish). The idea was to invest in the subregion to 
spark economic development and avoid migration. The pact 
was well received by the leaders. But the big problem was getting 
the required financial resources. One option was to involve the 
United States in the project, but that would be difficult. Later, 
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the SRE announced Mexico had reached an agreement with the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) to establish a plan to finance the PIC16.
The substantive change in Mexico’s foreign policy could 
be seen in the first few days of 2019. First, the Lima Group 
ignored Maduro’s government after it had been re-elected in 
a rather dubious election in 2018. On that occasion, Mexico’s 
government refrained from supporting the resolution17. This 
action was the first time AMLO’s foreign policy moved against 
Venezuela, a step away from the previous administration. In his 
speech, the Mexican representative said Venezuela was a “priority” 
for Mexico in its international relations and proposed finding 
a negotiated solution to the Venezuelan crisis, as originally 
proposed by the Lima Group. In addition, he said Mexico 
was committed to non-intervention, cooperation and human 
rights. It is important, though, not to downplay the radicalising 
effect on the Lima Group of right-wing governments coming to 
power in Brazil and Colombia. In response, Mexico proposed a 
more cautious path to resolve the conflict in Venezuela.
On 10 January, the Organization of America States (OAS) 
approved a resolution to declare Nicolas Maduro illegitimate18. 
Mexico also abstained at that meeting. Later, the regional 
organisation demanded “new elections” be held in Venezuela. 
The problem was the AMLO government was ignoring OAS 
Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, 
which compel American States to defend and promote 
democracy in the region. AMLO’s government preferred to 
guide Mexico’s foreign policy towards the principle of non-
intervention, which is included in the Mexican Constitution. 
16 “Foreign Ministers of  El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico Presented 
Comprehensive Development Plan in the Framework of  the Conference on the 
Global Compact for Migration”, The Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Press Release, 10 December 2018.
17 “Lima Group abstention marks shift in Mexican foreign policy”, The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 11 January 2019.
18 “OAS Permanent Council Agrees ‘to not recognize the legitimacy of  Nicolas 
Maduro’s new term’”, Organization of  America States, Press Release, 10 January 2019.
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The domestic political situation in Venezuela worsened 
on 23 January when Juan Guaidó proclaimed himself 
interim president. In an official statement, the SRE stated 
the government would not “ignore a government with which 
Mexico has diplomatic relations”19. This statement was not 
greeted favourably in all parts of Mexican society, with some 
seeing AMLO as taking Maduro’s side and Mexico as implicitly 
supporting an undemocratic dictator who violated human 
rights.
For Venezuela, AMLO opted for a “principist” foreign 
policy, marking a significant change from the Enrique Peña 
administration. It seems this stance reflected AMLO’s lack of 
interest in foreign affairs. It also seems this policy was mainly for 
domestic consumption since, in the past, a “principist”  foreign 
policy generated internal consensus and legitimacy. However, 
the decision increased political polarisation in Mexican society. 
A similar situation arose some months later. In Bolivia, Evo 
Morales resigned the presidency after a dubious election. The 
Bolivian army and police suggested Morales leave the country. 
Mexico’s government interpreted this as a coup d’état and 
offered Morales political asylum20. Morales accepted and went 
to Mexico. Once again, the decision polarised public opinion as 
many people saw Morales as a dictator who sought re-election 
to a third term through fraudulent means. The situation 
worsened when the Mexican embassy housed nine officials from 
Morales’s Cabinet. The new Bolivian government organised 
strict surveillance of the embassy and Mexico complained. 
After an incident involving Spanish bodyguards who went 
to collect Spanish diplomats from the Mexican embassy, the 
Bolivian government declared the Mexican Ambassador 
19 “México se apega a sus principios constitucionales y respalda llamado de las 
Naciones Unidas”, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Comunicado de Prensa 
no. 012, 23 January 2019.
20 “Position of  the Government of  Mexico on Granting Asylum to Evo Morales”, 
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Press Release 397, 11 November 2019. 
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persona non-grata and expelled her from the country21. This left 
AMLO’s administration in the midst of a diplomatic crisis with 
Bolivia.
In the economic realm, the leftist administration has also adopted 
some continuity in foreign policy. From the beginning, AMLO 
supported the Pacific Alliance, which is an economic integration 
process for Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. This mechanism 
fosters free trade and cooperation in several areas among the four 
members. It has become one of the most important integrative 
instruments in the region because it takes a pragmatic approach, 
the negotiation process moves forward swiftly and it had proven 
to be effective in recent years. For these reasons, many countries 
around the world are interested in the Pacific Alliance and have 
asked to be included in the list of observers.
Traditionally, Mexico has also played an active role in the 
OAS. However, the new administration has had its differences 
with the regional organisation, particularly in the cases of 
Venezuela and Bolivia. AMLO’s positions do not necessarily 
coincide with those of the body and tensions have arisen. For 
instance, Mexico refused to support an OAS resolution to ignore 
Nicolas Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela. As for 
Bolivia, the OAS also categorised the presidential election, in 
which Evo Morales was re-elected, as fraudulent, but Mexico 
defended him when he was ousted. 
Against such a backdrop, the Mexican government has 
resorted to a more active role in the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States (CELAC in Spanish). This 
multilateral mechanism was created in 2010 and aims at 
consolidating a multilateral forum to discuss regional and 
shared interests without the United States and Canada. In 
2020, Mexico took over the presidency of CELAC and set a 
goal to present new initiatives to further economic cooperation 
and understanding among members. 
21 “Bolivia says it’s expelling Mexican ambassador”, The Washington Post, 30 
December 2019.
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In summary, Mexico’s foreign policy towards Latin America 
in the first year of a leftist administration was characterised 
by three patterns: continuity and change, pragmatism and 
principism, conflict and cooperation. There was continuity in 
the foreign economic policy, but there was significant change 
in the diplomatic sphere, notably the cases of Venezuela and 
Bolivia. There was also an oscillation between a policy based 
on traditional tenets and a practical approach. AMLO’s foreign 
stance produced diplomatic conflict (as per the case of Bolivia) 
but also fostered cooperative ties, such as the Comprehensive 
Plan of Development with Central America.
Mexico`s Relationship with Other Regions:  
The Search for Economic Diversification
The United States and Latin America are demonstrably the 
most important relationships for Mexico. Other regions are 
significant, but they are not a priority for Mexico’s foreign policy, 
especially the new leftist administration. Europe is important 
because of Mexico’s historical links, particularly with Spain. 
Europe is also economically important as Mexico signed a free 
trade agreement with the European Union in 2000. Europe is 
an option for economic diversification, trade and investments. 
Asia is also an important region to Mexico for the same reasons. 
When the Mexican government opened up the market to the 
world in the 1980s, Europe and Asia became strategic zones for 
Mexico’s trade and for the goal of diversification. Both regions 
are interested in Mexico, especially after NAFTA. They want 
access to the US market and Mexico is an excellent platform 
for this.
In Asia, China plays an important role for Mexico. Bilateral 
trade and Chinese investments in the country have increased 
significantly in recent years. China has long had an eye on 
Latin America and, as such, Mexico is an excellent option both 
because of its huge economy and because it is next to the United 
States. There were some bilateral problems in the Enrique Peña 
Latin America and the New Global Order140
period because its government cancelled certain infrastructure 
projects in which Chinese investors were involved. However, 
the AMLO administration has tried to reconcile affairs. When 
Donald Trump threatened to increase trade tariffs for Mexican 
exports, Mexico’s government saw China as a direction for 
trade. 
In the context of the US-Chinese trade war, Mexico benefited 
slightly with a small increase in international trade. However, 
USMCA includes a clause preventing Mexico from signing a 
free trade agreement with a “non-market country”22. This is a 
direct reference to China. In essence, the US government forced 
the inclusion of a clause that prevents Mexico and Canada from 
signing a trade treaty with China. This was within the context 
of the trade war between China and the US in 2019.
Despite this clause, AMLO’s government has tried to build 
a closer relationship with China. The president did not travel 
abroad in 2019, but he sent his Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Marcelo Ebrard, to China to settle matters with the Xi Jinping 
government23. The idea is to guarantee more investment and 
promote free trade between both sides. Mexico has a trade 
deficit with China and wants to reduce it. As for now, China 
is very interested in some new infrastructure projects in Mexico 
in which they could participate, such as a new train route in the 
Yucatan peninsula and the construction of an oil refinery in Dos 
Bocas, Veracruz. In early 2002, some Chinese banks revealed 
they were interested in providing a loan for the refinery plan. 
Similarly, Chinese car companies announced they are planning 
to open a plant in Mexico to produce their vehicles. From a 
geopolitical perspective, China wants to export its Belt and 
22 Article 32.10 of  USMCA requires to notify three months in advance if  USMCA 
members “intend to begin free trade negotiations with non-market economies”. 
See United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Office of  the US Trade 
Representative, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
united-states-mexico-canada-agreement
23 “Primer Informe de Labores SRE 2018-2019”, Secretaria de Relaciones 
Exteriores, September 2019.
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Road Initiative (BRI) to Mexico and Central America24. Their 
geographical position, close to the US, makes them a strategic 
option for China to become a world hegemon.
Looking at other regions, Africa and the Middle East are 
practically forgotten areas for Mexico’s foreign policy. Trade 
is scarce in those zones and diplomatic ties are scant. Mexico 
only has six embassies in Africa. Even though AMLO promised 
friendly relationships with all countries in the world, interaction 
with those regions was meagre during the first year of his 
administration. 
Turning to the multilateral realm, the leftist government 
is trying to participate actively in different organisations. In 
2019, the SRE announced Mexico will seek a non-permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council for 2021/2022. The proposal 
somewhat contradicts the non-intervention principle since 
Mexico, if elected, would become involved in external world 
events. In early 2020, President Lopez Obrador and the UN 
Office in Mexico City inaugurated a centre to train Mexican 
military officials so they can take part in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations. The bid for the Security Council seat and support 
for Mexico’s involvement in UN operations reflect continuity 
with the PAN and Enrique Peña’s foreign policy since they 
initially proposed them. 
As has already been highlighted, AMLO did not travel abroad 
in 2019. For instance, he did not go to the G20 Meeting in 
Osaka, Japan. He sent Marcelo Ebrard to represent him. He 
also refused to be at the UN General Assembly when the 2019 
session period was opened in September. These decisions show 
AMLO is not interested in taking part, directly, in world affairs. 
He prefers to concentrate on domestic issues and to leave 
foreign affairs to the SRE.
24 The BRI is a key Chinese project adopted in 2013 that aims at constructing 
global infrastructure development and investments in several countries 
worldwide. See C. Devonshire-Ellis, “The Belt & Road Initiative in Mexico & 
Central America”, Silk Road Briefing, 27 May 2019.
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Conclusion
In the first year of a leftist administration, Mexico’s foreign 
policy has oscillated between change and continuity. In the 
economic sphere, AMLO defended free trade, as previous 
administrations had done. He backed USMCA and other 
integration mechanisms, such as the Pacific Alliance. His 
government changed Mexico’s stance on Venezuela significantly. 
The Enrique Peña administration was highly critical of Nicolas 
Maduro and demanded democratic reforms. When AMLO 
took power, he did not want to meddle in Venezuelan matters 
when Juan Guaidó was recognised as the new president of 
Venezuela. AMLO preferred to follow the non-intervention 
tenet.
AMLO’s foreign policy has also oscillated between pragmatism 
and principism. The decision to stop migrants at the southern 
border to avoid new US tariffs was a pragmatic decision. In 
the context of USMCA, accepting labour attaches to monitor 
Mexican compliance with the new labour regulations was also 
a practical measure. AMLO’s decisions in the Venezuelan and 
Bolivian cases are based on principism.
By the same token, Mexico’s world ties are characterised 
by cooperation and conflict. In the case of US relations, there 
were some disputes, mainly on migration, security and trade 
issues. However, both countries reached settlements to avoid an 
escalation of these conflicts. Mexican diplomacy was also drawn 
into a diplomatic crisis with Bolivia when President Jeanine 
Áñez expelled the Mexican Ambassador in La Paz in early 2020. 
In other contexts, Mexico has also proposed some cooperation 
mechanisms, such as the Integration Plan of Cooperation.
In all likelihood, AMLO’s foreign policy will follow the same 
trajectory in the next five years as it did in the first year. Mexico’s 
world stance will combine, at the same time, patterns of change 
and continuity, pragmatism and principism, and cooperation 
and conflict. In economic matters, it seems pragmatism will 
prevail. So, Mexico is likely to build a cooperative relationship 
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with the United States in the years ahead. AMLO will negotiate, 
in a cordially fashion, with Mexico’s neighbour to secure free 
trade and investments. With China, AMLO’s government 
will adopt the same approach. China will be an option for 
Mexico’s diversification of its economic ties. More specifically, 
AMLO’s administration will promote Chinese investments in 
key projects to encourage economic growth and the creation of 
jobs. Mexico will also look to other regions for this, like Latin 
America, Europe, Asia Pacific, Africa and the Middle East.
In diplomatic and political issues, it is likely that principles 
and traditional nationalism will guide Mexico’s foreign relations, 
particularly with Latin America. AMLO needs a nationalistic 
policy for domestic consumption. A closer relationship with the 
region will generate internal consensus and legitimacy, which 
are needed for the next presidential election. AMLO cannot 
be re-elected, but he will presumably work for MORENA, his 
political party, to prevail in 2024. As shown above, AMLO’s 
foreign policy has caused social and political polarisation when 
public opinion has criticised his decisions vis-à-vis the United 
States, Venezuela and Bolivia. 
Friendly relations with Latin America will also secure 
multilateral cooperation in key areas for contemporary Mexico, 
such as migration, security and economic prosperity. AMLO’s 
government will have the same goal for other geographical 
regions. Conflict will be present, especially with the United 
States in bilateral issues like migration, drug trafficking and 
trade. But it will be highly probable that both countries will 
negotiate their differences with mutual respect and cooperation. 
Trump needs to criticise Mexico to secure his re-election in 
2020. If he gets re-elected, there is a good chance bilateral 
conflict will decrease in his second term since he will no longer 
need to resort to attacking Mexico to get votes.
AMLO still thinks the best foreign policy is a “good domestic 
policy”. However, the first-year experience will, probably, make 
him change his mind. He needs to understand that foreign 
policy is a key instrument for economic, political and social 
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development. Therefore, he will need to pay more attention to 
the world and to invest in Mexico’s diplomacy. He will need 
this for a “good domestic policy”.
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